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The Positive- and Negative-Right Conceptions of Freedom of Speech and the Specter of 
Reimposing the Broadcast Fairness Doctrine ... or Something Like It 
Adam Fowler 
ABSTRACT 
 
A key theoretical debate underlying the now defunct Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) regulation known as the Fairness Doctrine is conflict over what 
constitutes the right to freedom of speech: a positive or negative conception. Similarly, 
since repeal of the Doctrine, other FCC measures to uphold the “public-interest” standard 
in broadcasting have relied on a positive conception of speech. This thesis demonstrates 
the history of this debate through court cases, news reports, scholarly articles and historical 
documents. It then is argued that the positive-right nature of these regulations is 
problematic philosophically, constitutionally and practically. The positive-right 
conception lends itself to an uncomfortable level of paternalism on the part of government 
regulators, a constitutional abridgement of negative-right speech and a tedious 
involvement of government in regulation that can lead to a chilling effect on speech. The 
conclusion then suggests further areas of research related to the topics covered in the thesis. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Introduction/Background 
One of the most notable and highly debated regulations of broadcast radio and 
television in the United States was a policy adopted in 1949 by the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) known as “The Fairness Doctrine.” The Doctrine 
held licensees to a “public-interest” standard which called for them to present reasonable 
opportunity for the airing of contesting points of view when covering issues of public 
importance to their community (FCC, 1949). Proponents, in light of the scarcity of 
broadcast outlets (frequencies and channels), viewed it as serving the public-interest 
necessity to foster a robust public dialogue that represented all voices from the public and 
not skewed to the side of the station owners‟ opinions; whereas opponents viewed it as a 
restriction on free speech, creating a “chilling effect” which led stations to stray away from 
covering any controversial public issues due to the requirement to present differing 
perspectives (Corry, 1987; Hershey, 1987). 
 The FCC did away with enforcement of the regulation in 1987 after it determined 
that such a chilling effect did exist and it was determined in court that the regulatory 
agency was not required by statute to enforce it (FCC, 1987; Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 
1987). Since then, periodic attempts, calls and suggestions have been made to reinstate the 
Fairness Doctrine or regulations similar to it over the past 20-plus years, with several 
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prominent Democrats voicing the most recent suggestions since their party has regained 
power in both Congress and the White House (Calderone, 2009b, 2009d, 2009e; Cusack, 
2008; Eggerton, 2007a). All attempts at reinstating the Doctrine have been unsuccessful, 
yet opponents still display worry over its potential return and proponents continue to voice 
their support for it periodically (“Despite Signs,” 2009). Conservative and Republican 
critics, lawmakers and talk radio hosts have gone further to argue that other seemingly 
innocuous calls for stricter media ownership rules, focus on public-interest obligations and 
regulations requiring more local input in programming (called “localism”) can be viewed 
as stealth attempts at achieving the goals of the Fairness Doctrine proponents without 
actually reinstating the Doctrine (Eberle, 2009; Eggerton, 2008b, 2009a; Limbaugh, 2009; 
Thompson, 2008). They view this as a way to stifle what has become a predominately 
conservative talk radio format.  
 One particularly important theoretical debate which the controversy over the 
Fairness Doctrine touches on is that over the distinction between what Isaiah Berlin (2002) 
dubbed “negative” and “positive” liberty. In a sense, the entire debate over the Fairness 
Doctrine and content regulation of the media can be related to this theory of a 
positive/negative-freedom dichotomy. Berlin believed that there were two strains or 
conceptions of freedom that had grown up along side each other and never really came into 
conflict with each other until around the time of his writing. He argued that this conflict 
could be exemplified in the Cold War and the differences in ideology of the capitalist, 
Western societies and the Communist societies. Both appealed to their own conceptions of 
freedom, however contrasting they may have been (Berlin, 2002). 
 Berlin‟s negative vision of freedom implies the absence of restrictions, force or 
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coercion on the part of others, particularly government. This conception holds that as long 
as an individual is not hindered from doing what he is capable of doing (not what he wishes 
to do, but what he is physically capable of) by outside forces, particularly government, he 
is said to be free. This conception is essentially one of non-interference (Berlin, 2002). 
 The positive conception of freedom involves the individual‟s desire to control 
himself. This vision holds that not only can an individual‟s freedom be hindered by other 
individuals or government but also by other factors such as the individual‟s emotions, 
impulses or socio-economic status. This conception often requires action or intervention 
on the part of others in order for the individual to realize his freedom, not just inaction or 
non-interference on the part of others like the negative conception (Berlin, 2002). 
 In the area of free speech, the tension between positive and negative freedom can be 
exemplified in a rather simple manner. At the heart of the tension is the question, “Is 
government responsible for actively fostering and ensuring a diverse and robust 
environment in which all opinions are heard, or is its responsibility to refrain from any 
action, allowing individuals to speak freely without government interference?” A positive 
conception of freedom is what is implied in the former notion. In its positive form, freedom 
of speech implies that government should be actively involved in ensuring all speech is 
presented to the public. The latter notion implies a negative conception of freedom. In its 
negative form, freedom of speech implies that government stay out of the way in terms of 
individuals exercising speech.  
 The differences in conceptions of freedom are indicative of the fact that 
disagreement abounds over the nature of freedom of speech and expression, which helps 
explain much of the debate over the Fairness Doctrine and other similar media regulations. 
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W.B. Gallie brought this issue of conceptual disagreement to the forefront in a 1956 essay 
titled “Essentially Contested Concepts.” Gallie argued that there are a range of concepts 
which people share in common that enable them to come to a certain degree of agreement 
in certain circumstances and disagreement in others. There may be a base understanding 
and agreement on the definition of such a concept but a large disagreement on the specifics 
of it. This disagreement stems from the normative, qualitative and abstract nature of the 
particular concepts (Gallie, 1956). 
  
Overview 
 This thesis will highlight areas in which the debate over the Fairness Doctrine 
relates to a more theoretical debate over what is the appropriate conception of freedom of 
speech: positive or negative? Case law, news articles, opinion pieces, previous scholarly 
work and official FCC and other government documents will be used to demonstrate the 
presence of this underlying theoretical contest over a positive versus negative conception 
of freedom of speech.  
 The next chapter will detail the positive- and negative-liberty dichotomy first 
explicitly expressed by Berlin. This dichotomy will be given as an example of what Gallie 
would call an “essentially contested concept.” 
A large purpose of the third and fourth chapters is to demonstrate how the 
positive-right/negative-right dichotomy has underlain the history of the debate over the 
Fairness Doctrine and similar public-interest regulation. The third chapter will be a history 
and background of the Fairness Doctrine and its use, including some background on early 
broadcast regulation leading up to the Doctrine as well as the removal of the Doctrine 
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(detailing the lead up to the FCC‟s decision and relevant court opinions). The fourth 
chapter will cover the attempts, calls and suggestions to revive the Fairness Doctrine, 
including the immediate reaction to removal in the late 1980s and periodic calls, 
murmurings and actions attempting to restore it in the last 20-plus years. It will also cover 
related public-interest regulations like localism and media ownership which seek the same 
result: diversity of viewpoint and a more informed democratic decision-making process. 
The fifth and perhaps most important chapter will argue against the positive-right 
conception of free speech exemplified in the Fairness Doctrine and similar broadcast 
regulation aiming for “fairness,” “diversity” and the “public interest.” These arguments 
will fall under three main areas of critique: a philosophical argument, a constitutional/legal 
argument and a practical argument. The paternalistic nature in which a positive-right 
conception of speech can take, the negative-rights nature of free speech that has developed 
in constitutional case law and the impracticality of government enforcing values like 
“fairness” and the more general public interest through other regulations like localism and 
ownership rules, as well as the “chilling effect” on speech that can result from positive 
action on the part of the government to regulate it, will all be used as evidence to support 
the general argument against the positive conception.  
The sixth and final chapter will act as a conclusion. It will summarize the thesis and 
the arguments made as well as suggest further areas of inquiry that could be made in future 
studies relating to the issues touched on in the thesis. 
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CHAPTER II 
CONCEPTUALIZING FREEDOM 
 
The Conceptual Debate    
 The Fairness Doctrine brought, and continues to bring, heated disagreement by 
those on all sides of the debate. Proponents and opponents alike often argue their side 
based on appeals to supposed common values and traditions in society they believe should 
be maintained, enhanced or returned. Chief among those values they portend to hold up as 
justifying their point of view has been free speech, and the broader First Amendment in 
general. Opponents argue that the Fairness Doctrine acts in a way to stifle the freedoms of 
speech, press and (in cases of religious broadcasts) religion due to a perceived 
encroachment of the regulatory arm of the government over broadcast content (Eggerton, 
2009a; Hentoff, 2007; LaRue, 2009). Proponents argue that the Doctrine upholds the 
broader First Amendment values of ensuring balanced, robust and informed discussion of 
controversial issues, free of station self-censorship. In their minds, the listener‟s right to 
receive information outweighs the speaker‟s right. (Kennedy, 2005; Lee, 1987).  
 What we find is that both those for and against the Doctrine appeal to the same 
concept: freedom. But how is it that this basic concept of freedom, more specifically 
freedom of speech, can be appealed to by both those for and against the Doctrine? What 
enables opposing sides to appeal to the same concept to justify their positions? Is one side 
simply ignorant of the meaning of the concept they are appealing to, or is there something 
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more complicated involved in the debate? One answer may be that the core concept itself, 
although nominally uniform, is one that is in actuality contested. It may be that the concept 
of freedom, on the surface, seems fairly conceptually clear but in actuality can be used by 
the opposing sides in different ways. 
 
Essentially Contested Concepts 
 W.B. Gallie (1956) brought this very issue to the forefront in his essay on 
“Essentially Contested Concepts.” Gallie argued that certain social concepts carry with 
them a degree of internal complexity and normative weight which can complicate their use. 
Members of society, even the most well-educated, may believe they hold the same 
understanding of these concepts but, in fact, may not. The source of this conceptual 
disagreement is largely the value-laden nature of the concepts in question. In other words, 
members of a society may be able to come to a certain degree of agreement on such social, 
and often political, terms in one instance, but they may strongly disagree on their use in 
other contexts based on the weight they put on certain aspects of the concept and the 
normative priorities they hold (Gallie, 1956). 
 The examples which Gallie gave to demonstrate this conceptual confusion were 
concepts like “democracy,” “art” and “the Christian tradition” (Gallie, 1956). For example, 
what characteristics of a society make it a democracy: its methods of voting, its degree of 
political freedom? What degree of each is necessary to meet the definition of democracy? 
While individuals may hold a general notion of what it means for a society to be dubbed a 
democracy, they may differ when it comes to the specifics. Another concept that may be of 
particular import to this thesis and can help elucidate the issue further would be “fairness.” 
 8 
For example, what makes a decision fair? What elements are needed either in the decision 
or the process to make the final outcome fair? Members of a society may often not 
necessarily agree on what is a fair outcome or presentation of sides. While we may hold a 
general agreement on what is meant by concepts like fairness, we may find disagreement 
on the specifics.  
 This disagreement can stem from the normative weight we put on certain elements 
of a concept‟s definition. While certain concepts used in social and political life could be 
argued to be value-neutral and descriptive, perhaps terms like “voting” or “education 
level,” there are others that cannot be strictly referred to as value-neutral or merely 
descriptive. The aforementioned concepts are examples of such, and there are many others. 
 As might be evident from the above examples, this idea of essentially contested 
concepts is of particular import to political terminology. In noting essentially contested 
concepts in the political realm, William Connolly (1993) demonstrated that, to a degree, 
the term “politics” itself can been viewed to be essentially contested. The range of 
instances that can be termed “political” are varying and often contextual, perhaps leading 
users of the concept to agree on its application to an occurrence in one instance and 
disagree in another (Connolly, 1993). 
In linking Gallie‟s contested concepts to the area of politics, Connolly went further 
to note that, “When groups range themselves around essentially contested concepts, 
politics is the mode in which the contest is normally expressed” (1993, p. 40). He argued 
that the contests over the conceptualization of such concepts relate to our “deepest 
commitments” and affect our society‟s politics in an important way (p. 40). He explained 
that:  
 9 
In convincing me to adopt your version of „democracy‟, „politics‟, or „legitimacy‟, 
you convince me to classify and appraise actions and practices in new ways; you 
encourage me to guide my own conduct by new considerations. And if I decide to 
repudiate your use, I am likely to range myself with others opposing the 
interpretations, strategies, and policies that express the judgments you would have 
us accept. (pp. 39 & 40) 
 
Politics, in this view, could be said to be an act in which opposing sides try to convince 
each other that their conceptualizations of issues and behaviors in a society are correct. 
Robert Grafstein (1988), in arguing for a realist approach to the study of contested 
concepts, perhaps noted it best when he said that such an approach would say: “. . . 
essential contestability does not characterize political concepts by accident. These 
concepts are essentially contestable because they are political.” (p. 26).  
 To the extent that social and political concepts are socially constructed within a 
society, their use can always be seen to be a matter of a certain degree of perspective. 
Objective, observable behaviors and actions by individuals take on new meaning when 
they are viewed in light of a particular set of conceptual meanings. It may be inappropriate 
to view such concepts as natural phenomena that can be observed objectively. Members of 
a society can use such terms in order for them to make better sense of their political life but 
may never come to a precise, agreeable definition of them. 
 
The Essential Contestability of Freedom 
 A concept that raises similar types of defining questions and is of specific import to 
this paper is the general concept of freedom, or more specifically “rights.” It should be 
noted here that the terms rights, freedom and liberty will often be used interchangeably in 
this thesis, while occasionally referring to rights as a more specific enumeration of what 
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constitutes the terms freedom and liberty
1
. Concepts of rights have a long and rich history 
in Western society. One could go as far back as the Old Testament to see protections for 
individuals as well as private property as indications of an acknowledgment of rights. 
Though this was not related to a notion of formal rights, it did represent an early precursor 
to such an idea (Pagels, 1979). The formulation of a formal concept of rights came later 
through the works of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and many succeeding political 
philosophers. As such, the scope of this thesis could not do this history justice, nor could it 
include the work of every philosopher who had an impact on the concept of rights. Rather, 
the main focus of this thesis will turn to the dichotomy of positive and negative liberty, first 
explicitly theorized by Isaiah Berlin in the late 1950s, to explain much of the debate over 
the Fairness Doctrine and related broadcast regulation (Berlin, 2002). 
 In recent times, one important formulation of what constitutes the components of 
the concept of rights came with the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. This fairly extensive list of rights was supposed to be geared toward creating a 
“common understanding of these rights and freedoms” (United Nations). In fact, some 
have called it authoritative in its catalog of rights (Henkin, 1989). However, a simple 
listing of the rights included in this document can quickly point out the problems with the 
notion that there is some common understanding of what constitutes the concept of rights 
or that it is the end-all/be-all authoritative catalog that all the world‟s people should adopt, 
as some have suggested. Rather, some would argue that it may be practically seen as a 
                                                 
1
 The term “rights” is virtually identical to the terms “freedom” and “liberty” in the U.S. Constitution. The 
Bill of Rights is put forth as a protection and guarantee of the freedom and liberty believed to belong to the 
people. It is in essence a type of operational definition of “freedom” or “liberty.” The connection between 
“right” and “liberty” or “freedom” becomes more problematic when referring to other charters of rights 
which include such welfare-oriented rights such as rights to a free education and a minimum wage. The 
difference between such charters and the Constitution will be noted in more detail later in this chapter. 
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general agreement on the idea of human rights, without adherence to the specified rights 
enumerated in the document – more of a pluralist approach (Messer, 1997). 
 Most Western countries that espouse a respect for human rights would no doubt 
agree with the rights to “life, liberty and security of person” noted in the document, and 
most would agree with the rights to “freedom of thought, conscience and religion.” But, 
what about the rights to “reasonable limitation of working hours” and “periodic holidays 
with pay”? Or, what about the right to a free “education”? (United Nations) To the degree 
that certain supposed rights are held up by the Declaration but not agreed to by all societies 
who espouse their support for the general notion of human rights, there could be said to be 
a conceptual disagreement over the term rights. 
 And to what degree can the conceptualization of a particular right, like that of free 
speech, be said to be uniform? In the example of free speech (of particular importance to 
this thesis), does the concept refer to government taking a hands-off approach or actively 
involving itself in fostering speech? Specifically dealing with freedom of speech or 
expression, the Universal Declaration states that such a right exists – leaving both a 
“hands-off” and a “fostering” interpretation possible, unlike the U.S. Constitution which 
implies, at least in its wording, a strictly “hands-off” interpretation on the part of 
government.  
 Clearly not every Western state secures all of these rights or a particular 
conceptualization of these rights as fundamental to their society – not to mention 
non-Western countries (to the extent that even the term “Western” is a completely clear 
concept). The concept of rights is one with obvious political implications. As such, it is 
prone to essential contestability just as any other political concept may be. Peter Jones 
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(1989) noted this constant dilemma with respect to the concepts of rights when he stated it 
this way:  
It is an unfortunate legacy of the natural rights tradition that people are sometimes 
still inclined to view argument over rights as though it must be argument over the 
existence of a single indisputable catalogue of rights. Many contemporary 
pronouncements on human rights also imply that that notion must incorporate a 
single uniform set of rights. But the concept of a right is one that can be 
accommodated in many different moral points of view and those who share the 
more specific idea of human rights may still have reason to disagree over what 
rights humans have and why. Consequently, to look for an end to argument over 
rights may be as absurd as to look for an end to moral and political argument itself. 
(p. 96) 
 
This demonstration of the disagreement that can occur over what specifically constitutes 
the value-laden and politically-charged concept of rights is related to the dichotomy first 
formally laid out by Berlin (2002). 
 
Positive and Negative Liberty: An Example of Freedom’s Essential Contestability 
 Berlin‟s 1958 essay, based on a lecture he delivered that year, spoke of two 
conceptions of liberty or freedom. He saw these conceptions as a key ideological 
difference that might explain the conflict between the West and communist countries 
(Berlin, 2002). 
 The first conception is that of non-interference. This conception says that a person 
is free so long as he is not prevented to act by others. It emphasizes actual coercion or 
interference from another person. In that sense, Berlin related it to Hobbes‟ notion that a 
man is free provided that he, “in those things, which by his strength and wit he is able to do, 
is not hindered to doe (sic) what he has a will to” (Hobbes, 1985, p. 262). This conception 
is not related to what the person may have the desire to do but rather what he can actually, 
physically do barring any constraints from others (Berlin, 2002).  
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Berlin called this first conception the “negative” view of liberty; it pertains to 
negative action from others or what they cannot do without violating an individual‟s 
freedom. In that sense, Berlin related this negative conception to the writings of Locke, 
Mill, Constant and Tocqueville, who all considered there to be certain areas of freedom for 
the individual in which no one (particularly government) could interfere without negating 
the individual‟s ability to use his freedom to reach ends which are considered to be “good 
or right or sacred” (Berlin, 2002, p. 171).  
Berlin was also careful in his essay to delineate between this concept of freedom 
and other human goals such as equality and justice. He noted that we should not confuse 
the presence of liberty with the presence of equality; just because a person is in poor 
economic conditions, this does not mean that he is not free. “Everything is what it is: 
liberty is liberty, not equality or fairness or justice or culture, or human happiness or a quiet 
conscience,” he wrote (Berlin, 2002, p. 172), adding:  
If the liberty of myself or my class or nation depends on the misery of a number of 
other human beings, the system which promotes this is unjust and immoral. But if I 
curtail or lose my freedom in order to lessen the shame of such inequality, and do 
not thereby materially increase the individual liberty of others, an absolute loss of 
liberty occurs.  (p. 172) 
 
Berlin argued that this loss of liberty may have resulted in an increase in his happiness or 
peace, but still his freedom has been damaged (Berlin, 2002).  
The last important component of this conception of liberty noted by Berlin is that it 
concerns the area or scope of the control over individuals, not who yields the control. That 
is what mainly distinguishes this first conception from the second (Berlin, 2002). 
 The second conception is what Berlin dubbed the “positive” conception of liberty. 
This conception involves the individual‟s desire to control himself, or be “his own master” 
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(Berlin, 2002, p. 178). This relates to the wish of individuals to be the sole and final 
determinant of their decisions and life. An individual‟s desire to direct his own course 
through life and determine his own way without any constraints or hindrances is what is 
captured by this conception of positive liberty. In this conception, the individual himself 
yields reasoned control over his life, not others. This conception is not concerned with the 
area of control but who is in control. Berlin related this second conception with the notion 
that there is a true self within individuals that acts with reason to attain its will. This idea 
poses that an individual‟s true will can be not only hindered by other individuals but by 
other factors such as his irrational emotions or misguided impulses (Berlin, 2002). 
It is this last point concerning positive freedom, the idea that an individual may not 
even be aware of his own true self or will, that Berlin was most critical of in his essay. 
Berlin saw this notion as a tipping point into paternalism – allowing others to abridge a 
person‟s negative rights in order to help them realize their true, reasoned self. In fact, he 
referenced Immanuel Kant when he wrote, “Nobody may compel me to be happy in his 
own way” and “paternalism is „the greatest despotism imaginable‟” (Berlin, 2002, p. 183). 
This paternalism is not unique to Berlin or Kant alone; many in the “liberal” 
tradition have warned against such paternalism – of note was Hayek just a decade or so 
earlier when he warned that such paternalism was leading us down a “road to serfdom” 
(Hayek, 1944). This paternalism resulting from the positive conception can in instances 
have the effect of treating others as if they were objects and not individuals with their own 
desires and wills. In fact, Berlin noted in his essay that this “positive” conception of 
self-mastery or self-direction could be easily translated into collective self-mastery or 
self-direction – essentially a movement that treats individuals as members of groups 
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aiming for collective governance (Berlin, 2002). 
 Charles Taylor (1985) referred to the positive conception as one in which “freedom 
resides at least in part in collective control over the common life” (p. 211), or “collective 
self-government” (p. 213). But Berlin repeatedly emphasized in his essay the notion that 
the ends of individuals are different and any attempt to claim a unified purpose or end, in a 
sense a unified standard of public interest
2
, is misguided and can lead to a type of 
despotism that tramples individual negative rights in the name of promoting a perceived 
common goal. Berlin, although acknowledging that the negative view could be construed 
to allow despotism provided that the despot does not interfere with the people‟s actions, 
places more emphasis on the positive view as potentially leading to such despotism in the 
form of paternalism (Berlin, 2002).  
 No doubt the pertinent example of such paternalism in the name of the freedom of 
man‟s “true self” at the time the essay was written could be seen in the growth of 
communism. At that time, the seeming contrast between communitarianism and 
individualism seen in the contrast between communism and capitalism played an important 
role in the political discourse and would continue to attract much attention by scholars even 
toward the end of the Cold War (Avineri & de-Shalit, 1992). In fact, Berlin pointed out that 
Marx was a proponent of the idea that there is a reasoned and true path for individuals that 
can be realized through proper understanding: “liberation by reason” (Berlin, 2002, p. 
190). Such a liberation in practice calls upon positive action by others, which is often in the 
form of government action, to enable individuals to reach such a state of self-realization or 
                                                 
2
 The wording of “public interest” used here is no mere coincidence. It will be shown in later chapters that a 
large part of arguments for the Fairness Doctrine, and much of the broadcast regulation in the United States 
that has developed since the advent of the medium, relies on appeals to the “public interest.” 
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fulfillment
3. As such, the type of “rights” stemming from the growth of socialism and 
communism that placed emphasis on economic and social conditions rather than individual 
property rights, because they involved positive action on the part of government rather than 
a hands-off, “negative” approach, have been dubbed “positive” rights4.  
 Berlin was careful to note that the negative and positive conceptions developed 
along side of each other, never really coming into clear conflict until more recent times (the 
divide between the West and communism being the example). As such, he noted that many 
philosophers, including Kant who warned against paternalism, had an element of each 
conception in their writings. He pointed out that a common assumption of many of the 
notable political philosophers, including from Locke to Rousseau to Marx, was the idea 
that “the rational ends of our „true‟ natures must coincide, or be made to coincide, however 
violently our poor, ignorant, desire-ridden, passionate, empirical selves may cry out 
against this process” (Berlin, 2002, p. 194). This conception, he held, meant that freedom 
to do what is “irrational” is not freedom and to “force empirical selves into the right pattern 
is no tyranny, but liberation” (Berlin, 2002, p. 194). He related this idea particularly to 
Rousseau and Kant, who held the notion that the willful surrender of our selves to the 
society (Rousseau) or to the law (Kant) does not mean we lose freedom but rather that we 
secure it.  
                                                 
3
 This wording of “realization” or “fulfillment” of rights is often used when referring specifically to 
welfare-oriented, positive rights (United Nations; United Nations Office). 
 
4
 The negative conception of liberty and its non-interference principle have generally been used to describe 
rights which involve a hands-off approach on the part of government and others – essentially leaving 
individuals alone. Other types of “rights” are left to be placed under the positive conception of liberty. 
However, it should be noted here that Berlin‟s original essay on the distinction between negative and positive 
liberty did not specifically outline what specific types of “rights” would fall under each concept of liberty. He 
did, however, allude to the fact that the contestation between the two concepts could be exemplified in the 
struggle between the Western, capitalist countries and their Communist counterparts. At times it is argued 
that certain provisions are required from a society in order for individuals to fully realize their positive 
liberty; such provisions have been termed “positive rights.” 
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 Berlin viewed these ideas as part of the rationalist approach to social science: the 
idea that the social sciences could be ordered in a way similar to the natural sciences, the 
notion that reason could create a uniform set of laws that would represents man‟s true self. 
As such, individuals, according to this view, should be educated to obey the laws which 
will make them rational. In essence, such a framework requires action on the part of the 
government to foster an environment which it believes is in accordance with promoting an 
informed and rational citizenry. Relating this back to despotism, Berlin showed how this 
attitude – the one that sees educating and leading individuals to follow reason – can easily 
be used by, and has often been used by, dictators to justify their actions. This conception 
leads those who believe they are acting with complete rationality to treat others who they 
believe are not acting rationally like children in need of correcting – thus justifying 
interference with them in the name of “liberty” (Berlin, 2002). 
 Berlin concluded his essay by noting that a degree of plurality is needed. He 
believed that the negative conception of liberty could better attain this, since it did not 
suppose one true goal of men or one set of laws that would reflect what all reasoned 
individuals would do, unfettered by emotions or conditions they finds themselves in. In 
demonstrating this belief, he pointed in a footnote to Jeremy Bentham who wrote that 
“Individual interests are the only real interests” (Berlin, 2002, p. 217). He believed that the 
negative conception at least acknowledged, as did he, that “human goals are many, not all 
of them commensurable, and in perpetual rivalry with one another” (Berlin, 2002, p. 216).  
 Berlin‟s dichotomy shows just that, a dichotomy – two similar but eventually 
divergent (historically speaking) conceptions. That dichotomy will be shown in this thesis 
to be of particular importance to the Fairness Doctrine debate. But Berlin would point out 
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that these two conceptions are by no means the only way of studying rights or human 
liberty. They are, however, one useful way.  
In fact, the varied criticisms of Berlin‟s essay, displayed in writings by those who 
believed that his two conceptions of liberty are not contrasting but complementary (Reed, 
1980), or that his analysis is at time confused (Kaufman,1962) or too skeptical (Kocis, 
1980), or that he, despite his warnings not to, confuses liberty with justice (Cohen, 1960), 
or that there is a way of conceptualizing positive liberty without yielding it to the influence 
of tyranny (Christman, 1991), show that his dichotomous conception is by no means the 
definitive way to look at liberty, nor is the idea of a dichotomy itself necessarily 
appropriate (MacCallum, 1967). This is not to mention the separate distinction that has 
been made between rights contained in the strict legal sense and those which are innate to 
human beings (Marshall, 1992). And then there are the criticisms, in recent decades, that 
previous conceptualizations of rights have perhaps placed too much emphasis on, and have 
been largely based on, the male perspective and neglected to encompass rights more 
related to women, as well as other minority groups (Pitanguy, 1997).  
To write on all of the conceptualizations of freedom would no doubt go beyond the 
scope of this thesis – particularly if one were not only to discuss the Western concepts of 
rights but also to delve into the varying non-Western approaches to respect for human 
dignity as examples of conceptualizations of rights (Donnelly, 1982). Berlin‟s dichotomy 
should be sufficient enough, however, to show how the conceptualization of such a 
fundamental notion to the study of politics as rights, or in the broader sense “freedom” or 
“liberty,” has been rife with controversy to the point that, although many would appeal to 
the notion that humans have rights, and might even agree on several fundamental specific 
 19 
rights, they would greatly differ on what their total list of rights would entail or what the 
definition of those commonly-accepted rights would entail. Words, in the end, can mean 
different things to different people, particularly in the realm of rights talk and 
conceptualization (Marshall, 1992). The particular conceptualization they hold of liberty or 
freedom will determine the operationalization of that concept into specific listings of rights 
and/or how those rights are defined and practiced. 
 That brings the discussion back to the United Nations Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. In this document, one can see elements of both negative and positive 
conceptions of human rights. One could argue that perhaps if it were written many years 
before, the rights commonly construed to be outgrowths of the positive notion of liberty, 
such as the aforementioned rights to education and paid holidays, might not have been 
included. Of note is the timing of the document. It came out at the end of World War II and 
the United States‟ newly found domination on the world scene. The culture in the United 
States at the time was one in which a focus on welfare, or as many would characterize 
positive, rights was made. An example of this trend‟s effect on the global scene can be seen 
not only in the U.N. Declaration but also in the new Japanese Constitution that was 
influenced by the American occupation – it has been interpreted by some to be an updated 
version of the U.S. Constitution to include more positive-right elements (Mixon & 
Wilkinson, 2000).  
But to say that the adoption of the Declaration meant that everyone in the world 
agreed upon the list of rights would be totally uncalled for. To even say that just because it 
was a trend in the U.S. to adopt the more positive conception of rights would necessarily 
mean that everyone in this country agreed on that conceptualization would be a far stretch 
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from reality. So, we are left with a seemingly definitive operationalization of the concept of 
human rights that is far from definitive in the minds of individuals, let alone social 
scientists, at the time. 
 This seeming attempt to get at the truly definitive definition of what the concept of 
freedom or liberty is through enumerated lists of rights is not new; it can be seen in the first 
amendments to the U.S. Constitution. The founders held in another declaration, the 
Declaration of Independence, that it was a matter of self-evident truth that all men were 
endowed with certain unalienable rights. Such statements about a clear, unadulterated 
concept of rights can be seen throughout the history of the development of the concept, 
with social scientists in recent times still continuing to attempt to formulate a way to make 
them universal to all and partial to no particular culture (O‟Manique, 1990). Yet, there can 
be found no clear understanding of what the concept of freedom, liberty or rights would 
specifically entail.  
 Jack P. Geise viewed talk of what constitutes freedom as “polemical,” adding: “… 
the subject, by its very nature, demands political judgments and precludes the value-neutral 
disposition. The concept of freedom, like that of democracy, has too much rhetorical and 
political force to be treated with a fictive neutrality” (Geise, 1985, p. 47). Geise quoted 
Gerald C. MacCallum in his article, who noted that the predilection to claim such a clear 
understanding of the concept can be seen as opposing sides attempting “to capture for their 
own side the favorable attitudes attaching to the notion of freedom”(Geise, 1985, p. 47; 
MacCallum, 1967, p. 313). Part of Geise‟s argument was that it becomes evident in many 
cases that the particular researcher or philosopher‟s own values can be seen to be supported 
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by their claims to truth concerning the concept of freedom (Geise, 1985)
5
. 
 
Positive and Negative Conceptions of Free Speech in the Fairness Doctrine Debate 
 Of particular import to this thesis is the conceptualization of freedom of speech or 
expression. In the area of free speech the tension between positive and negative freedom 
can be exemplified in a rather simple manner. At the heart of the tension is the question, “Is 
government responsible for actively fostering and ensuring a diverse and robust 
environment in which all opinions are heard, or is its responsibility to refrain from any 
action, allowing individuals to speak freely without government interference?”  
A positive conception of freedom is what is implied in the former notion. In its 
positive form, freedom of speech implies that government should be actively involved in 
ensuring all speech is presented to the public. The latter notion implies a negative 
conception of freedom. In its negative form, freedom of speech implies that government 
stay out of the way in terms of individuals exercising speech. This negative vision is 
exemplified in the First Amendment wording: “Congress shall make no law...” Notably, it 
does not say, “Congress shall ensure” or “Congress shall foster.” This exemplifies that the 
bulk of the United States Constitution could be said to be negative in respect to its vision of 
what the concept “freedom” entails. The text of the Bill of Rights in most cases puts limits 
on what the government can do, rather than empowering it to act positively on behalf of 
supposed common goals or ends.  
 The negative-rights wording in the Constitution can be viewed in somewhat of a 
                                                 
5
 In sum, the last several centuries have demonstrated the popularity of the concepts of “freedom,” “liberty” 
and “rights.” As such, the argument is that many individuals and groups have noticed the popular appeal of 
such concepts and have tried to link, however rightly or wrongly, their particular partisan ideas to these 
concepts in order to gain greater support for them.  
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contrast to the more positive-rights language used in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (United Nations). That Declaration, as noted earlier, contains what could be 
construed as both negative and positive rights. The impositions placed by the Constitution 
are negative ones which state the Congress or government cannot do certain things. The 
Declaration contains several more general statements which proclaim that rights exist, 
several of which would require positive action on behalf of government or others which 
would abridge certain negative rights. Specifically dealing with freedom of speech or 
expression, the Universal Declaration states that such a right exists – leaving a 
positive-right interpretation possible, unlike in the U.S. where the Constitution has been 
interpreted in case law to convey a more negative-right interpretation (United Nations). 
 The differences in conceptions of freedom that are exemplified in the U.S. 
Constitution and the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights are indicative of the fact that 
disagreement abounds over the nature of freedom generally and, pertinent to this thesis, 
freedom of speech and expression specifically. This implies that such freedom represents a 
contested concept, which helps explain much of the debate over the Fairness Doctrine and 
other similar media regulations. 
 Reviewing the history of arguments for and against media regulations such as the 
Fairness Doctrine, which will be done in detail in later chapters, helps to show how such 
regulation relies on appeals to a positive conception of the right to free speech – one which 
implies government fostering an environment where all viewpoints are given a reasonably 
equal level of prominence in the public dialogue. This positive-right conception of speech 
focuses on the supposed collective right of listeners to be afforded with a robust, fair and 
balanced presentation of political opinion. 
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A contrasting appeal comes from a negative-right conception of speech – one in 
which government refrains from regulating individual speech in order to leave the public 
“free” in terms of political and social debates. The negative conception would argue that 
placing government in a regulatory capacity over political and social speech necessarily 
acts in a way as a filter or censor on speech, creating what some have dubbed the “chilling 
effect” – something to be detailed later in the history sections. 
 The history will show that both sides of the argument – those for and against the 
Fairness Doctrine and/or similar regulations which have the same aim of a diverse 
presentation of views – appeal to the concept of rights, specifically the rights enshrined in 
the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. But how they conceptualize the First 
Amendment differs in a way that displays Berlin‟s dichotomy. One side appeals in rhetoric 
to the strict, literal interpretation of the First Amendment, “Congress shall make no law,” in 
arguing for a completely hands-off approach on the part of government in terms of 
regulating individual speech
6
. The other side rhetorically appeals to what they view as the 
underlying “values” of the First Amendment, which they construe as placing emphasis on 
the right of the public as a whole to be fully informed on matters of public discourse and 
importance (Kennedy, 2005; Lee, 1987). This contrast in interpretations of the First 
Amendment cannot be taken lightly. It has marked the debate and controversy over the 
Fairness Doctrine and the reasoning behind other regulation of the broadcast media 
throughout the history of radio and television. 
                                                 
6
 See Justice Douglas‟ concurring opinion in Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National 
Committee (1973) for an example of the negative-right argument against the Fairness Doctrine. In that 
opinion, Douglas wrote: “But the prospect of putting Government in a position of control over publishers is 
to me an appalling one, even to the extent of the Fairness Doctrine. The struggle for liberty has been a 
struggle against Government. The essential scheme of our Constitution and Bill of Rights was to take 
Government off the backs of people” (p. 162). 
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 This is why, although Berlin‟s dichotomy of two concepts of liberty is certainly not 
the only framework in which to view debates over rights, it is of particular relevance to the 
debate over broadcast regulation in the name of the “public interest.” This 
positive/negative dichotomy will be the guiding theory behind the discussion of such 
regulation that will follow in this thesis. While the theory itself may have its critics and 
shortcomings, the history of appeals made by both sides to the notions of freedom, liberty 
and rights demonstrate the particular importance of Berlin‟s dichotomy to understanding 
the debate over the Fairness Doctrine and other related public-interest regulation. The 
opposing sides, themselves, have demonstrated the importance of understanding how 
rights can be conceptualized either as positive or negative. This debate has been a prime 
example of the type of contestation that Connolly would argue results from the politics of 
Gallie‟s essentially contested concepts in practice. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE HISTORY OF THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE 
 
Introduction 
 The history of the rise and fall of the Fairness Doctrine is characterized, among 
other things, by appeals to the First Amendment from all sides of the debate. The 
theoretical issues discussed in the previous chapter explain the reasons for this. Throughout 
its roughly 40-year history, the Doctrine touched on sensitive issues involving the 
freedoms of speech and the press. 
  This chapter will highlight major events in the birth, life and death of the Fairness 
Doctrine and note throughout how they depict a conflict of visions over what constitutes 
“freedom” in terms of the aforementioned areas of First Amendment concern. A large part 
of the history of the debate centers on the question of whether that freedom is negative or 
positive. The following historical overview will also highlight some of the trials and 
pitfalls resulting from enforcement of the Doctrine.  
 
Early Years of Radio Regulation 
 To understand the history of the Fairness Doctrine, and similar broadcast regulation 
that evolved later, requires first a broad understanding of the fundamentals of the early 
years of broadcast regulation in the United States. Early regulation of the broadcast 
airwaves resulted from the problem of scarcity in radio frequencies. Because there were 
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only so many frequencies to broadcast on and many more people who wanted to use the 
airwaves, broadcast radio transmissions often conflicted with each other, leading to 
overlapping signals and confusion. 
 In an effort to correct this problem, the federal government sought to regulate the 
airwaves. So-called “radio conferences” were initiated by Republican President Warren G. 
Harding and then Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover. A key component of this 
framework developed at the conferences was the idea that the broadcast airwaves belonged 
to the people as a whole – public property not to be abused by private interests. At one of 
the conferences, Republican President Calvin Coolidge warned the attendees that either 
private or government control over the airwaves would be dangerous. Further emphasizing 
the perceived danger of private control of the airwaves
7
, Secretary Hoover, in the fourth 
conference, placed emphasis not just on ending the chaos of radio broadcast interference 
but also on the notion that the public as a whole should own the airwaves – noting 
specifically the freedom of the listener, not just of the speaker (Simmons, 1978). 
 Emerging from the push to regulate the airwaves would be the Radio Act of 1927, 
which enabled official licensing and allocation of signals to radio-station owners. It also set 
up the idea that the airwaves were owned by the public and not to be used exclusively for 
private gain. While it did not specifically mention a need for balanced presentation of 
controversial issues, there was debate on that subject in the legislative history of the 1927 
Act that was closely tied to a public-interest standard
8
. The 1927 Act created the forerunner 
                                                 
7
 Hoover also testified to Congress that he thought government should never censor material (CBS v. DNC, 
1973). 
 
8
 See Simmons (1978) for details on the legislative history of the Radio Acts and the links made in the 
legislative debates between the “public-interest” standard and a fair and balanced presentation of issues. Also 
see Arbuckle (2006) for more on this subject. 
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to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the Federal Radio Commission 
(FRC). The FRC regulated the industry in the name of “the interest, convenience, or 
necessity of the public” (FRC, 1927, p. 6). In a FRC report from 1927, a commissioner 
noted the FRC‟s “appalling” responsibility under the Act, given the scarcity of radio 
frequencies. He argued that such regulation would involve the FRC in determining that one 
broadcaster is “rendering a service of great value in the interest, convenience, or necessity 
of the public,” while finding another‟s “service of less value to the public,” which could 
mean denying a license to the latter (FRC, 1927, p. 6). 
 In the early 1930s, the FRC denied a license renewal for KGEF in California, and it 
succeeded in court. The FRC argued that the station, including the opinions of the 
Reverend Bob Shuler, had repeatedly made unfounded and personal attacks on local public 
officials. In its opinion, the FRC argued that broadcast speech was not the same as printed 
speech in terms of First Amendment protection and that the type of oversight it provided in 
determining whether broadcast content was in the public‟s interest was not a kin to 
censorship (Powe, 1987). 
 The FRC noted in a later case that loyalty to its community and nation could justify 
granting a license to a given station. Despite the fact that the 1927 Radio Act specifically 
banned censorship of free speech in section 29, the FRC‟s logic at the time was that such 
actions against radio speech were not equivalent to censoring the type of speech covered 
under the First Amendment. Radio was viewed more as entertainment and not deserving of 
the same protection (Powe, 1987). 
 In its third annual report to Congress, the FRC specifically linked the 
public-interest standard to treatment of opposing sides‟ views in questions of public 
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importance. Part of the report stated the following: 
In so far as a program consists of discussion of public questions, public interest 
requires ample play for the free and fair competition of opposing views, and the 
commission believes that the principle applies not only to addresses by political 
candidates but to all discussion of issues of importance to the public.  (FRC, 1929, 
p. 33) 
 
This can be seen as a precursor to the more explicit pronouncement of the Fairness 
Doctrine that would come later under the FCC. In introducing this point, the FRC noted 
once again that the rights of the listening public (in part to hear opposing views on issues of 
importance) were paramount to the rights of any speaker (FRC, 1929). 
 
Early Years of the FCC 
 The newly-created FCC soon evolved from the FRC. In an effort to consolidate all 
communications regulation under one agency, Democratic President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt (FDR) called upon Congress to act in 1934 (Roosevelt, 1934; Sterling, n.d.), 
resulting in the Communications Act of 1934, which created the FCC, similar in structure 
to the FRC in that it consisted of a small number of appointed commissioners. One note 
that is of particular import to broadcast regulation was that there was specific legislation in 
the run up to the completion of the Act that would have included wording noting the 
necessity for hearing both sides on public questions, but it was later omitted in favor of 
language similar to the radio regulation noted in the 1927 Radio Act (Simmons, 1978). One 
particularly notable carry-over from the Radio Act was the provision that the FCC not be 
involved in censorship or interference with free speech in radio (“Communications Act,” 
1996). 
 In cases and statements that followed, the FCC further exemplified the push for fair 
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and balanced coverage. One of the more explicit pronouncements made by the 
Commission came in its 1940 annual report to Congress. Referring specifically to the 
requirement for stations to operate in the public interest, convenience and necessity, the 
report stated that, “In carrying out the obligation to render a public service, stations are 
required to furnish well-rounded rather than one-sided discussions of public questions” 
(FCC, 1940, p. 55).  
 In what could be viewed as a diversion from robust debate, the FCC set in place a 
new doctrine in 1941 that many broadcasters and observers interpreted as a ban on 
editorializing by licensees. The so-called “Mayflower Doctrine” originated from an FCC 
decision concerning station WAAB in Boston which was charged by a competitor, the 
Mayflower Broadcasting Company, of not adhering to fairness by airing one-sided 
opinions. Though renewing WAAB‟s license, the FCC noted in its decision that radio 
should not be used toward partisan ends (Friendly, 1976). In its report to Congress in 1941, 
the Commission noted the Mayflower standard concerning radio station editorializing:  
... the public interest can never be served by a dedication of any broadcast facility to 
the support of ... partisan ends. Radio can serve as an instrument of democracy only 
when devoted to the communication of information and the exchange of ideas 
fairly and objectively presented.”  (FCC, 1941, p. 28) 
 
It also noted its positive view of free speech when it wrote that radio free speech must 
encompass the presentation of “all sides of public issues” (p. 28). The result of this decision 
had the effect of shunning licensees for presenting their particular partisan opinions on 
public matters (Powe, 1987). 
 Occurring around this same time was FDR‟s attempt to gain support from all areas 
of society, including the media, for his New Deal legislation. FDR regarded many in the 
media as sympathetic to the interests of big business and opposed to his social welfare 
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programs – essentially more supportive of Republicans. FDR had already received 
criticism from newspapers, and he believed that since radio was under tougher regulatory 
scrutiny, he could use proposed rules concerning cross-ownership as a means to end what 
he viewed as a near monopoly of media opinion. Although the FCC made statements 
regarding the trouble with broadcast ownership being concentrated in a few hands, FDR‟s 
attempt at cross-ownership regulations was initially unsuccessful (Powe, 1987). 
 A more successful attempt by a political party in using the FCC to control who 
owned broadcast stations came later with Republican President Dwight D. Eisenhower. 
When television broadcasts began to emerge, the FCC was there to award licenses. Though 
not making a clear link between Eisenhower and the decisions by the FCC at the time, 
Powe (1987, pp. 83 & 84) recounts how those owners initially denied television licenses 
were predominately Democrats or critical of Republicans, and those that were granted 
licenses were more supportive of Republicans. 
 
Fairness Doctrine Spelled Out 
 In 1949, the FCC laid out what has come to be known as the origin of the explicit 
Fairness Doctrine in its report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees (FCC, 1949). The 
purpose of the report was to clear up what the Commission viewed to be “confusion” 
among licensees and the public over its previous statements (FCC, 1949, p. 1246). Part of 
the report was meant to disavow the belief that the Mayflower decision was intended to end 
all editorializing by licensees; it did so by laying out broadcasters‟ fairness obligations 
(FCC, 1949).  
 The Commission noted that its prime consideration was that the broadcast system 
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in the United States was one in which private license holders were responsible for 
programming that would meet the overall principle of the public interest, in that each 
licensee was considered to be “a trustee for the public at large” (FCC, 1949, p. 1247). The 
report continued that vital to a democracy was the presence of informed public opinion. 
The Commission reasoned that such informed opinion could be achieved through the 
public presentation of news and ideas. But the presentation of such ideas would need to be 
carried out in a fair and balanced manner, hence the Fairness Doctrine (FCC, 1949).  
 The tenets of the Fairness Doctrine consisted of two components. The first 
component was that licensees should “devote a reasonable percentage of their broadcast 
time to the presentation of news and programs devoted to consideration and discussion of 
public issues of interest in the community served by the particular station” (FCC, 1949, p. 
1249). The second component required that when covering such public issues, “the public 
has a reasonable opportunity to hear different opposing positions on the public issue of 
interest and importance in the community.” (FCC, 1949, p. 1258). 
 In addressing arguments that this doctrine would abridge the First Amendment, the 
Commission wrote: 
It is the right of the public to be informed, rather than any right on the part of the 
Government, any broadcast licensee or any individual member of the public to 
broadcast his own particular views on any matter, which is the foundation stone of 
the American system of broadcasting.  (FCC, 1949, p. 1249) 
 
The report continued: 
... a requirement that broadcast licensees utilize their franchises in a manner in 
which the listening public may be assured of hearing varying opinions on the 
paramount issues facing the American people is within both the spirit and letter of 
the first amendment.  (FCC, 1949, p. 1256) 
  
Further downplaying the right of the broadcaster to speak in relation to the public to hear, 
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the Commission stated that the licensee‟s editorialization was only part of the picture.  
Only insofar as it is exercised in conformity with the paramount right of the public 
to hear a reasonably balanced presentation of all responsible viewpoints on 
particular issues can such editorialization be considered to be consistent with the 
licensee‟s duty to operate in the public interest.  (FCC, 1949, p. 1258) 
  
 These statements linked the reasoning behind the Fairness Doctrine with a 
positive-rights view of the First Amendment. The FCC essentially stated here that the 
public had a positive right to be informed and that broadcasters had a duty to inform them
9
. 
The Commission believed that censorship could not only originate from government but 
also through private station owners serving their own personal interests – as opposed to the 
general public‟s interest. To ensure that such private censorship was to be avoided, it was 
the job of the FCC, a small government board of appointed commissioners, to determine 
which opinions were “balanced” and whether such presentations included “all responsible” 
views (FCC, 1949, p. 1258). 
 
Doctrine Codified? 
 When the FCC spelled out the Fairness Doctrine in 1949, it was then an 
administrative rule and not a specific law. Although the Commission viewed the Doctrine 
as a reasonable application of the public-interest standard set forth in the Communications 
Act, it was not so far specifically required by the Act. This would allow the FCC to end 
fairness requirements.  
 Some, however, have argued that this changed in 1959 with the newly amended 
                                                 
9
 Recall here that a positive right requires action on the part of government or others (in this case the 
broadcasters would essentially act as trustees of the government) in order for it to be realized. In order for the 
public to be informed, someone had to inform them. This job, according to the FCC, would be left to private 
broadcasters. These licensees would be required to use their time, money and resources to provide to the 
public its positive right to be informed. 
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Communications Act of that year (Simmons, 1978). The 1959 amendment inserted a 
statement referencing the Fairness Doctrine into section 315 of the Act (Powe, 1987). 
Section 315 concerns requirements that broadcasters provide equal time to political 
candidates. In amending this provision, Congress intended to exempt the equal-time 
requirement for news casts, news interviews, news documentaries and on-the-spot 
coverage of news events. In doing so, they added that: 
Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall be construed as relieving broadcasters ... 
from the obligation imposed upon them under this Act to operate in the public 
interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views 
on issues of public importance.  (“Communications Act,” 1996, p. 167) 
 
 This amendment would become the most overt acknowledgment in law of the 
Doctrine. Whether or not this amendment represented specific legal codification of the 
Fairness Doctrine or mere Congressional acknowledgment of the existence of the 
FCC-created regulation would later become important to the debate in the 1980s when the 
FCC would seek to end enforcement of the Doctrine. 
 
Kennedy and Johnson Use Fairness and Cullman Doctrines 
 During enforcement of the Fairness Doctrine that proceeded in the 1960s, the 
Democratic administrations of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson showed interest in 
using the FCC regulation to their advantage. Friendly (1976), in his detailed account of the 
history of the Fairness Doctrine, recounted how members of President Kennedy‟s 
administration were concerned that the prevalence of certain conservative broadcasts may 
adversely affect their policy goals. Friendly recounted a discussion among two 
high-ranking executive branch officials on how they could use the Fairness Doctrine “to 
provide support for the President‟s programs” (p. 33). Friendly also noted that one of those 
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officials actually spent time in the basement of his home listening to and recording radio 
broadcasts, some of which he dubbed “irrationally hostile to the President and his 
programs” (p. 35). He then recounted one telling quote from another Kennedy 
administration official that summed up the aforementioned actions: “Our massive strategy 
was to use the Fairness Doctrine to challenge and harass right-wing broadcasters and hope 
that the challenges would be so costly to them that they would be inhibited and decide it 
was too expensive to continue” (p. 39).  
Also noted were several other quotes from Democratic officials noting that their 
attempt to harass right-wing broadcasters, who were often radio preachers, were not 
appropriate and may, in fact, have created an inhibiting effect on stations, making them 
reticent to broadcast more partisan programming
10
. One operative predicted: 
Were our efforts to be continued on a year-round basis, we would find that many of 
these stations would consider the broadcasts of these programs bothersome and 
burdensome (especially if they are ultimately required to give us free time) and 
would start dropping the programs from their broadcast schedule.  (p. 42) 
 
 The reference to free time referred to a new policy adopted by the FCC called the 
“Cullman Doctrine,” which required that if those with views in opposition to a broadcast 
were unable to afford to pay for a response, then the radio station would be required to pay 
for that side to air their opposition (Powe, 1987). The broadcast stations were required to 
provide free time for those voicing opinions that were not represented on their normal 
programming. Powe (1987) noted that a committee created at Kennedy‟s behest to combat 
anti-Nuclear Test Ban Treaty rhetoric used the Cullman Doctrine to gain response time 
many times when a broadcast personality proceeded with such commentary. 
 Related to free air time were two corollary rules to the Fairness Doctrine: the 
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 For more detail on the manipulation of the Fairness Doctrine, consult Friendly (1976). 
 35 
personal-attack and political-editorial rules. These rules, although their principles were 
practiced by the FCC beforehand, were not officially issued by the Commission until 1967. 
The personal-attack rule required that attacks on individuals or groups in the course of 
airing controversial issues of public importance be followed by notices from the licensee to 
those individuals who were attacked, with the offer of response time on the station(s) 
where the initial attack occurred. The political-editorial rule required the same type of 
action on the part of licensees when their station specifically endorsed or opposed a 
candidate for public office; the candidate would be notified of the aired endorsement or 
opposition and would be allowed response time (Red Lion v. FCC, 1969)
11
. 
 Powe (1987) also recounted the use of radio broadcast monitoring by the 
Democratic National Committee (DNC) under the Johnson administration. These actions, 
coupled with enforcement of the Fairness Doctrine and its, at the time, not-yet officially 
spelled-out two corollaries, now on a case-by-case basis rather than at license renewal 
time, would eventually lead to Supreme Court action on the FCC rules (Powe, 1987).  
One article, noted by Powe, that was published in The Nation magazine in 1964 at 
the behest of Democratic operatives admitted that DNC officials were monitoring the 
airwaves and called for the use of mandatory response time in situations where their 
policies were criticized. The same author of that article, Fred J. Cook, would go on to write 
a critical biography of Republican Senator Barry Goldwater (Arizona), titled Goldwater: 
Extremist on the Right, again at the behest of Democratic operatives (Powe, 1987). One 
reader of that book who happened to be a prominent preacher and radio commentator, the 
Reverend Billy James Hargis, used his broadcast time to attack Cook. Hargis had, himself, 
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 These corollary rules are often confused with the actual Fairness Doctrine in reporting on the subject in the 
media. Although both the corollary rules and the Doctrine focus on fair presentations of views, they are 
distinct in their origin and applicability. 
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been the subject of Cook‟s criticism in the earlier mentioned 1964 article, “Radio Right: 
Hate Clubs of the Air,” published in The Nation (Friendly, 1976). The aired attack on Cook 
by Hargis would lead to perhaps the most prominent Fairness Doctrine case before the 
Supreme Court, Red Lion v. FCC (1969). 
 
The Red Lion Case 
 In November of 1964, WGCB in Red Lion, Pennsylvania aired a taped program in 
which Reverend Hargis, a Goldwater supporter, opined on Cook‟s history, his affiliations 
and his critical biography of the senator (Friendly, 1976). He called Cook “a professional 
mudslinger” and referred to The Nation as “a scurrilous magazine which has championed 
many Communist causes” (Friendly, 1976, p. 5). But unlike Cook‟s criticism of Hargis, 
Goldwater and talk radio in print, Hargis‟ criticism of Cook came under the regulation of 
the FCC and its fairness requirements. 
 Cook wrote to WGCB and other stations that aired the Hargis broadcast stating that 
he expected them to give him equal time to respond, at the stations‟ expense (Friendly, 
1976). Friendly (1976) recounted that Hargis viewed Cook‟s actions as instigated by 
liberals who “intended the Fairness Doctrine to be their sole possession – a mandate from 
the government to coerce those who differ with their opinions” (p. 11). The parent 
company of WGCB, Red Lion Broadcasting, did not allow Cook free air time, leading to 
court action (Red Lion v. FCC, 1969). 
 The FCC had argued in lower court that Red Lion did not live up to its obligations 
under the Fairness Doctrine, and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia upheld that argument (Red Lion v. FCC, 1969). Amidst the timing of this case 
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came the official pronouncement of the personal-attack and political-editorial rules from 
the FCC, which were actually held unconstitutional by the Court of Appeals in RTNDA and 
NAB v. FCC (1967) because they abridged the freedoms of speech and the press
12
. The case 
made its way finally to the United States Supreme Court in Red Lion (1969). 
 The majority opinion of the Court in Red Lion was brought by Justice Byron White. 
In that opinion, the Court ruled that application of the Fairness Doctrine in the lower 
court‟s Red Lion case and the corollary regulations under question in the RTNDA case 
enhanced First Amendment rights rather than abridging them, declaring them to be both 
“valid and constitutional” (Red Lion v. FCC, 1969, p. 375). The opinion went on to detail 
the history of the FCC‟s regulations in this area and related them to the Congressional 
mandate in the Communications Act that licensees behave in a manner consistent with the 
public interest. It noted that the legislative history links the public-interest standard to the 
concept that contrasting views should be aired (Red Lion v. FCC, 1969).  
 The Red Lion Court relied to a large degree on the notion that the scarcity of 
available broadcast frequencies, something it viewed to be “not entirely a thing of the 
past,” required the special type of regulation embodied in the Fairness Doctrine and the 
corollary rules (Red Lion v. FCC, 1969, p. 396). The opinion argued that: 
Where there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there 
are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unbridgeable First Amendment right 
to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write or publish.  
(Red Lion v. FCC , 1969, p. 388) 
  
It further added: 
No one has a First Amendment right to a license or to monopolize a radio 
frequency; to deny a station license because “the public interest” requires it “is not 
a denial of free speech”... There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents 
the Government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to 
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 This is cited in the details of the Red Lion v. FCC (1976) case. 
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conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and 
voices which are representative of his community and which would otherwise, by 
necessity, be barred from the airwaves.  (Red Lion v. FCC, 1969, p. 389) 
  
 After stating this, the Court went on to note that this did not forbid the FCC from 
considering an essentially positive notion of free speech in its regulation. Arguing that the 
scarcity of frequencies allowed the government to restrain licensees, the Court asserted that 
“the people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and their collective right 
to have the medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First 
Amendment” (Red Lion v. FCC, 1969, p. 390). The Court wrote that, “It is the right of the 
viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount” (Red Lion v. 
FCC, 1969, p. 390).  
It linked this positive right to the idea of an “uninhibited marketplace of ideas in 
which truth will ultimately prevail,” noting that a monopolization of such a marketplace 
could come from both government and a private licensee (Red Lion, 1969, p. 390). In 
putting forth this marketplace idea, the Court referenced the ideas of Alexander 
Meiklejohn in terms of free speech. Meiklejohn believed that varying alternatives should 
be considered in public decision making and that, in a public forum, or “town-meeting,” 
“what is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be 
said” (Powe, 1987, p. 42). Further elaborating on this positive-right notion of free speech, 
the Court wrote that, “It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, 
political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here” (Red Lion 
v. FCC, 1969, p. 390). 
 The Red Lion Court placed emphasis on the idea that free speech could be censored 
by private broadcasters. It believed that such private censorship through the scarce, public 
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airwaves was not protected by the First Amendment. “There is no sanctuary in the First 
Amendment for unlimited private censorship operating in a medium not open to all,” it 
wrote (Red Lion v. FCC, 1969, p. 392). Then it referenced an earlier case‟s wording that, 
“Freedom of the press from governmental interference under the First Amendment does 
not sanction repression of that freedom by private interests” (Red Lion v. FCC, 1969, p. 
392). These “private interests” stood in contrast to the public interest in which the medium 
of broadcast radio was supposed to operate. 
 The Court also addressed the criticism that such active involvement by the 
government, through the FCC, in broadcast speech would lead to a potential chilling effect 
– leading broadcasters to stray away from covering controversial public issues under fear 
of FCC action. It first noted that critics charged if radio stations were required to provide 
free air time every time that a political editorial or personal attack was made, they would 
self-censor in a way that would inhibit the presentation of issues of public importance (Red 
Lion v. FCC, 1969). The Court concluded that such a situation would be “a serious matter, 
for should licensees actually eliminate their coverage of controversial issues, the purposes 
of the doctrine would be stifled” (Red Lion v. FCC, 1969, p. 393).  
But the Court‟s opinion was in line with the opinion of the FCC at the time: such a 
chilling or stifling effect was “at best speculative” (Red Lion v. FCC, 1969, p. 393). It did, 
however, leave open the possibility of reexamining the FCC rules should this chilling 
effect actually prove to be the case. “And if experience with the administration of these 
doctrines indicates that they have the net effect of reducing rather than enhancing the 
volume and quality of coverage,” the Court wrote, “there will be time enough to reconsider 
the constitutional implications” (Red Lion v. FCC, 1969, p. 393). 
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 Footnotes and arguments from Red Lion‟s counsel in the Red Lion case displayed 
notable comments opposed to the Fairness Doctrine and its corollary rules which also 
relied on appeals to the First Amendment – but more of a negative conception of it. One 
footnote quoted the president of CBS, who stated that he would refuse to be “affected by 
official intimidation” (Red Lion v. FCC, 1969, p. 393). The counsel for Red Lion argued 
that: “... the commandment of the First Amendment is simply: Thou shalt not abridge. And 
it is not „you may abridge, but please try to keep it reasonable‟” (Friendly, 1976, p. 62). He 
later noted that there could be a “chilling and deterrent effect” resulting from the threat of 
FCC action against a broadcaster (Friendly, 1976, p. 62). Red Lion believed that the 
personal-attack rule could act in way to deter broadcasters from airing either the attack or 
the response, given that the costs legally and financially would be deemed, essentially, not 
worth it (Friendly, 1976). 
 
Post-Red Lion Developments 
 The Supreme Court‟s decision in Red Lion gave legal backing to the Fairness 
Doctrine and its corollary rules. This backing would bolster the FCC in its subsequent 
fairness and licensing decisions in the decade that followed to greater promote what it 
believed to be in the public interest. The actions by the Commission and attempts by 
officials in government to use the Doctrine and its corollary rules in the years following, 
however, further exemplified the criticisms made against it. These actions further 
demonstrated that the FCC rules could be used by presidential administrations and others 
to create both a chilling effect and a general climate in which government acted in a 
paternalistic manner toward the listening and viewing public in its efforts to oversee what 
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speech could be presented over the broadcast airwaves. 
 Although its Court of Appeals case occurred before the 1969 Red Lion decision, the 
Banzhaf v. FCC (1968) case did emerge amid the predominant FCC reasoning stemming 
from the Red Lion issue. Taking to the notion that it was the government‟s role to ensure 
that the public is exposed to contrasting opinions on issues of public importance through 
the medium of broadcasting, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of an FCC 
decision which essentially stated that broadcasters who aired advertisements that 
represented one side of a controversial public issue – in this case, smoking – had to present 
the opposite side as a matter of fairness. The Court wrote:  
Whatever else it may mean, however, we think the public interest indisputably 
includes the public health. ... The power to protect the public health lies at the heart 
of the states‟ police power. ... evoking the legitimate concern of government 
wherever its regulatory power otherwise extends.  (Banzhaf v. FCC, 1968, pp. 
1096 & 1097) 
  
Of note is that Congress later acted to ban all cigarette advertisement on broadcast radio 
and television (Friendly, 1976). 
 The next year after the Red Lion decision, the FCC moved to deny the renewal of 
WXUR in Media, Pennsylvania. The Commission argued that the station‟s programming – 
exemplified by, as in the Red Lion case, a reverend, Carl McIntire – failed to live up to 
fairness obligations. Programs on the station had often voiced views critical of 
Communists, liberals, blacks and Jews. As such, it received much criticism in the 
community. Complaints against the station were upheld in the FCC‟s decision in 
Brandywine-Main Line Radio v. FCC (1972) (Friendly, 1976). 
 The complaints against McIntire noted in the text of the case were that he had 
made: 
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“intemperate” attacks on other religious denominations and leaders, various 
organizations, governmental agencies, political figures and international 
organizations; and that such expressions are irresponsible and a divisive force in 
the community and help create a climate of fear, prejudice and distrust of 
democratic institutions.  (Brandywine-Main Line Radio v. FCC, 1972, p. 20) 
  
Part of the court‟s rationale for ruling in favor of the FCC was that it was assumed, given 
the amount of time devoted to radio and television by the American public, “that the public 
be given access to varied information so that they may remain an intelligent and viable 
group – free to choose from the options available to them – free to make a choice” 
(Brandywine-Main Line Radio v. FCC, 1972, p. 42). The Court apparently believed that 
fairness regulation via the FCC was an acceptable way to ensure this. 
 In the Brandywine case, one judge who had originally supported the FCC‟s 
decision had chosen to hold his detailed statement until a later date (Friendly, 1976). In that 
statement, Chief Judge David L. Bazelon seemed to have had a change of heart. This 
change of heart is especially noteworthy given that Bazelon was the same judge who 
delivered the opinion in the Banzhaf case. 
Bazelon wrote that the FCC‟s decision against Brandywine was a “prima facie 
violation of the First Amendment” and that, “In silencing WXUR, the Commission has 
dealt a death blow to the licensee‟s freedoms of speech and press” (Brandywine-Main Line 
Radio v. FCC, 1972, pp. 63 & 64). Bazelon went on to criticize what he viewed to be a 
“supreme penalty”: “ But if we are to go after gnats with a sledgehammer like the fairness 
doctrine, we ought at least to look at what else is smashed beneath our blow” (pp. 63 & 64). 
After acknowledging the difficulty in answering such a question given that broadcast 
regulation was characterized by “competing interests and uncertain results” (p. 64) coupled 
with a “shifting balance of First Amendment freedoms,” (p. 64) he also criticized the idea 
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that the courts should just “hang our hats on Red Lion and relax” (p. 70). Bazelon went 
further to suggest that the Commission should reconsider its fairness rules in light of 
technological developments and the belief that it had developed in such a way that it 
actually hindered its intended goals, creating a chilling effect. He implied that greater 
freedom given to the broadcaster might “enhance, rather than retard, the public‟s right to a 
marketplace of ideas” (p. 80). 
 Friendly (1976) recounts in his book that McIntire viewed the action as a way for 
Republican President Richard Nixon to retaliate against their broadcasts in which they 
were critical of his policy to end American involvement in Vietnam. McIntire described 
the action as “just another one of those dirty tricks from that Watergate gang” (Friendly, 
1976, p. 82). He also lamented that many stations which had before carried his program 
had feared FCC action against them and dropped his show (Friendly, 1976). 
 The years following the earlier Banzhaf case, involving the FCC applying the 
Fairness Doctrine to cigarette advertisements, saw what Simmons (1978) called a “crazy 
quilt” of decisions by the FCC (p. 106). These rulings involved the FCC in deciding to 
apply or not apply fairness obligations to anything from ads for the U.S. Marines to 
boycotted department stores. Recognizing the problems associated with applying fairness 
rules to an infinite number of product advertisements, one of which being the hit to the 
financial base of radio and television, the FCC later exempted such ads in 1974 (Simmons, 
1978).  
 However, like presidential administrations before them, the Nixon administration 
also sought to use the FCC and its fairness rules to its advantage. One Democratic 
operative recounted how he believed that Nixon gave his vice-president, Spiro Agnew, the 
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job of insinuating potential FCC action against television news organizations that were 
critical of Nixon‟s administration (Friendly, 1976). Friendly (1976), Simmons (1978) and 
Powe (1987) all gave examples of where the Nixon administration used the threat of FCC 
action, among other tactics, to intimidate and coerce broadcasters – particularly the 
television networks – into avoiding critical coverage of Nixon and his policies13. One 
telling quote came from Agnew, who retorted in a 1976 speech that the “privileged men” 
who used their “monopoly sanctioned and licensed by government” represented a 
questionable concentration of power, and that “perhaps it is time that the networks were 
made more responsive to the views of the nation and more responsible to the people they 
serve....” (Powe, 1987, p. 124)14. Powe (1987) argued that this abuse of the FCC licensing 
system would always be the case given that the FCC was made up of commissioners 
appointed by those politicians in power. 
 The Democrats, at the same time, also tried to use the FCC to their advantage. In 
CBS v. DNC (1973), they argued that the network‟s refusal to sell air time went against the 
First Amendment and fairness obligations. In its opinion essentially upholding the CBS 
policy, the Supreme Court noted that the Commission had beforehand ruled that 
broadcasters who provided fair coverage of public issues were not required to accept such 
editorial ads (CBS v. DNC, 1973).  
The Court‟s opinion seemed to be more guarded this time, as opposed to in Red 
Lion, in respect to the extent to which the FCC could involve itself in the editorial decisions 
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 These sources provide much more detail on the abuse of the FCC by both Nixon and other administrations 
that, to include here, would go well beyond the constraints of this thesis. 
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 Powe (1987) also quoted from a 1972 oval office conversation where Nixon and advisors contemplated 
using the fact that the Washington Post also owned a television station, which would come up for FCC 
license renewal, as leverage against them. 
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of licensees. Part of the opinion stated that, “Only when the interests of the public are found 
to outweigh the private journalistic interests of the broadcasters will government power be 
asserted within the framework of the [Communications] Act” (CBS v. DNC, 1973, p. 110). 
Despite this notable caution, the Court still maintained that the public‟s positive 
right to be informed was of critical importance in broadcast regulation. It also again 
recounted as appropriate Meiklejohn‟s town-hall concept of including all opinions deemed 
worth hearing. In doing so, it questioned the lower court‟s – again the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals – approval of the respondents‟ argument for a constitutional right-of-access to the 
airwaves. The Court believed that such a regime would involve the government too much 
in the day-to-day operation of broadcast stations and would risk increasing the 
government‟s authority in regulating discussion of public issues (CBS v. DNC, 1973).  
Notably, the Court of Appeals had argued that the existing system was a kin to “a 
paternalistic structure in which licensees and bureaucrats decide what issues are 
„important,‟ and how „fully‟ to cover them, and the format, time and style of the coverage” 
(CBS v. DNC, 1973, p. 130). The Supreme Court rejected that notion and wrote that, 
although the Fairness Doctrine was not perfect, a solution would not be to decrease the 
responsibilities of the licensee (CBS v. DNC, 1973). 
 Justice William O. Douglas, concurring with the Court‟s majority opinion15, called 
into question the government‟s role in regulating broadcast journalists through fairness 
obligations. Invoking Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson‟s views toward the printed 
press in their time, Douglas, who was around but did not participate in the oral arguments 
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 Justice Potter Stewart, who voted in the majority in Red Lion, also wrote a concurring opinion, although 
somewhat less forceful than Douglas‟, that was critical of the government‟s role in regulation of broadcast 
content. Stewart opined that the positive-right notion that “the First Amendment requires the Government to 
impose controls upon private broadcasters - in order to preserve First Amendment „values,‟” was a 
“frightening specter” (CBS v. DNC, 1973, p. 133). 
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in Red Lion, wrote: 
Of course there is private censorship in the newspaper field. But for one publisher 
who may suppress a fact, there are many who will print it. But if the Government is 
the censor, administrative fiat, not freedom of choice, carries the day ... The same is 
true, I believe, of TV and radio.  (CBS v. DNC, 1973, pp. 153 & 154) 
 
He added that the government should not be involved in forcing its ideas of fairness on the 
press by noting the negative nature of the First Amendment: 
The First Amendment is written in terms that are absolute. Its command is that 
“Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ....” 
... The ban of “no” law that abridges freedom of the press is in my view total and 
complete.  (p. 156)
16
 
  
And specifically addressing the need for regulation of licensees because of the scarcity of 
radio frequencies, Douglas opined that the FCC‟s role should be confined to preventing 
monopolies and promoting innovations in technology that would expand the broadcast 
spectrum. “But censorship or editing or the screening by Government of what licensees 
may broadcast,” Douglas wrote, “goes against the grain of the First Amendment” (p. 158). 
One other important point in Douglas‟ opinion was that granting broadcast the 
same First Amendment protections as print would prevent politicians from using the 
apparatus of government to promote their version of the common good. “The philosophy 
of the First Amendment requires that result, for the fear that Madison and Jefferson had of 
government intrusion is perhaps even more relevant to TV and radio than it is to 
newspapers and other like publications,” he wrote (p. 148). “That fear was founded not 
only on the spectre of a lawless government but of government under the control of a 
faction that desired to foist its views of the common good on the people” (p. 148). This 
argument from Douglas touches on the notion that government regulation like the Fairness 
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Amendment to grant access to opposing views. 
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Doctrine can be used in a paternalistic manner in which those in control of government 
decide for the people – in this case, the listeners and viewers – what is in their common or 
best interest
17
. 
 
Miami Herald v. Tornillo Contradicts Fairness Doctrine Rationale 
 Further FCC actions in the 1970s saw more judicial, and other, criticisms of the 
Commission‟s involvement in the details of broadcast and journalistic decisions18. The 
controversy over the Fairness Doctrine resulted from the fact that it, as the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals wrote in its NBC v. FCC (1974) opinion, represented an attempt “to 
harmonize the freedom of the broadcaster and the right of the public to be informed ... both 
the Commission and the courts have proceeded carefully, mindful of the need for 
harmonizing these often conflicting considerations” (Simmons, 1978, p. 216). This was not 
a balancing act that was required for the printed press as it was for the broadcast press. 
 This difference in regulatory regimes between broadcast and print and the 
implications for First Amendment considerations came to an interesting point in the 
Supreme Court‟s Miami Herald v. Tornillo (1974) case. This case involved a candidate for 
state office in Florida, Pat Tornillio, who was denied a reply to editorials in the Miami 
Herald which were critical of his candidacy. Under Florida‟s then “right-of-reply” law, it 
was a misdemeanor for a newspaper to not allow such replies. The Florida Supreme Court 
had reversed a lower court decision declaring the law unconstitutional, noting that the 
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 See chapters 10 and 11 in Friendly (1976) for detailed examples that, to include here, would go beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
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right-of-reply law enhanced free speech and the greater positive-right interest of the public 
to be informed. The Herald appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court (Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 
1974). 
 The U.S. Supreme Court‟s opinion was that the Florida law was unconstitutional in 
that it violated the First Amendment in respect to freedom of the press. The Court‟s opinion 
argued that the government compelling newspapers to publish something which they 
reasonably disagreed should be published was a kin to forbidding a newspaper to print 
something, which is unconstitutional. The decision also noted that the Florida law created a 
penalty in terms of various printing, labor and materials cost that would need to be used for 
such a reply instead of printing what the newspaper wanted to print – potentially chilling 
coverage. But the Court argued that even ignoring the costs associated with such a law still 
left the government in the inappropriate role of crossing First Amendment lines by 
intruding into the editorial decisions of the newspapers (Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 1974). 
 In its opinion, the Supreme Court noted that Tornillo had argued the positive-right 
notion of the First Amendment that it was government‟s role to “ensure that a wide variety 
of views reach the public” (Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 1974, p. 248). It noted that 
proponents of the right to reply had also argued that, unlike the printed press at the time of 
the American founding, the contemporary press was controlled by large businesses that 
were increasingly less responsive to the public. These proponents, the Court wrote in its 
opinion, “reasoned that the only effective way to insure fairness and accuracy and to 
provide for some accountability is for government to take affirmative action” (p. 251, 
emphasis added). The Court noted that these proponents argued that the public interest in 
being informed was jeopardized by what they viewed as a monopolized market (Miami 
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Herald v. Tornillo, 1974). 
The majority opinion went on to note several statements from the Court and others 
acknowledging that a newspaper could act as a monopoly, but it argued that a legal remedy 
to this, resulting from a right of access, might involve government coercion. Such 
government coercion, the justices argued, was in conflict with the wording of the First 
Amendment and interpretations of it that the courts had developed. Noting the checks on a 
monopolization of opinion, the Court quoted the CBS v. DNC case opinion that the ability 
of a privately owned newspaper to promote its own opinion was constrained by its ability 
to sustain readership (and consequently advertisers) and its journalistic integrity (Miami 
Herald v. Tornillo, 1974). 
 In touching on the positive-right tendency to seek government action to enforce 
press responsibility and its conflict with the First Amendment, the Court argued that while 
such responsibility was important, it was not constitutionally required and could not be 
enforced in the legal system (Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 1974). Such a positive action on 
the part of government in order to ensure a right of access, the Court argued, quoting from 
a previous case, “inescapably „dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate‟” 
(Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 1974, p. 257). It also argued that such a positive-right 
regulatory scheme could not be implemented without contradicting the First Amendment‟s 
free-press clause and the judicial interpretations of it (Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 1974). 
 The noticeable contrast between this decision in respect to the print media and the 
decision in respect to the broadcast media by the Court in Red Lion is an important 
development that would lead to further scrutiny of the Fairness Doctrine and content 
regulation of broadcasting. Red Lion had upheld an active, positive-right role for the 
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government in attempting to ensure that a fair and robust debate of public issues be 
presented in the broadcast media. The Miami Herald opinion refused the government the 
positive-right duty to regulate the print media in hopes of ensuring such a fair presentation 
of public issues, arguing rather for a negative-right application of the First Amendment. 
The critical element that distinguished the reasoning for these two contrasting opinions 
was argued to be the scarcity rationale, which itself was increasingly becoming more 
controversial given the increase in avenues of public opinion through the media. The years 
to follow would bring an about-face in terms of how such content regulation was viewed in 
light of a supposed scarcity rationale. 
 
The Questioning of the Justifications for the Fairness Doctrine 
 As the years passed since both the formalization of the Fairness Doctrine in 1949 
and the Supreme Court‟s affirmation of it in 1969, the broadcast medium continued to 
expand. The total number of radio stations (AM and FM) had increased from 2,564 in 1949 
to 7,501 in 1974, the same year as the Miami Herald decision; the number of television 
stations had increased from 51 to 938 in the same period (FCC, 1985). However, this 
decrease in scarcity did not immediately deter the courts.  
A series of cases questioned whether the FCC should deny radio stations the ability 
to change formats. In ruling that the Commission had the ability to do so, the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals once noted in referring to a particular case involving a station seeking to 
move away from classical music that, “We do not doubt that, at our present level of 
civilization, a 16 % ratio between devotees of classical music and the rest of the population 
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is about right ...” (Citizens Committee v. FCC, 1970, p. 269)19. 
Up until 1981, the courts were still upholding the positive-right concepts noted in 
Red Lion. The Supreme Court argued in its CBS v. FCC (1981) case that the right of access 
did not violate the First Amendment but rather balanced the First Amendment rights of all 
parties involved – broadcasters, political candidates and the public. The Court argued that, 
“Although the broadcasting industry is entitled under the First Amendment to exercise „the 
widest journalistic freedom consistent with its public [duties]‟,” the right of the listeners 
and viewers outweighed those of the speakers – again upholding a positive notion of the 
right to free speech (p. 395). The Court then argued that this contributed to the overall 
democratic process by ensuring access to candidates and information to the public (CBS v. 
FCC, 1981)
20
.  
 However, there was a gradual shift in the FCC‟s ability to justify its content 
regulation of media, partially based on the advent of new modes of communication like 
cable. One example came with HBO v. FCC (1977), where the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals ruled that there was a difference to be made between physical scarcity and 
economic scarcity. Red Lion had shown that physical scarcity could justify content 
regulation, whereas the Miami Herald case had shown that mere economic scarcity could 
not justify the government imposing content requirements on a medium. The appeals court 
judges in HBO argued that this difference in types of scarcity meant that the FCC could not 
                                                 
19
 The FCC rejected the Court's determination and argued that it violated the First Amendment (Powe, 1987). 
 
20
 This insistence by the courts to uphold these positive-right concepts as consistent with First Amendment 
values occurred along side other contemporary and earlier developments which questioned the First 
Amendment validity of the FCC‟s content regulation. For example, Jung (1996) notes how several 
academics, lawyers and journalists met in 1973 in what would become known as the Warren Conference. The 
report they developed from this two-day meeting called for broadcast journalists to receive the same First 
Amendment freedom as print journalists. Jung also notes that the FCC would later use much of the reasoning 
in this report to call for an end to the Fairness Doctrine (Jung, 1996). 
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regulate what amount of programming, in terms of certain categories, HBO could present 
because it violated the First Amendment (HBO v. FCC, 1977). 
Technological developments like cable, which brought the scarcity rationale under 
greater scrutiny, emerged around the same time as the new climate of deregulation that was 
brought about by the administration of Republican President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. 
This combination would speed up the undoing of the Commission‟s role in regulating 
fairness. 
 Reagan‟s economic philosophy centered on free-market capitalism, which 
bolstered efforts to deregulate the nation‟s economy. Broadcasting was not immune to this 
push. But the push to deregulate came even before Reagan. FCC Commissioner Charles 
Ferris, who arrived in 1978, sought to greater understand the effect of the Commission‟s 
decisions on the economy as well as reorient the FCC to focus more on ownership and 
structural issues rather than direct regulation of program content; as early as 1979, the FCC 
made it known that it intended to deregulate radio (Jung, 1996). The Commission issued a 
formal report in 1981, a result of an inquiry made a few years before, announcing what it 
considered to be an experiment in deregulation of commercial broadcast radio (FCC, 
1981).  
This turn toward economic considerations was greatly increased during the 
chairmanship of Mark Fowler, who was appointed by Reagan. Fowler made it known on 
several occasions that he wanted the Fairness Doctrine and its corollary rules removed
21
. In 
a 1982 interview, he argued for a deregulation of broadcasting which would relegate the 
FCC to simply enforcing technical regulations, making broadcast speech equal to print 
                                                 
21
 See Jung (1996) for a detailed history of Fowler‟s push for deregulation as well as several quotes 
highlighting his belief in repeal of the Fairness Doctrine and the FCC‟s role in content regulation in general. 
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(Donlan, 1982). Fowler also suggested that broadcasters could obtain their free speech 
rights by paying user fees to the FCC, making a particular frequency their property 
(Donlan, 1982)
22. In the article, Fowler also questioned the scarcity rationale: “When the 
founding fathers came up with the First Amendment, there were eight weekly newspapers 
in the entire country, and yet they said, „These eight shall be free.‟ They didn‟t do a scarcity 
analysis”23. Fowler also co-authored a notable law review article in 1982 arguing for a 
marketplace approach to the regulation of broadcasting in which broadcasters would be 
more accountable to market forces instead of the government (Fowler & Brenner, 1982). 
One of Fowler‟s frequent statements concerning his view that the marketplace approach 
was better for broadcasting was that the public-interest standard should be defined by “the 
public‟s interest,” meaning that the listening and viewing public should determine what 
programming broadcasters presented – through ratings, not government decree (Boyer, 
1987). 
 Fowler was not the only one pushing for a reassessment of the FCC‟s role in 
regulating fairness. One new Democratic member of the Commission, James Quello, noted 
his fidelity to First Amendment rights for broadcasters in his confirmation hearing by 
stating that he proposed the removal of all First Amendment constraints on broadcasters in 
an effort to lift them to the same level of First Amendment protection as newspapers. He 
went even further to state that this meant eliminating the public-interest standard. 
Specifically dealing with fairness obligations, Quello admitted that he believed it would 
better serve the public to get rid of the Fairness Doctrine and Section 315 of the 
                                                 
22
 One such spectrum-use fee proposal, though not calling for the removal of the Fairness Doctrine, was part 
of a proposed revision of the Communications Act that is noted on page 17 of Jung (1996). Fowler eventually 
stepped away from emphasizing such a user fee (Jung, 1996). 
 
23
 This is the quote from the Donlan (1982) article as presented on page 53 of Jung (1996). 
 54 
Communications Act. He characterized the Fairness Doctrine as a regulation that governed 
the practice of journalism, something he believed was better handled by actual professional 
journalists and editors (Jung, 1996).  
In Congress, senators like Republican Robert Packwood (Oregon) and Democrat 
William Proxmire (Wisconsin) had pushed for bills, and even at one point a constitutional 
amendment, that would have asserted the free speech rights of broadcasters and abolished 
the Fairness Doctrine and its corollary rules. Adding further momentum to the push to do 
away with the FCC‟s fairness rules was a Commission ruling on teletext regulation that 
claimed that Section 315 of the 1959 amendment to the Communications Act did not, in 
fact, make the Fairness Doctrine applicable to the new technology (Jung, 1996). 
 This background of persons and events foreshadowed further action by the FCC to 
abolish fairness obligations. In April of 1984, the Commission voted on a notice of inquiry 
into the Fairness Doctrine to see if it was still warranted given changes in the media in the 
last decade (Black, 1984).  
Later that year, the Supreme Court weighed in on the issue in FCC v. League of 
Women Voters of California (1984). In that case, the Court was charged with determining 
if a ban on editorializing by those public broadcast stations awarded grant money from the 
government-created Corporation for Public Broadcasting was constitutional; the Court 
affirmed the lower court‟s ruling that it was not. The Court questioned whether such a ban 
was an unconstitutional “attempt „to allow a government [to] control the search for 
political truth‟” (FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 1984, p. 384). In that 
decision, the Court still maintained that it was legitimate to deny a broadcaster‟s freedom 
to voice their own opinion without presenting opposition views, unlike in newspapers. 
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They argued that the rationale for this was that it upheld a “substantial government 
interest” in seeing that full and fair coverage of issues of public importance was presented 
over this scarce resource (FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 1984, p. 380). It 
again appealed specifically to public‟s right to be informed (FCC v. League of Women 
Voters of California, 1984).  
However, the Court also made a couple of interesting points in the footnotes to its 
opinion that called into question the continued validity of the rationale for the Fairness 
Doctrine. In one footnote, the Court acknowledged recent criticism of the scarcity 
rationale, but wrote: “We are not prepared, however, to reconsider our longstanding 
approach without some signal from Congress or the FCC that technological developments 
have advanced so far that some revision of the system of broadcast regulation may be 
required” (FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 1984, p. 376). In the next 
footnote, it acknowledged the FCC‟s arguments that a chilling effect would warrant 
removal of the Doctrine, adding that: 
... the Commission may, in the exercise of its discretion, decide to modify or 
abandon these rules, and we express no view on the legality of either course. As we 
recognized in Red Lion, however, were it to be shown by the Commission that the 
fairness doctrine “[has] the net effect of reducing rather than enhancing” speech, 
we would then be forced to reconsider the constitutional basis of our decision in 
that case.  (FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 1984, p. 380) 
 
Those on the FCC who supported repeal of the Doctrine, specifically Chairman Fowler, 
considered these footnotes ammunition that would aid them in seeking such an end 
(Kidder, 1985). 
 In August of 1985, the FCC “signaled” to the judiciary by releasing a detailed and 
scathing report on the Fairness Doctrine (FCC, 1985). In it, the Commission argued that the 
scarcity rationale was no longer valid given the increase in media outlets; the report noted 
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that the total number of radio stations had gone from 2,564 in 1949 to 9,766 in 1985 and 
television stations had increased from 51 to 1,208 in the same period. It also gave several 
examples of where broadcasters perceived a chilling effect which inhibited them from 
presenting issues of public importance. More specifically, it argued that this inhibiting 
effect was particularly potent when it came to the airing of opinions that may not be in the 
mainstream. It also argued that the Doctrine enabled potential abuse and intimidation on 
the part of partisan politicians. Given this, the Commission believed that the Fairness 
Doctrine no longer served the public interest and was constitutionally suspect. It, however, 
deferred the issue to Congress or the courts given that, in its view, whether or not the 
Doctrine was codified by the 1959 amendments was unclear (FCC, 1985). 
 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals seemed to answer the Commission in 
Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. FCC (1986). There, in ruling on the 
application of fairness requirements to teletext, it opined that the 1959 wording did not 
impose the Fairness Doctrine as a statutory obligation but simply acknowledged it as an 
administrative rule allowed under the public-interest standard (Telecommunications 
Research and Action Center v. FCC, 1986). 
Later, that same court, in Meredith Corp. v. FCC (1987), heard a case that involved 
a broadcaster challenging an FCC ruling that it had violated the Fairness Doctrine. 
Meredith Corp., the broadcaster, argued that the Commission‟s action not to rule on 
Meredith‟s constitutional challenge to the Fairness Doctrine was arbitrary and capricious. 
This was in light of the FCC‟s own report two years earlier calling the constitutionality of 
the Doctrine into question. The Commission and an intervener, Syracuse Peace Council, 
argued against Meredith‟s claim (Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 1987). The Court of Appeals 
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argued that, despite the FCC‟s contention that it was not in a place to judge the continued 
constitutionality of the Doctrine, it was “aware of no precedent that permits a federal 
agency to ignore a constitutional challenge to the application of its own policy merely 
because the resolution would be politically awkward” (Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 1987, p. 
874). It went further to add that members of the Commission swore an oath to support and 
defend the Constitution and concluded that, “To enforce a Commission-generated policy 
that the Commission itself believes is unconstitutional may well constitute a violation of 
that oath” (Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 1987, p. 874).  
With that statement, the Court of Appeals both acknowledged the Doctrine as a 
regulatory rule (rather than specifically a codified law) and compelled the FCC to take 
action in light of its 1985 report. The ruling remanded the issue to the Commission to 
consider the constitutional claims made by Meredith. It, however, also noted that should 
the Commission determine that the Doctrine no longer served the public interest, it could 
end enforcement of it without necessarily addressing the constitutional issues (Meredith 
Corp. v. FCC, 1987). 
 
The Death of the Doctrine 
 While the judiciary had responded and remanded to the Commission, the 
legislative branch was busy attempting to make the Doctrine unequivocally a part of law 
(Jung, 1996). A bill working its way through Congress would have specifically codified the 
Fairness Doctrine into law, removing any ambiguity as to whether the FCC could act 
independently to stop enforcing it. The bill made it to the desk of President Reagan, who 
vetoed it in June of 1987 (Noble, 1987). Reagan, in effectively killing the congressional 
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attempt to save the Doctrine, called it “antagonistic to the freedom of expression” in the 
Constitution and asserted that, “In any other medium besides broadcasting, such Federal 
policing of the editorial judgment of journalists would be unthinkable” (Noble, 1987, p. 1). 
 Now that a clear signal had been sent from the judiciary to take action on the 
Fairness Doctrine and opposition from Congress was blocked by Reagan, the FCC wasted 
little time in ruling. It released an order on August 6, 1987 that ceased enforcement of the 
Doctrine (FCC, 1987). In doing so, the Commission once again argued that the scarcity 
rationale was no longer applicable and that the Doctrine chilled speech. It concluded in the 
order that the Doctrine went against the First Amendment and further enforcement of it did 
not serve the public interest (FCC, 1987). But although enforcement of the Fairness 
Doctrine would end here, debate over it would not. 
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CHAPTER IV 
POST-DOCTRINE 
 
The Specter of Reimposition? 
 The FCC‟s decision in August, 1987 to end enforcement of the Fairness Doctrine 
was neither the end of debate over the Doctrine nor content regulation of broadcasting in 
the name of the public interest. The controversy over such regulation would continue for at 
least the next 20-plus years. And the arguments for and against would still center to a 
degree around what constitutes freedom of speech: a positive or negative conception? But 
the debate also broadened beyond the specific Fairness Doctrine to other regulatory 
measures that sought to enforce “diversity” or “localism,” both thought to be in the public 
interest.  
 The specter of reimposing the Doctrine or something similar to it under the 
auspices of diversity or localism would continue to animate public debate, particularly as 
changes in parties in power would occur. Since the 1987 decision, periodic calls have been 
made by some to reimpose the fairness rule, while others have proposed other regulations 
which critics argue would have the same effect as reimposing the Doctrine. This chapter 
will highlight some of the pertinent events since the repeal of the Fairness Doctrine, 
emphasizing their relation to the right to freedom of speech mostly in the context of the 
positive/negative dichotomy. Whether or not each individual or group noted in the 
following section genuinely believed their rhetoric, particularly their rhetoric around 
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election seasons, is not something explored here. It is sufficient for the purposes of this 
thesis that their arguments, rhetorical or not, often exemplified a debate over what 
constitutes free speech: a negative or positive conception. With these events, the rhetoric 
on both sides, genuine or not, continued to warn of danger to First-Amendment rights. 
 
The Immediate Reaction to the Repeal 
 After the FCC ended enforcement of the Fairness Doctrine, several people almost 
immediately voiced either their support or opposition. Consumer advocate Ralph Nader 
argued that the Doctrine allowed minority viewpoints and issues to be raised and called the 
repealed rule “constitutionally required” (Hershey, 1987). Democratic Senator Ernest 
Hollings (South Carolina), then head of the Senate Commerce Committee, hinted at the 
positive-right access that the Fairness Doctrine enabled by claiming that it represented “the 
only means for many in the public to be heard” (Shaw, 1987). Democratic Representative 
Edward Markey (Massachusetts) said the decision exemplified the Commission deciding it 
knew more about the Constitution than the Congress or courts did; he suggested Congress 
would seek to write the Doctrine into law (Shaw, 1987). In contrast, the Chairman of the 
FCC at that time, Dennis Patrick, claimed that the decision would “introduce the First 
Amendment into the 20th century,” and FCC General Counsel Diane Killory argued that, 
“No matter how good the intention, there is no way for government to restrict freedom of 
speech and the press and foster a robust and unfettered exchange of ideas” (Shaw, 1987). 
 Within a few days, the Syracuse Peace Council, represented by Media Access 
Project (MAP), petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals in New York to block the decision – 
though MAP‟s executive director, Andrew J. Schwartzman, predicted that Congress would 
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make the petition unnecessary by codifying the Fairness Doctrine (Mesce, 1987a). 
Democratic Representative Al Swift (Washington) warned in a National Association of 
Broadcasters (NAB) luncheon that the Commission was “daring Congress to legislate” and 
that other broadcast legislation could be held back until the rule was made into law (Mesce, 
1987b). NAB and other broadcaster and journalist groups joined together shortly thereafter 
and wrote a letter to members of Congress voicing their opposition to codifying the 
Doctrine (“Media Groups,” 1987). 
 The Senate Commerce Committee soon voted to bring back the Fairness Doctrine 
as part of a deficit-reduction bill. The bill also imposed a fee on broadcasters selling their 
stations, specifically adding an extra fee if they had violated the Doctrine. Some of the 
money derived from the fee would have gone to public broadcasting systems. Republican 
lawmakers voiced their opposition to the reinstatement of the Doctrine in the bill (Fram, 
1987). Senator Robert Packwood warned that a reinstatement of the Doctrine in law could 
be interpreted to impose the fairness requirements on newspapers which used broadcast 
signals to transmit their publications to other areas to be printed and sold, adding that, 
“Either they‟ve got to go one of two ways, either treat all media as broadcasters ... or merge 
all communications together and protect them with the First Amendment” (“Packwood 
Fears,” 1987).  
 By the end of 1987, more than one attempt by Congress to reimpose the Doctrine 
had failed (Molotsky, 1987). But that did not deter proponents of the Doctrine like Nader 
and Senator Hollings. Nader claimed that the failed attempts at reinstating it “[stripped] the 
people of all their rights to their airwaves” (Molotsky, 1987). Hollings insisted that he and 
fellow Democrats would pursue the issue in later sessions (Molotsky, 1987).  
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 In February, 1989, in Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals upheld the FCC‟s decision to no longer enforce the Fairness Doctrine on the basis 
that it no longer served the public interest, leaving aside judgment on the constitutional 
issue. Syracuse Peace Council had challenged the ruling by the Commission to not apply 
the Doctrine in its previous decision on the Meredith Corporation (Syracuse Peace Council 
v. FCC, 1989). The FCC praised the court‟s decision, stating that, “The court has 
vindicated the public‟s right to receive broadcast press coverage free from government 
interference.” (Johnston, 1989). 
 Not deterred by the court‟s decision, proponents of the Fairness Doctrine continued 
their efforts. A research group founded by Nader released a study in April, 1989 calling 
into question the supposed rationale for removing enforcement of the Doctrine in order to 
create an uninhibited environment for free speech. The study argued that less broadcast 
time had been devoted to public affairs since repeal of the rule (Shales, 1989).  
Meanwhile, members of Congress were still attempting to put the defunct Doctrine 
into law. A subcommittee led by Representative Markey was seeking to mark up 
legislation that would restore the rule (Shales, 1989). Markey had argued that a return to 
the Doctrine would ensure that broadcast licensees would not be able to pose a threat to the 
First Amendment rights of those without licenses (Arnold, 1989). The Senate Commerce 
Committee approved legislation to codify the Doctrine later that month (“Fairness 
Doctrine Bill,” 1989). Neither of these moves was in the end successful, attributed to 
Republican President George H.W. Bush‟s threat to veto later legislation containing the 
fairness revival (Cronauer, 1994, footnote 66; Dewar & Kenworthy, 1989).  
 In court, the Syracuse Peace Council continued to plea for reinstatement of the 
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Doctrine; the U.S. Supreme Court, however, refused in January, 1990 to restore the 
Doctrine. That refusal seemed to embolden certain members of Congress like Senator 
Hollings to pursue legislating the Fairness Doctrine (Salant, 1990). However, attempts to 
reinstate the Doctrine still did not gain enough support to pass, and President Bush sided 
with the earlier Reagan administration‟s position against the rule (Zelnick, 2009). 
 
The Clinton Years 
 Renewed attempts at legislating fairness came in the mid 1990s with the belief that 
the administration of Democratic President Bill Clinton would be more receptive to such a 
move (Wharton, 1993a). Aside from moves to reinstate the Fairness Doctrine, issues 
concerning ownership rules, coverage of local issues and the still-existing corollary rules 
also became more prominent.  
 Senator Hollings again introduced a bill in February, 1993 to reinstate the Doctrine 
(Wharton, 1993a). In response to the renewed efforts, Christian broadcasters became more 
concerned. The National Religious Broadcasters (NRB), meeting in February, 1993, 
voiced fears that a revived Fairness Doctrine would force them to air views contrary to 
their beliefs (“Christians to oppose,” 1993). The next month, the federal court of appeals in 
St. Louis agreed to rehear a case raising the question of whether Congress intended to 
codify the Fairness Doctrine, only later to rule that the Doctrine was not codified in the 
1959 amendment (Wharton, 1993b, 1993e). In June, the U.S. Senate successfully attached 
a provision reinstating the Doctrine in a campaign reform bill (Wharton, 1993c). And a 
House panel began meeting in July to discuss returning to the fairness rule (Boliek, 1993).  
 Some linked the renewed efforts to the fact that one of talk radio‟s most popular 
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hosts, Rush Limbaugh, was a strong critic of President Clinton (Halonen, 1993; Moss, 
1993)
24
. Calls to members of Congress spurred by radio talk-show hosts were reported to 
have put a snag in the efforts in 1993 to reinstate the Doctrine (Wharton, 1993d). Groups 
like NAB and the Radio-Television News Directors Association (RTNDA) continued to 
push against the move. One NAB spokesman stated that reinstating the fairness rule was 
“not about fairness, but about political control” (Diamond, 1993), and the president of 
RTNDA questioned the government‟s ability to decide what is “fair” (Diamond, 1993). 
With failed legislative efforts in 1993, reports emerged the next year claiming that 
members of Congress were pressuring the FCC to reinstate the Doctrine (Wharton, 1994a). 
However, the Commission showed no signs of leaning in that direction (Wharton, 1994b). 
Meanwhile, the ascendency and influence of talk radio to shape the public political 
debate was being recognized by the print media (Dreher, 1994; St. George, 1994). In 1995, 
that influence was viewed by some in a negative context. After the bombing of a federal 
office building in Oklahoma City, critics charged that the rhetoric used in talk radio fanned 
the flames of terrorism that led to that incident. Some conservatives argued that placing the 
blame on talk radio was an attempt by President Clinton and liberals to justify a return to 
the Fairness Doctrine (Fleeson, 1995). This justification was exemplified with Democratic 
Representative Jim Clyburn (South Carolina), who voiced his concern after the bombing 
that conservative talkers were promoting violence and pledged to restore the Doctrine 
(Piacente, 1995). 
                                                 
24
 But not all proponents of restoring the Fairness Doctrine were liberal Democrats and not all opponents of it 
were conservative Republicans. Democratic Governor of New York Mario Cuomo, in an opinion piece in 
The New York Times that year, wrote against the disparity in First-Amendment treatment between the print 
and broadcast press and in favor of a negative-right conception of free speech, specifically quoting the 
negative-rights wording in the First Amendment (Cuomo, 1993). In contrast, several conservatives had also 
voiced their support of the Doctrine in the past (Moss, 1993).  
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 In addition, efforts to further deregulate media ownership were gaining momentum 
in Congress – eventually leading to the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
(“Telecommunications Act,” 1996). Deregulation was argued by proponents as a way of 
freeing up the marketplace of ideas (Fields, 1995). Linking the ownership debate to 
fairness, President Clinton warned that: 
… it would be an error to set up a situation in the United States where one person 
could own half the television stations in the country, or half of the media outlets, 
and we don‟t have a Fairness Doctrine anymore, and we don‟t have ... any kind of 
maintenance of a competitive environment.  (Wharton, 1995) 
  
However, early the next year, George Stephanopoulus, a senior advisor to President 
Clinton, told a group of talk-radio hosts that though they had in the past wished the 
Doctrine was still in place, they did not plan to bring it back (Duin, 1996). 
 Further moving along the road to deregulation, in March, 1996, RTNDA urged 
Congress to make the FCC repeal the two corollary rules on political editorials and 
personal attacks (Wharton, 1996). After the FCC found itself divided on the issue, late in 
1997, RTNDA and NAB asked the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals to end the corollary rules 
(Littleton, 1997). The appeals court agreed to hear oral arguments (Boliek, 1997). While 
these old rules were on their way to being shelved, the Clinton administration had proposed 
looking at new public-interest rules for the digital age – something broadcasters were 
skeptical of (Boliek, 1998). 
 Broadcasters pushed further for looser regulation when they called in 1999 for 
ending the restrictions on how many stations they could own in a local market (Boliek, 
1999a). The Clinton administration opposed further loosening of the rules, arguing that the 
current rules “preserve the core principles of viewpoint diversity embodied in the First 
Amendment as well as the fundamental values of localism and competition” (Boliek, 
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1999b). But that did not stop the FCC. Later that year, the Commission loosened ownership 
rules to allow, under certain circumstances, a broadcaster to own two stations in one city, 
provided that eight other full-power stations remained in the market and one of the two 
owned stations was not ranked in the top four in the market (FCC, 1999b; Schwartz, 1999). 
The FCC argued that this was done in light of the growth in media outlets and in order to 
allow the broadcasters to be more efficient (FCC, 1999b). This seemed to anger some in 
Congress, like Democrats Senator Byron Dorgan (North Dakota) and Representative 
Markey, who viewed it as harmful to the values of localism and diversity (Markey, 1999; 
Schwartz, 1999). 
 Concepts like “localism” and “diversity” were seemingly beginning to gain 
prominence in the appeals from those opposed to further deregulation, even as the FCC 
moved to further deregulate by proposing to ease the ban on owning a newspaper and a 
broadcast station in the same city. In proposing this change, the FCC‟s then Chairman 
William Kennard noted the changing environment in information sources through newer 
avenues like the internet and satellite (“FCC aims,” 2000). MAP‟s Schwartzman argued 
against the relaxation by pointing to the reliance of many voters on broadcasting and 
newspapers for local information and arguing that fewer owners of these mediums “cannot 
help democracy” (“FCC aims,” 2000).  
However, the Commission at the same time voted to retain the national station 
owner cap (Schneider, 2000). Chairman Kennard justified the decision by arguing: “... it is 
vitally important that we encourage the widest possible dissemination of this information 
from diverse and antagonistic sources ... Our structural ownership restrictions seek to 
promote this First Amendment principle” (Schneider, 2000). 
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 Amid greater focus on ownership rules, RTNDA and NAB were still urging court 
action against the corollary rules (Boliek, 2000a). In a petition to the judiciary to act, the 
two groups wrote: 
In less time than it has taken the FCC to address the petition giving arise to this 
case, the American Revolution was fought and won, the Articles of Confederation 
adopted and rejected, and the Constitution drafted, ratified and amended by the Bill 
of Rights – including the [First] Amendment – which these rules flatly violate.  
(Boliek, 2000a) 
 
MAP‟s Schwartzman disagreed and argued that individuals need an opportunity to respond 
(Boliek, 2000a).  
In October, 2000, after the issue was remanded to the Commission, the FCC voted 
for a temporary lifting of the corollary rules in order to study the effect it would have (FCC, 
2000). Critics were frustrated that the FCC did not just permanently put an end to the rules 
(Boliek, 2000b; McClintock & Bernstein, 2000). NAB and RTNDA soon filed an 
emergency request to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals to permanently end the rules 
(McClintock, 2000a). In its decision in RTNDA and NAB v. FCC (2000), the appeals court 
finally struck down the corollary rules. NAB and RTNDA naturally hailed the decision as a 
victory for the First Amendment (McClintock, 2000b; Stern, 2000).  
Some FCC commissioners were not as thrilled. Earlier, in defending the FCC‟s role 
to protect the public interest over broadcasters‟ financial interests, Chairman Kennard 
criticized the “disarray and disinterest of our mass media towards fulfilling its crucial 
democratic commitments” (Labaton, 2000). Lamenting the court‟s decision, FCC 
Commissioner Gloria Tristani argued in a statement, “The purpose of the rules has always 
been to ensure the American public is an informed citizenry, a goal fundamental to our 
democracy” (Tristani, 2000). She added that, “Whether the rules properly balance the 
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competing constitutional rights at issue is a question left open by today‟s ruling” (Tristani, 
2000). 
 
Ownership, Diversity, Localism and Other Issues in the Bush Years 
 With both the Fairness Doctrine and the corollary rules repealed, much of the 
debate in the early years under the administration of Republican President George W. Bush 
revolved around issues of media consolidation, diversity and localism. Deregulation 
opponents saw regulation as a safeguard against concentration of ownership in a few hands 
and a mechanism for ensuring diverse opinion. Supporters of deregulation often viewed 
stricter regulation as a means for the government and politicians to control speech. 
Congressional opponents of deregulation warned against the media-merger trend and 
called for more diversity (Boliek, 2001a; Hollings & Dorgan, 2001; Lieberman, 2001), 
while some proponents of looser standards argued that the goal of localism was not 
necessarily served by having local control over stations but rather by the business interests 
of broadcasters to cater to local listeners (Boliek, 2001b). 
 In February, 2002, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals made a decision to end the 
broadcast-cable cross ownership rule and remanded the national-television station 
ownership rule back to the FCC based on the judicial panel‟s belief that the decision by the 
FCC to keep the rules was “arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law” (Fox Television 
Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 2002, p. 3). Again protesting judicial action loosening the FCC‟s 
regulatory power, MAP‟s Schwartzman claimed, “The (D.C. Circuit) Court of Appeals 
continues its Sherman‟s march through the FCC rulebook, squashing congressional powers 
and the public‟s First Amendment access rights along the way” (Boliek, 2002a). 
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 In June of that year, the FCC decided to consolidate several of its media-ownership 
reviews into one larger review (Boliek, 2002b; Gatlin, 2002). Michael Copps, then the only 
Democratic member of the Commission stated that, “At stake are old and honored values 
of localism, diversity, competition and the multiplicity of voices and choices that 
undergirds our American democracy” (Gatlin, 2002). In similar sentiments appealing to 
democracy and the “free flow of information” later that year, the director of broadcast for 
the American Federation of Television and Radio Artists lamented that deregulation and 
the resulting consolidation harmed localism and diversity of perspective (McNary, 2002). 
 In early 2003, the FCC found itself internally divided over whether to further 
loosen ownership rules (Violanti, 2003), and lawmakers from both major parties were 
urging the Commission to proceed with its review cautiously (Boliek, 2003a). Chairman 
Michael Powell had linked the public interest to the goals of “diversity, localism and 
competition,” but just how those ends could be achieved was at the heart of the debate – 
through greater or lesser regulation (Hinckley, 2003). The FCC took to the road to garner 
opinions and more information to help it solve the debate amid a requirement by the 1996 
telecommunications law to review ownership rules every two years and pressure from the 
judiciary to justify its current rules (Boliek, 2003b; Labaton, 2003a). The Commission 
soon began developing a diversity index as a way to measure media diversity in local 
markets (Crabtree, 2003; Szalai, 2003). 
 The link was increasingly being made between ownership rules and overall fairness 
in coverage. Lamenting what she viewed as the unfairness in the balance of political talk 
radio, Chellie Pingree, president of the group Common Cause appealed to positive-right 
language when noting, “I think the public believes it is their right to have fair coverage, and 
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they don‟t even realize what‟s been lost over the last two decades” (Cox, 2003). 
Liberal-leaning groups argued that the stations owned by large media corporations were 
not being fair to their side (“Critics say,” 2003). Amid this also came a push from a group 
of wealthy Democrats to start up a liberal alternative to what they viewed as a now 
conservative-dominated talk-radio format (“Democrats rush,” 2003). 
 In May of 2003, a plan was developed by FCC staff that would have further 
deregulated the media-ownership market, partially by allowing networks to own more 
local stations (Labaton, 2003b). The two Democrats on the Commission urged caution 
over concerns that the plan was too drastic (Gatlin, 2003a; Labaton, 2003b). Chairman 
Powell, however, rejected a plea from the two to delay a vote in order to give time for more 
public comment and review (Boliek, 2003c).  
The vote took place on June 2 and was down party lines, 3-2, in favor of further 
relaxing the rules – allowing networks to own more local stations and companies, in certain 
cases, to own a newspaper and television station in the same city (“FCC loosens,” 2003). 
Powell – arguing that these changes would advance the goals of localism and diversity 
(“FCC loosens,” 2003) – and the other two Republican commissioners deemed the 
decision appropriate (Martin, 2003), while their Democratic counterparts on the 
Commission, Jonathan Adelstein and Copps, argued that they would “damage the media 
landscape” (Adelstein in “FCC loosens,” 2003) and “empower America‟s new media elite 
with unacceptable levels of influence over the ideas and information upon which our 
society and our democracy so heavily depend” (Copps in Geewax, 2003).  
Opposition to the plan in Congress was not strictly among party lines, with several 
Republicans voicing their concerns along with Democrats (Dinan, 2003; Geewax, 2003). 
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Moves were soon made in the Senate to reinstate the rules (Gatlin, 2003b). Such moves 
were threatened with a veto from President Bush, but they continued to have bipartisan 
support (Boliek, 2003d).  
Later that year, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Philadelphia ordered the 
enactment of the rules to be stopped (Labaton, 2003c). In litigation, the FCC defended its 
position but eventually lost in June, 2004 when it was ordered to rewrite the rules (Boliek, 
2003e; Free Press, 2004). 
 Seeming to acknowledge the concerns about the potential negative effects of this 
deregulation on values like diversity and localism (Ransby, 2003; Safire, 2003), Powell 
had begun to pursue ways to safeguard against the erosion of the coverage of local issues 
by promoting measures to ensure localism (Ahrens, 2003; FCC, 2003; Gatlin, 2003c). In 
doing so, he also linked localism with diversity issues focused around women and 
minorities (Mollison, 2003). The FCC established a localism task force and planned to hold 
six public hearings across the country to garner citizen and activist opinion on the issue 
(Harper, 2003). Critics, however, argued that the Commission should have studied the 
localism issue prior to loosening the ownership rules (“FCC media,” 2003). 
 In October, 2004, an issue that gained national attention played into both the 
localism and fairness debates. Sinclair Broadcasting had produced and planned to air a 
documentary critical of Democratic presidential nominee Senator John Kerry, of 
Massachusetts (Routhier, 2004). Critics argued that the preemption of local programming 
to air the documentary went against the stations‟ obligations to cater to local interests and 
needs (Lazaroff, 2004). The Kerry campaign argued that it should receive equal time in 
response to the documentary, but that requirement no longer applied given the earlier 
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repeal of the Fairness Doctrine and the corollary rules (Dean, 2004; Furchtgott-Roth, 
2004).  
Referencing Sinclair and the Kerry documentary, critics began pointing out how 
they believed fairness rules should be brought back. “As public trustees, broadcasters 
ought to be insuring that they inform the public, not inflame them,” said MAP‟s 
Schwartzman (Rendall, 2005). “That‟s why we need a Fairness Doctrine” (Rendall, 2005). 
After losing his 2004 bid for the presidency, Kerry stated the following: 
There has been a profound and negative change in the relationship of America‟s 
media with America‟s people. This all began, incidentally, when the Fairness 
Doctrine ended. You would have had a dramatic change in the discussion in this 
country had we still had a Fairness Doctrine in the course of the last campaign.  
(Anderson, 2006) 
  
 In February, 2005 Democratic Representative Louise Slaughter (New York) 
introduced an eight-page House bill which would have, among other things, essentially 
restored the Fairness Doctrine by requiring broadcast stations to cover important local 
issues in a fair manner. It also would have mandated that stations hold meetings assessing 
the interests of their local community and shortened the license period (“Fairness and 
Accountability,” 2005). The bill raised concerns that since repeal of the Fairness Doctrine, 
networks and news outlets had become “highly partisan” and “unbalanced” (“Fairness and 
Accountability,” 2005, p. 2).  
Such moves to restore regulation concerned broadcasters. Speaking in a February 
meeting of the NRB, Commissioner Kevin Martin – who would soon take over as FCC 
chairman – said he did not think a return to the Doctrine was appropriate given its chilling 
effect on free speech. Specifically referencing the interests of the religious broadcasters, he 
added that removal of the Doctrine enabled broadcasters to air more “niche” programming 
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(Gerstein, 2005).  
Critics of deregulation had become increasingly concerned about such niche 
programming. One example of these critics was Cass Sunstein, from the University of 
Chicago Law School. Sunstein argued that such niche coverage of the issues in print, 
broadcast and especially the internet, by not presenting issues from a broad and balanced 
perspective, hindered the functioning of democracy (Coy, 2001). Seeming to agree with 
Sunstein‟s sentiments, Susan Douglas, a communications professor at the University of 
Michigan, wrote that, “Ongoing media consolidation, and the censorship and pro-right 
blather that go with it, are sustained by the silencing of oppositional voices Americans are 
no longer required to hear” (Douglas, 2005) – required to hear by a government fairness 
rule, insinuating a positive-right conception of free speech.  
In March, 2005, a report from the FCC‟s Media Bureau staff added more fuel to the 
fire of deregulation by arguing that the scarcity rationale for regulating broadcast was “an 
idea whose time has passed” (Berresford, 2005, p. ii). However, the report concluded that 
although the scarcity rationale was no longer valid, the government still had an interest in 
making sure that news and information, particularly about local issues, was available to 
Americans. It suggested looking at new ways of ensuring this that were consistent with the 
current media landscape (Berresford, 2005). That same month, after becoming the new 
chairman, Commissioner Martin reiterated the FCC‟s role in ensuring ownership rules that 
would, in light of the current media landscape, preserve the values of diversity, localism 
and competition (“A North Carolinian,” 2005). 
Another piece of legislation reinstating fairness rules was proposed by a co-sponsor 
of Representative Slaughter‟s earlier bill in 2005. Democratic Representative Maurice 
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Hinchey (New York) introduced his “Media Ownership Reform Act,” seeking to reverse 
many of the FCC‟s deregulatory decisions (“Media Ownership,” n.d.). The bill would have 
restored the Fairness Doctrine and returned to stricter ownership caps (“Breaking Up,” 
2005). Hinchey argued that it was the job of Congress to “ensure that our citizens are 
provided access to diverse and educational programming from a variety of sources ...” 
(Hinchey, 2005). 
 In June, 2006, the FCC began taking up the issue of revisiting its ownership rules 
made in 2003, given the requirement by the appeals court in 2004 (FCC, 2006; Holland, 
2006). Critics of further deregulation argued that diversity and broadcaster treatment both 
in coverage and employment of minorities and women were deterred by ownership 
deregulation (Garofoli, 2006; Triplett, 2006a). Several lawmakers urged the FCC to finish 
its localism study before considering new ownership rules (Triplett, 2006b). The push to 
avoid further deregulation was aided by the fact that, as a result of the 2006 mid-term 
elections, Congress was soon to be controlled by Democrats. 
 Early in 2007, several Democratic lawmakers began talk once again of restoring the 
Fairness Doctrine. Representatives Hinchey and Slaughter were joined by two others, 
Democratic Representative Dennis Kucinich (Ohio) and independent Senator Bernie 
Sanders (Vermont), in calling for legislation to restore the rule (Hinckley, 2007; “Policing 
Speech,” 2007). An annual meeting of notables, including Democratic lawmakers, in favor 
of a return to the Doctrine was held in January of 2007 in which Sanders and others voiced 
support for restoring the Doctrine as a way to ensure more liberal voices were heard 
(Accuracy In Media, 2007). 
 In February, the two Democratic commissioners on the FCC wrote an op-ed in 
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which they linked fair presentations of views and localism to media ownership. They 
argued that, “We deserve to be exposed to a variety of viewpoints and local programs, 
rather than being force-fed content provided by a few companies that dominate our media 
landscape” (Copps & Adelstein, 2007). They also appealed to the Red Lion decision‟s 
support of a “right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, 
moral and other ideas and experiences” (Copps & Adelstein, 2007). 
 Further reports of support in Congress for a return to the Doctrine continued 
throughout 2007. One report in May claimed that two unnamed members of the House 
Democratic Caucus said that Democratic representatives Nancy Pelosi (California) and 
Steny Hoyer (Maryland) were both “aggressively” pursuing a return to the Fairness 
Doctrine (Washington Prowler, 2007). 
In June, others added their comments on the subject. Republican Senator James 
Inhofe (Oklahoma) claimed on a radio program that he overheard Democratic senators 
Hillary Clinton (New York) and Barbara Boxer (California) lamenting the influence on 
conservative talk radio and contemplating a “legislative fix” for it (“Claim,” 2007). 
However, spokespersons for both senators denied that the conversation ever took place 
(Rowland, 2007a). Senator Olympia Snowe (Maine) stated her concern around the same 
time over the quality of programming in her state in light of the lack of local media 
ownership; she linked ownership rules to localism and diversity of viewpoint (Kesich, 
2007). Democratic Senator Dick Durbin (Illinois) voiced his support for a return to the 
Fairness Doctrine, appealing to what he viewed as the need for the airwaves to be used as a 
means to “strengthen our country and our democracy” (Pike, 2007). In addition, Senator 
John Kerry also voiced his support for a return to the Doctrine in a radio interview 
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(Eggerton, 2007a). 
In a television appearance in that same month, Republican Senator Trent Lott 
(Mississippi) and Democratic Senator Dianne Feinstein (California) both lamented the 
influence talk radio had on the current immigration-reform debate in the country, with Lott 
suggesting that talk radio had not represented the proposed reform legislation accurately 
(Lott, 2007). Feinstein went further to accuse talk radio of tending to be one-sided, arguing 
that it “pushes people to, I think, extreme views without a lot of information” (Feinstein, 
2007). She then said she was looking at reviving the Fairness Doctrine (Feinstein, 2007). 
Amid this rhetoric, however, a House amendment to an appropriations bill, 
introduced by Republican Representative Mike Pence (Indiana), was passed that would 
prevent money from being spent by the FCC the following year to restore the Doctrine. 
Pence argued that while the current debate over the return of the Doctrine was important, it 
was the next administration he and his cosponsors were concerned about. Representative 
Kucinich also agreed that a future administration might be willing to reinstate it (Eggerton, 
2007b). One commentator from Congressional Quarterly warned similarly that, “Unless 
broadcasters take steps to voluntarily balance their programming, they can expect a return 
of fairness rules if Democrats keep control of Congress and win the White House next 
year” (Kincaid, 2007). 
Pence also soon proposed a separate bill, “the Broadcast Freedom Act” (Boliek, 
2007a). In a letter to Pence, FCC Chairman Martin said the Commission still had no 
“compelling reason” to reconsider the repeal of the Doctrine based on its 1987 
determination that it was not in the public interest, adding that the boom in information 
sources since 1987 had rendered the Doctrine even more unnecessary (Boliek, 2007b). 
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Similar legislation blocking the reinstatement of the Doctrine was also supported by 
several Republican lawmakers in the Senate (Diaz, 2007). A report released from the 
Senate Republican Policy Committee in July further attacked the Fairness Doctrine by 
calling it “Unfair, Outdated and Incoherent” (Senate Republican Policy Committee, 2007).  
 Aside from the overt calls to reinstate the Doctrine, supporters of more government 
regulation of the airwaves also continued to voice support for localism and stricter 
ownership regulations – all in the name of the public interest. A joint report from the liberal 
think-tank Center for American Progress and the liberal group Free Press, released earlier 
in the year, presented talk radio as severely unbalanced in its point of view – tilted to the 
conservative side (Center for American Progress & Free Press, 2007). The report, titled 
“The Structural Imbalance of Talk Radio,” (referred to hereafter as the CAP report) argued 
that “The disparities between conservative and progressive programming reflect the 
absence of localism in American radio markets” and called for three main moves to correct 
the imbalance: restore ownership caps on commercial radio, “ensure greater local 
accountability over radio licensing” and impose a fee supporting public broadcasting on 
those “commercial owners who fail to abide by enforceable public interest obligations” 
(Center for American Progress & Free Press, 2007, p. 2).  
The CAP report, however, did not call for a return to enforcement of the Fairness 
Doctrine. The authors argued that the Doctrine alone was never sufficient, but rather that it 
“was most effective” when combined with shorter license terms, challenges to those 
licenses via “comparative hearings,” interviewing local leaders and public notice of license 
expiration dates (Center for American Progress & Free Press, 2007, p. 6).  
One of the report‟s authors, Mark Lloyd, wrote in a separate article that the 
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Doctrine was never enough alone to ensure diverse coverage of local issues. He added that 
it was not necessary to return to enforcing the Fairness Doctrine, instead emphasizing 
regulation supporting more local accountability and diversity in hopes of serving the public 
interest (Lloyd, 2007a). 
The conservative think-tank Heritage Foundation criticized the CAP report. 
Heritage argued that the goals of the report were to reduce the number of conservative 
voices and increase funds to more liberal-leaning public broadcasting (Gattuso, 2007). 
 This did not deter calls to reinstate the Doctrine or efforts to prevent its return in 
Congress. In October, Republicans were calling on lawmakers to make sure that Congress 
would have a final say in any possible attempt to reinstate the Doctrine. One Democratic 
congressman, David Obey (Wisconsin), was in favor of blocking reinstatement of the 
fairness rule, arguing that it would play into the hands of conservatives. A report had also 
come out around that time that Democratic Representative Henry Waxman (California) 
had planned investigations into talk-radio hosts in hopes of reinstating the Doctrine; 
Waxman‟s office denied that report (Pfeiffer, 2007). 
 Toward the end of 2007, FCC Chairman Martin was pushing to further loosen 
ownership rules, particularly cross-ownership rules (McConnell, 2007). Several senators 
attempted to delay any move from the FCC to loosen regulations (Carter, 2007a, 2007b). 
Republican Senator Lott, Democratic senators Dorgan, Barack Obama (Illinois) and John 
Edwards (North Carolina), and Representative Hinchey, among others, all stated their 
opposition to the rule changes (McConnell, 2007; Orol, 2007). Obama wrote to Martin in 
opposition to greater consolidation in media ownership, noting that “the commission has 
failed to further the goals of diversity in the media and promote localism” (Boliek, 2007c). 
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Obama also later co-wrote a letter with Senator Kerry warning Martin that they would act 
to block funding to the FCC if it voted to loosen the rules. In that letter, he argued, “We 
must ensure that we have an open media market that represents all of the voices in our 
diverse nation and allows them to be heard” (Triplett, 2007). 
 Soon, the Commission also released its report on localism and notice of proposed 
rulemaking, which among other things suggested the creation of community advisory 
boards made up of local officials and “leaders” of segments in the community to guide 
licensees on their service to their local communities (FCC, 2008, p.14). Republican FCC 
Commissioner Robert McDowell warned that the FCC “[risked] treading on the First 
Amendment rights of broadcasters with unnecessary regulation,” but Commissioner 
Copps, arguing that there were fewer local programs and reports, claimed that, “Big 
consolidated media dampens local and regional creativity, and that begins to mess around 
pretty seriously with the genius of our nation” (Virgin, 2008). 
 The Commission issued its final order on the proposed ownership-rule changes in 
February, 2008; lawmakers from both parties decried it (Carter, 2008a, 2008b). By now, 
though, attention had been shifted to some degree to the newly proposed localism rules. In 
commenting on the proposed rules, NAB laid out several arguments against them that were 
similar to those often levied against the Fairness Doctrine. They viewed this potential 
regulation to be similar in effect to the Doctrine in that it went against the First Amendment 
and would inhibit the goals of diverse opinion in much the same way that the chilling effect 
did with the Fairness Doctrine. They also argued that the rules would place the FCC in the 
position of subjectively defining for communities what was truly “local” programming 
(Parshall, 2008). 
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 Then in March of 2008, President Bush made comments to the NRB raising the 
specter of a return to the Fairness Doctrine. He called the Doctrine “Orwellian” and argued 
supporters of it “want to silence those they don‟t agree with” (Eggerton, 2008a). Noting 
that the Democratic congressional leadership had blocked action on Republican-drafted 
legislation to ban the reimposition of the Doctrine, Bush vowed to veto any legislation 
seeking to reinstate the rule (Eggerton, 2008a). 
 Comments on the proposed localism rules were due April 28 (Skrzycki, 2008). 
NAB was joined by other broadcasters like Disney, which stated that, “Such inquiries 
clearly indicate that the FCC would ultimately state a preference for certain types of local 
programming over others ... and this raises serious constitutional issues” (Boliek, 2008). 
Members of Congress, particularly Republicans, also voiced their opposition to the 
localism rules (Spivey, 2008). Some began to argue, similar to NAB, that the localism rules 
were a type of backdoor method of achieving the goals of the Fairness Doctrine – which in 
conservatives‟ minds meant silencing conservative opinion (Boulet, 2008a)25. However, 
that backdoor attempt argument was something that FCC sources denied (Weyrich, 2008). 
 Amid the localism debate, there continued to be hints at returning to the Fairness 
Doctrine. A Human Events editor reported in June that Democratic Speaker of the House 
Nancy Pelosi told him and others in a breakfast meeting that the interest of her caucus was 
to see that the efforts by Representative Pence and others to block reimposition of the 
Doctrine did not come to the floor, and, when asked, she said she personally supported a 
revival of the Doctrine (Gizzi, 2008). Religious broadcasters were also worried about the 
return of the Doctrine and its potential effect on their First Amendment free-speech and 
                                                 
25
 Representative John Boehner (Ohio), the Republican leader in the House, called the rules a “stealth 
enactment of the Fairness Doctrine, a policy designated to squelch the free speech and free expression of 
specifically targeted audiences” (Weyrich, 2008). 
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religious-exercise rights, particularly with the change of parties in power (Butts, 2008; 
Nereim, 2008; Rao, 2008). 
However, both leading presidential candidates voiced their opposition to a return to 
the Doctrine. A spokesman for Republican Senator John McCain (Arizona) said, “Sen. 
McCain believes the federal government should not be in the position of policing the 
airwaves,” and a spokesman for Senator Barack Obama wrote that Obama did not support 
reimposing the Doctrine, adding that, “He considers this debate to be a distraction from the 
conversation we should be having about opening up the airwaves and modern 
communications to as many diverse viewpoints as possible” (Nereim, 2008). 
But those comments did not stop the rumblings. Commissioner McDowell went so 
far as to link a revival of the Fairness Doctrine to the debate over internet network 
neutrality. “So you know, this election, if it goes one way, we could see a re-imposition of 
the Fairness Doctrine,” he said (Poor, 2008). “There is a discussion of it in Congress. I 
think it won‟t be called the Fairness Doctrine by folks who are promoting it. I think it will 
be called something else and I think it‟ll be intertwined into the net neutrality debate” 
(Poor, 2008). Related to that, a spokesman for Senator Obama told Broadcasting and 
Cable that, while the senator did not support restoring the Fairness Doctrine, he did support 
“media-ownership caps, network neutrality, public broadcasting, as well as increasing 
minority ownership of broadcasting and print outlets” (Eggerton, 2008c). 
 Toward the end of 2008, reports continued of lawmakers voicing support for the 
Fairness Doctrine and tighter regulation of broadcast. In October, Democratic Senator Jeff 
Bingaman (New Mexico) told a radio station that under the Doctrine: “... the country was 
well-served. I think the public discussion was at a higher level and more intelligent in those 
 82 
days than it has become since” (Kovacs, 2008). Then on election day, Democratic Senator 
Charles Schumer (New York) voiced his support for the goals behind the fairness rule after 
a Fox News anchor asked him if he supported telling radio stations what content they could 
present. Schumer responded by asking the anchor, “I think we should all try to be fair and 
balanced, don‟t you?” (Schumer, 2008). He then went on to voice his support of the FCC‟s 
ability to ban pornography from broadcasts, arguing: “But you can‟t say, „Government, 
hands off in one area to a commercial enterprise, but you‟re allowed to intervene in 
another.‟ That‟s not consistent.” (Schumer, 2008). Similarly, a Forbes article that month 
argued that the Bush-era FCC‟s actions against offensive language gave more leeway to 
Democrats and Obama should they decide to regulate broadcast content in the form of a 
restored Fairness Doctrine or something similar to it (Bolick, 2008)
26
. 
 
Fairness, Localism and Diversity in the Age of Obama  
 While several lawmakers continued to voice their support for a restoration of the 
Fairness Doctrine, the issue had not gained any relevant traction. However, critics began to 
increasingly argue that under the auspices of localism, diversity or similar broadcast goals, 
liberal Democrats in charge of Congress, and potentially President-elect Obama, could 
move to achieve many of the same results of the Doctrine (Boulet, 2008b; Stotts, 2008; 
Thompson, 2008). Shortly after the election, President Bush‟s top telecommunications 
advisor warned that she thought restoring the Fairness Doctrine was still on the agenda of 
some in Congress (Eggerton, 2008d). Fox News interviewed Representative Pelosi and 
                                                 
26
 But not all Democrats were voicing pro-regulation sentiments. On election night, Democratic 
representatives Chris Van Hollen and Ben Cardin, both of Maryland, voiced their concern over the difficulty 
in reimposing the Fairness Doctrine given what they viewed as the current proliferation of media outlets 
(“Two Top Democrats,” 2008). 
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Senator Bingaman in November and they again voiced their support for the Doctrine 
(Bingaman & Pelosi, 2008). However, MAP‟s Schwartzman said of accusations of a return 
to the Doctrine around that time: “We‟ve got a lot of work to do, and this would be a 
sideshow. This is entirely a creation of a bunch of right-wing talk-show hosts trying to 
make a ruckus” (Helling, 2008). Also, press secretaries for both senators Feinstein and 
Durbin said in November that their bosses did not intend to call for or vote for a restoration 
of the Doctrine (Nathan, 2008).  
 That was not enough to diminish the specter of the Doctrine‟s return. Conservative 
groups continued to ramp up their rhetoric and actions to prevent it (Motley, 2008), and 
commentators and lawmakers continued rhetorically pointing out the possibility of its 
restoration (Kyl, 2008; Wicker, 2008). Writing in December, conservative columnist 
George Will argued, as might have been evidenced in the earlier writing of Cass Sunstein:  
... some liberals now say: The problem is not maldistribution of opinion and 
information, but too much of both. Until recently, liberals fretted that the media 
were homogenizing America into blandness. Now they say speech management by 
government is needed because of a different scarcity – the public‟s attention, which 
supposedly is overloaded by today‟s information cornucopia.  (Will, 2008) 
 
Then came comments from Democratic Representative Anna Eshoo (California) saying 
that she would not only push to support restoring the Fairness Doctrine, but she would also 
want it to apply to cable and satellite programming (Gladnick, 2008); Representative 
Boehner quickly criticized those comments and appealed to President-elect Obama to 
voice his opposition to any such attempts (Eggerton, 2008e). 
 Early in 2009, with the Democrats still in charge of Congress and a new 
Democratic president soon to take office, Republicans in the House and Senate once again 
offered bills to block reimposition of the Fairness Doctrine (Teinowitz, 2009) and NAB 
 84 
and conservative groups voiced their support for them (“Broadcaster Freedom Act,” 2009; 
“Christian Coalition,” 2009; “NAB Applauds,” 2009). But Democratic leaders were still 
insistent that they had no intention of bringing the rule back (Ryan, 2009a). A spokesman 
for Democratic Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (Nevada) said, “We have enough real 
problems facing this country that we don‟t need to invent ones that don‟t exist,” adding, 
“This is not even close to being on our radar screen” (Rowland, 2009).  
 Republican lawmakers, however, were not deterred by such statements. In Eric 
Holder‟s confirmation hearings for attorney general, senators questioned him on the 
Fairness Doctrine. Republican Senator Jeff Sessions (Alabama) pointed to a 2004 speech 
from Holder in which he lamented the influence of conservative media and its effect on the 
dissemination of liberal views and then asked him if he believed the government had the 
authority to impose balance on the airwaves. Holder characterized his views as those of a 
private citizen and said he was not intending to implicate the Fairness Doctrine (Holder, 
2004; Picket, 2009). 
Some conservative critics also pointed to a statement on the new White House‟s 
official Web site page on technology, that read, “Encourage diversity in the ownership of 
broadcast media, promote the development of new media outlets for expression of diverse 
viewpoints, and clarify the public interest obligations of broadcasters who occupy the 
nation‟s spectrum” (“Technology,” n.d.) as an indication that the administration was open 
to imposing stricter regulations on broadcasters in the areas of localism and diversity 
without overtly bringing back the explicit Fairness Doctrine (Unruh, 2009). More 
controversy ensued over the new administration with a report that Obama told Republican 
leaders in one of his first meetings with them that, “You can‟t just listen to Rush Limbaugh 
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and get things done” (Shipman, 2009). Twice, one time in a press conference and another 
in a “Fox News Sunday” appearance, key members of the Obama administration seemed to 
not be certain of the president‟s views on the Fairness Doctrine, despite his earlier 
statement during the campaign that he did not support reinstating it (Calderone, 2009f; 
“„Fairness Doctrine‟ question,” 2009). The White House later reiterated Obama‟s 
campaign position against reinstating the Doctrine (Eggerton, 2009b). 
 The month before, Commissioner McDowell warned again in a speech to the 
Media Institute that the Fairness Doctrine could come back in a stealth form, suggesting it 
could be marketed under a new name, this time “intertwined into other communications 
policy initiatives that are more certain to move through the system, such as localism, 
diversity or net neutrality” (McDowell, 2009, p. 9). Conservative groups echoed 
McDowell‟s contention (Groening, 2009). 
Acting Chairman Copps soon noted that although he did not support returning to 
the Doctrine, he thought the FCC had a “tremendous opportunity ... to ensure that the 
public airwaves truly deliver the kind of news and information that we need to sustain our 
democratic dialogue and to reflect the great diversity of our country” (Cover, 2009a). He 
added that, “If markets cannot produce what society really cares about, like a media that 
reflects the true diversity and spirit of our country, then government has a legitimate role to 
play” (Cover, 2009a).  
 Worries also came when Democratic Senator Debbie Stabenow (Michigan) hinted 
that she would push for hearings and told radio host Bill Press: “I think it‟s absolutely time 
to pass a standard. Now, whether it‟s called the Fairness Standard, whether it‟s called 
something else – I absolutely think it‟s time to be bringing accountability to the airwaves” 
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(Calderone, 2009a). Although her press secretary shortly thereafter said she would not be 
calling for hearings (Calderone, 2009c), another Democrat, Senator Tom Harkin (Iowa), 
also weighed in on Press‟ radio show and kept the specter alive by recounting how he had 
read an op-ed by Press and thought to himself, “there you go, we gotta get the Fairness 
Doctrine back in law again” (Calderone, 2009b). Harkin, too, later stepped back from those 
remarks (Norman, 2009)
27
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 Aside from overt statements in support of the Fairness Doctrine, the localism issue 
also continued to concern conservatives and several broadcasters. Representative Boehner 
commented that, “Localism is quickly becoming code for the efforts of liberals to limit free 
speech and dissent” (Hair, 2009). And soon thereafter, Rush Limbaugh wrote an open 
letter to President Obama asking if he intended to “censor talk radio through a variety of 
contrivances, such as „local content,‟ „diversity of ownership,‟ and „public interest‟ rules” 
(Limbaugh, 2009). 
Conservative lawmakers continued their push to oppose a return to the Doctrine or 
something resembling it (Meyers, 2009; Thune, 2009). The Senate voted for a 
Republican-initiated amendment in late February that would have banned reinstatement of 
the Fairness Doctrine, while also voting for a Democrat-initiated amendment calling for 
the FCC to ensure diversity in ownership and public-interest standards (“District of 
Columbia,” 2009; Jones, S., 2009). Senator Durbin, who proposed the latter amendment, 
noted that he believed it pertained more to ethnic and gender diversity and that, “... we‟re 
convinced that if there is diversity, then that is going to give us the kind of diversity of 
                                                 
27
 Former presidents Clinton and Jimmy Carter even weighed in. Clinton said he had not supported repealing 
the Fairness Doctrine and thought that if it was not present, something else would be needed to ensure 
balance (Calderone, 2009e), while Carter stated that he had not supported the perpetuation of the Fairness 
Doctrine (“Carter: „Not,” 2009, February). 
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opinion that America wants to hear” (York, 2009). However, Republican lawmakers were 
concerned that it would lead to a back-door type of Fairness Doctrine (Inhofe, 2009). 
 Liberal groups like Free Press also shifted their focus away from the Doctrine and 
onto localism, diversity and ownership rules (Eggerton, 2009c). A Penn State professor 
and former Clinton administration official, seeming to confirm Commissioner McDowell‟s 
marketing theory, was reported to have told a group at a think-tank forum in early 2009 
that, “„activities simulated by the repeal of the fairness doctrine‟ contributed to the need for 
new regulation, but that they would need rebranding to avoid the „strong and stereotyped‟ 
reactions to the term „fairness doctrine‟” (Eggerton, 2009d). Senate Majority Leader Reid 
soon reiterated that no one had an interest in bringing back the Fairness Doctrine (Ryan, 
2009b). 
 The FCC‟s focus was also turned to issues of diversity, ownership and localism. In 
April, Chairman Copps announced the members of a new Advisory Committee on 
Diversity for Communications in the Digital Age (FCC, 2009a). Conservative critics 
argued that the makeup of the committee did not contain any conservative groups and that 
it may be another back-door way into achieving a new type of Fairness Doctrine 
(“Concerns Raised,” 2009; Motley, 2009; Roberts, 2009). In the committee‟s first meeting, 
Copps denied those suggestions and called them “issue-mongering” (Copps, 2009a). 
Copps later referred to a “progressive promised land” in a speech to Free Press where he 
also touted localism and diversity and warned that “... we are skating perilously close to 
depriving our fellow citizens of the depth and breadth of information they need to make 
intelligent choices about their future” (Copps, 2009b). 
Meanwhile, one of the larger broadcast companies, Clear Channel, had 
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preemptively ordered its local stations to set up local advisory boards (“Nation‟s talkers,” 
2009). Commissioner McDowell warned that “a mandatory community advisory board 
that could have legal sway over a broadcaster‟s license renewal could start dictating 
content under such a rule”, adding, “There are comments in the record supporting that, so it 
is not just a law-school hypothetical horrible situation” (Eggerton, 2009e). 
 In Congress, Republican attempts to legislate a block to any future attempt to bring 
back the Fairness Doctrine were blocked in committee and on the House floor by 
Democrats (“House Committee Rejects,” 2009; KDRV Staff, 2009). In an op-ed lamenting 
their failed efforts, Republican representatives Pence and Greg Walden (Oregon) noted 
previous support of the Fairness Doctrine from Democratic lawmakers and argued that 
proposed localism regulations were also “just a Trojan Horse for unelected bureaucrats in 
Washington determining what you can or cannot listen to” (Walden & Pence, 2009). 
 Conservative critics also began in 2009 to focus on several so-called “czars” in the 
Obama administration (Cantor, 2009). Those appointees pertaining to broadcast regulation 
were not immune. 
Among those was the earlier mentioned Cass Sunstein, appointed as the head of the 
Obama White House‟s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. Sunstein came under 
increased scrutiny for his previous writings in favor of tighter regulation of broadcast and 
internet content as well as a new book reportedly calling for increased monitoring and 
regulation of “false rumors,” specifically recounting President Obama‟s critics‟ attempts to 
link him with former 60‟s radical William Ayers, now a Chicago professor (Hill, 2009; 
Klein, 2009). 
Also on the radar for conservative critics was the FCC‟s newly-selected Chief 
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Diversity Officer, Mark Lloyd (FCC, 2009b). Lloyd, as aforementioned, had co-authored 
the 2007 CAP report. Critics, however, began to emphasize his other comments, like those 
proposing that commercial broadcast stations should pay license fees equal to their 
operating costs that could go toward funding public broadcasting stations (Cover, 2009b). 
He also wrote another article for CAP in light of the media ownership regulation debate in 
which he recounted FDR‟s battle with the media to present his New Deal legislation in a 
favorable light (Lloyd, 2007b). Lloyd concluded the following: 
A pro-big business Supreme Court aligned with Murdoch, Limbaugh and Zell and 
ready to battle a progressive in the White House begins to sound a lot like the early 
years of the FDR administration. Will progressives sound like FDR and commit to 
creating media policy that actually serves democracy and promotes diverse and 
antagonistic sources of news?  (Lloyd, 2007b) 
  
He had also reportedly written in favor of the positive-right conception of free speech by 
arguing: 
The American republic requires the active deliberation of a diverse citizenry, and 
this, I argue, can be ensured only by our government ... Put another way, providing 
for the equal capability of citizens to participate effectively in democratic 
deliberation is our collective responsibility.  (Cover, 2009c) 
  
He wrote that: 
... blind references to freedom of speech or the press serve as a distraction from the 
critical examination of other communications policies. ... the purpose of free 
speech is warped to protect global corporations and block rules that would promote 
democratic governance.  (Lloyd, 2006, pp. 20 & 21) 
 
 Republican Senator Charles Grassley (Iowa) wrote a letter to new FCC Chairman 
Julius Genachowski expressing his concerns over Lloyd‟s previous proposals in light of 
Genachowski‟s earlier statements disavowing support for the Fairness Doctrine (Grassley, 
2009). Genachowski responded back stating, as he had done before, that he did not support 
reinstating the Doctrine or “any effort to censor or impose speech on the basis of political 
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views or opinions” (Brown, 2009). He, and other FCC members, later voiced their support 
for Lloyd‟s appointment, with Commissioner McDowell noting some reservations about 
Lloyd‟s previous writings (“Commissioners spar,” 2009)28.   
 
Continuing Debate 
 As of the writing of this chapter, the debate over broadcast regulation in the name 
of the public interest has continued. That debate, however, has made a notable shift from 
the overt reinstatement of the Fairness Doctrine to other regulatory matters that revolve 
around the issues of diversity, ownership and localism. All of those issues, however, relate 
to a positive-right conception of free speech – one in which government‟s perceived role is 
to actively foster, through regulation, the positive-right goals of diverse speech and access 
to media outlets and information. 
 Those in favor of the positive conception of political speech contend government 
regulation is the appropriate vehicle to attain those goals they believe are inherent in the 
values behind free speech and democracy. Those in favor of a negative conception 
continue to point out their belief that government regulation necessarily chills free speech 
and goes against the explicit wording in the First Amendment. This debate over the right to 
free speech, particularly in the rhetoric used by either side, continues to be animated by 
contrasting views of what that right represents: positive or negative liberty. The next 
chapter will, in light of the aforementioned history of this debate, attempt to argue that the 
positive-right conception of free political speech runs into problems philosophically, 
constitutionally and practically. 
                                                 
28
 Groups like Free Press and the Minority Media & Telecommunications Council also defended Lloyd 
(Eggerton, 2009f; “Honig Defends,” 2009). 
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CHAPTER V 
PROBLEMS WITH THE POSITIVE CONCEPTION 
 
A Positive or Negative Conception? 
 The previous chapters have demonstrated that underlying the Fairness Doctrine and 
similar public-interest regulations relating to localism and diversity of ownership is a 
positive conception of the right to free speech. This positive-right conception places 
emphasis on the government as the guardian of diverse speech in broadcasting (and at 
times, other mediums). Supporters of the positive right to free speech seem to believe 
government should foster and maintain diversity and balance of opinion in order to 
promote the broader goals of an informed citizenry and better democratic decision-making. 
In contrast to this positive-right conception is the negative-right view of free speech. It sees 
no role for government in policing the political content of broadcast speech. In fact, 
government, it contends, by involving itself in such regulation, may inhibit the very diverse 
political speech it intends to foster. 
 The purpose of this chapter will be to argue that the negative-right conception of 
free speech is philosophically, constitutionally and practically more appropriate than the 
positive-right vision exemplified in the Fairness Doctrine and similar regulations relating 
to localism and ownership rules. It will do so by arguing three main points. First is that a 
positive-right conception tends to treat individuals in a paternalistic manner, viewing them 
as incapable of making decisions on their own without the guidance of government 
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regulation. Second, a positive-right conception of free speech is constitutionally suspect in 
relation to a negative-right interpretation of the First-Amendment. And the third point is 
that the positive-right conception of free speech is impractical to implement and can 
actually inhibit the stated goal of diversity of political opinion – creating a chilling effect. 
 
Positive-Right Paternalism 
 Isaiah Berlin warned in his writing on the two conceptions of liberty that the 
positive conception of liberty would lend itself more to abuse than a negative conception. 
As was noted in this thesis‟ earlier exposition of Berlin‟s positive/negative liberty 
dichotomy, he placed particular emphasis on the threat of paternalism (Berlin, 2002). 
Essentially, at its heart, paternalism means treating an individual as if they were incapable 
of making decisions on their own. It requires an assumption on the part of the paternalist 
that they know better than the actual individual what that individual truly, in their core, 
desires. As such, it often negates the autonomous free will of the individual and replaces it 
with the goals of the paternalist. 
 Berlin referenced Kant when he noted that paternalism allows others to treat 
individuals as not fully free (Berlin, 2002). This treatment allows the paternalist – referred 
to by Berlin as the “social reformer” (p. 184) – to shape individuals into his mold or vision, 
without regard to the individuals‟ desires, goals or free will. The paternalist is using 
individuals to reach some social goal he believes is in their best interest, as well as the 
society‟s interest. He is “[doing] for men (or with them) what they cannot do for 
themselves, and [the paternalist] cannot ask their permission or consent, because they are 
in no condition to know what is best for them” (Berlin, 2002, p. 197). This, Berlin notes, is 
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viewed by the paternalist as “the only path to „true‟ freedom” (p. 197).  
 In this emphasis on “„true‟ freedom,” (p. 197), there is, in Berlin‟s view, a 
confusion of liberty and freedom with other values like equality and fraternity. At one 
point, as noted before, he expressly argues, “Everything is what it is: liberty is liberty, not 
equality or fairness or justice or culture, or human happiness or a quiet conscience” (p. 
172). He argues that while these values may be as equally important to individuals or a 
society, they should not be conflated with liberty (Berlin, 2002). Here he seems to side with 
the negative conception of liberty as a more accurate depiction of what should be in the end 
defined as liberty. This negative liberty is essentially the liberty to be left alone to decide 
for one‟s self what to say or how to act. In contrast, Berlin equated the values inherent in 
the positive conception to a more general desire for “collective self-direction” (p. 208). 
This was, in essence, democracy in the simplest form: deliberative decision-making, in the 
end by a majority vote or action; he used as an example the French Revolution (Berlin, 
2002).  
 These other values – fairness, equality, democratic governance – are no doubt 
desirable aspects of our political culture; however, conflating them with freedom, 
individual rights and liberty can become evident in practice. It is these other values such as 
equality, deliberative democracy and, in particular, fairness that best exemplify the values 
behind appeals to a positive-right conception of free speech. Recall the many appeals to 
free speech from those in favor of the Fairness Doctrine and other regulations like localism 
and ownership diversity. Their vision of free speech placed particular emphasis on the 
ability of every voice to be heard. To achieve this, it required action on the part of 
government to either limit the speech of others or compel them to present views they did 
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not espouse. In its focus on ensuring equality, deliberative democracy and fairness on the 
airwaves, the positive-right conception seems to have no qualms with limiting the negative 
free-speech rights of certain individuals in order to serve the interests of the whole. Berlin 
noted that philosopher Benjamin Constant viewed this form of popular government, where 
the individual‟s rights could be denied in order to further the broader goals and interests of 
the voting majority, with disdain – going so far to the extreme as to call it “merely a 
spasmodic tyranny” (Berlin, 2002, p. 209). 
 That susceptibility to government paternalism is what best differentiates the 
positive-right conception of liberty from the negative-right conception, which can be 
exemplified in the area of broadcast regulation of speech. The first prong of the Fairness 
Doctrine required individual broadcasters to speak on issues deemed by a government 
regulatory agency to be of public interest and importance. The second prong compelled 
broadcasters to give more than just their own opinion on the issue (FCC, 1949). At a 
minimum, such regulation required them to cease from speaking at certain times on their 
privately-owned broadcasting equipment to allow other speech they are not necessarily in 
agreement with. While this no doubt represented an attempt to further goals such as 
fairness, equality, diversity, deliberative democracy and a well-informed citizenry, it also 
expressly restrained the individual negative speech rights of broadcasters to determine for 
themselves what to say – in essence to act as autonomous speakers free from government 
paternalism.  
 This demonstrates that the positive and negative conceptions of free speech are not 
necessarily congruent – protecting one conception can be a detriment to the other 
conception. The positive conception of speech that has been present in broadcast regulation 
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might in many instances best be more clearly redefined as equality, diversity or fairness 
rather than calling it freedom or liberty. However, appeals to the terms “rights,” “freedom” 
and “liberty,” as noted in the earlier chapter covering contested concepts, carry quite 
possibly an even greater moral weight in American political culture than terms like 
“fairness” and “diversity” do, something which the positive-conception proponents have 
utilized to bolster their case. They have attached their goals of diversity and fairness with 
the concepts of freedom, perhaps to gain more support – similar to what MacCallum 
referred to as “[capturing] for their own side the favorable attitudes attaching to the notion 
of freedom” (MacCallum, 1967, p. 313). 
 Beyond the problems with the terminology used, there is the treatment of 
individuals under the positive conception. The positive conception of free speech in many 
cases necessarily requires government regulators to – though appealing to the public 
interest when enforcing fairness, localism and ownership rules – in practice substitute their 
own particular vision of what is in the public‟s interest with what may truly be in the 
public‟s interest (to the extent that such a unified interest can be said to exist).  
Recall Justice Douglas‟ concurring opinion in CBS v. DNC (1973). There he wrote 
that the prohibition in the First Amendment of government oversight of speech was 
founded partly on a fear of “government under the control of a faction that desired to foist 
its views of the common good on the people” (p. 148). Also, recall the examples given 
earlier of presidential administrations, Democratic and Republican, using the FCC to 
further their own political goals. They may have in rhetoric appealed to a notion of the 
public interest but were in reality protecting and advancing their own political agenda. This 
possibility necessitates taking a critical approach to the public-interest standard which the 
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FCC, an arm of the federal government, is supposed to enforce. Such an approach can 
become paternalistic in that it can replace what is actually in the public‟s interest with what 
those in control of government view to be in the public‟s interest. 
 When regulators attempt to pass rules ensuring diversity of opinion and 
perspective, they often do so believing that the public desires to hear such diverse opinion 
in order to make an informed decision on public matters. In so doing, they also intend to 
allow as many individuals as possible to have their opinions at least represented on the 
airwaves for others to hear, with the ultimate goal being a more informed citizenry. This 
form is the type that emphasizes the positive rights of the listeners, not the negative rights 
of the speakers. In doing so, it limits the individual negative speech rights of broadcasters 
in favor of providing a diverse and balanced presentation to the listeners and/or viewers. It 
says to someone that they must stop speaking in order to allow for another viewpoint. In 
those terms, it may be constitutionally and legally suspect (as will be addressed in the next 
section), but it does not necessarily represent overt paternalism.  
 However, another form this can take is when regulators seek to enforce diversity 
and balance in the presentation of views in order to expose individuals to views other than 
their own. Those in favor of this form point to the increasing partisan, niche broadcasting 
that has developed over the last several years that seems to cater to individuals already 
holding certain political beliefs, and they desire regulations that would require more 
balance. They believe that requiring balance of perspective by exposing individuals to 
views contrary to their own aids the functioning of democratic decision-making, which is 
in the public interest.  
Examples of this reasoning were noted earlier in the writings of professors Sunstein 
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and Douglas (Coy, 2001; Douglas, 2005). Both, particularly Sunstein, exemplify a strain of 
thought that sees individual choices as to what to watch or listen to as somehow not fully 
interested in hearing all sides of an issue. They tend to view this as a flaw in the 
marketplace that needs to be corrected by government regulation. It is not enough to rely 
on individuals, on their own, to make the conscious decision to seek out contrasting 
viewpoints in order to better their understanding of political issues; government, the 
paternalists argue, must ensure via regulation that individuals are exposed to other sources. 
In doing so, they devalue the decisions of individuals, their autonomy, to choose for 
themselves what to listen to or watch. They substitute the individual‟s judgment for their 
own – which is at the heart of the problem with paternalism.  
This is akin to what Berlin was referring to when he appealed to Kant: “Nobody 
may compel me to be happy in his own way” (Berlin, 2002, p. 183). In this substitution, the 
regulators become the decision makers rather than individuals, done in the name of helping 
the individuals to become more rational. To that point, a Washington Post editorial noted 
shortly after removal of the Fairness Doctrine that not only would a reinstatement of the 
Fairness Doctrine be in opposition to the First Amendment, but it also represented a 
worrisome level of paternalism on the part of government. It bluntly stated, “The 
assumption that Americans today are air-heads who must have certain 
government-prescribed doses of ideas orally and visually disseminated by every station 
and channel is repugnant as well as dead wrong.” (“„Fairness‟,” 1987). 
 In addition, in so doing the regulators yield their actions to not only paternalism but 
also a condition in which individuals – with certain constitutionally-protected rights – are 
treated as a means to an end. That greater end is more rational and informed political 
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decision-making and what the regulators believe is exposure to a diversity of presented 
perspectives. This emphasis on free speech as a mere means to another end is what was 
captured in the Supreme Court‟s opinion in Red Lion, and it related to Meiklejohn‟s belief 
that in a town-hall setting, decision-making should be made remembering that “what is 
essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said” 
(Powe, 1987, p. 42).  
The Fairness Doctrine and localism, to the degree that they coerce or outright force 
individual broadcasters into ceasing speech in order to present speech they may not agree 
with, necessarily limit the individual‟s rights to free speech to the goals deemed more 
important and in the greater public interest to the regulators – those views the regulators 
have decided are “worth saying” (Powe, 1987, p. 42). Government under this construction 
has now become the regulator of the search for political truth
29
, deeming some views on 
politics to be more worthy of mention than others. Government, in effect, becomes the 
regulator of opinions about government – for what is politics but the contestation over how 
individuals and societies should be governed. 
 Moreover, a deeper analysis of the positive conception of free speech might call 
into question the very notion of the assumed capability of regulators to successfully define 
a unified “public interest.” To what extent, if any, can it be said that there exist certain 
interests in terms of speech which individuals hold collectively that can then be captured 
accurately by regulatory decisions that are by their nature incapable of omniscience. As 
noted before, Berlin referenced such a difficulty when he mentioned in a footnote a quote 
                                                 
29
 Such as situation was argued to also go against the grain of the First Amendment in Consolidated Edison 
Co. v. Public Service Commission of New York (1980), because, according to the majority opinion, “To allow 
a government the choice of permissible subjects for public debate would be to allow that government control 
over the search for political truth” (p. 538). 
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from Jeremy Bentham: “Individual interests are the only real interests” (Berlin, 2002, p. 
217). Berlin argued that “human goals are many, not all of them commensurable, and in 
perpetual rivalry with one another” (Berlin, 2002, p. 216). The proponents of upholding the 
public interest would argue that certain values such as deliberative democracy and fairness 
are in the public‟s interest – in practice making them more important than the negative 
free-speech rights of individuals. Here, they invariably place themselves in a position 
where they are prone to substitute their own vision of interests for the actual interests of the 
individuals. Such supposed unified goals determined by regulators necessarily fall prey to 
the limitations of information available to regulators, while at the same time hindering 
individual political speech. 
 This contention between varying individual interests and supposed unified public 
interests highlights deeper philosophical differences between the value placed on 
individualism versus communitarianism. The negative conception emphasizes the 
individual‟s rights to be free from government coercion or limitation to determine for 
themselves what is in their individual interests, whereas the positive conception 
emphasizes the role of government to collectively uphold what it deems to be in 
community‟s interests (or the “public interest”).  
FCC Chief Diversity Officer Mark Lloyd emphasized the latter conception when 
he, as noted in the previous chapter, wrote: 
The American republic requires the active deliberation of a diverse citizenry, and 
this, I argue, can be ensured only by our government – by the only institution 
established to operate for the general welfare. Put another way, providing for the 
equal capability of citizens to participate effectively in democratic deliberation is 
our collective responsibility.  (Lloyd, 2006, p. 18) 
  
This conception of the role of government in speech seems to again view speech as a means 
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to a greater end – that being informed decision-making in the interest of the greater public 
– rather than an end in itself. It places emphasis on a more utilitarian goal of serving the 
perceived needs of the community as a whole and devalues the individual negative rights 
of broadcasters to freely speak as they see fit. 
 The way this type of paternalism played out with the Fairness Doctrine has been 
demonstrated. But, despite the several aforementioned calls to bring back the overt 
Fairness Doctrine, attempts thus far have not gained any significant traction. However, 
newer regulatory measures, particularly localism, have.  
 Though the FCC had some detailed localism rules that required, among other 
things, stations to ascertain the needs of their listening community and log how they were 
meeting those needs, they were to a large degree scrapped in the 1980s in favor of 
issues/programs lists and reliance on market forces. However, in 2007 the Commission 
created a form which required broadcasters to spell out how they were attempting to meet 
the specific needs of segments in their community, particularly those traditionally deemed 
underserved by broadcast programming. The FCC became increasingly concerned that 
licensees were not sufficiently catering to the interests and needs of their local 
communities. Among its proposals to implement stricter rules for ensuring localism, the 
Commission has suggested the creation of local advisory boards, made up individual 
leaders representing various segments in the community, to steer the programming 
decision-making process. The details of such boards, however, have neither been 
specifically spelled out nor implemented (FCC, 2008).  
 Conceivably, proposed localism regulations would also be susceptible to similar 
paternalistic behavior on the part of regulators. The local boards in the communities 
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responsible for monitoring broadcast stations would necessarily be small. Attempts to 
make them representative of the community at large or even of the actual listeners or 
viewers of a particular station, even with the best of intentions, would nonetheless fall 
short.  
Take for example the earlier noted FCC Advisory Committee on Diversity for 
Communications in the Digital Age, which critics argued failed to accurately represent the 
public as a whole by not containing any conservative-leaning groups. Similar small panels 
would be set up to monitor local radio and television stations under a localism regime. It is 
conceivable that these smaller community advisory boards would essentially have more 
sway over programming decisions than the larger group of actual listeners would – given 
the importance placed on the boards by the FCC.  
Though the reasoning behind such a board is to better serve the public interest, the 
possibility of achieving that goal is hindered by the fact that the board represents a smaller 
percentage of the public than the listeners do. In that sense, it would represent those on the 
board (who would tend to be the most politically active in a community) substituting their 
judgment for the judgment of the listeners. Added to this consideration should also be that 
these advisory boards would have the blessing and backing of the government. Put 
together, this combination essentially would represent government again (as it behaved 
under the Fairness Doctrine) behaving in a paternalistic manner toward individuals – 
substituting its judgment (or at least the judgment of its approved board) for the judgment 
of individuals when it comes to what they should listen to and watch. 
 The degree to which ownership regulations are susceptible to the same type of 
paternalism is not as readily evident. In one respect, ownership restrictions might be 
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classified as a content-neutral method of preventing monopolization of an industry. In 
other commercial endeavors, the argument would be left at that. However, the industry 
regulated in this example is an industry where the product is speech itself. This adds an 
extra layer of complexity to the analysis of ownership regulation in broadcast.  
Specifically dealing with paternalism, it might be argued that regulations 
preventing a company from acquiring a broadcast license would usurp the listeners‟ 
opportunity to judge for themselves if they should listen to a particular broadcast. The 
government, in that respect, is deciding for the listener that too much speech from the same 
owner is not in the public interest. Here again, the paternalistic nature of broadcast 
regulation in the name of the public interest becomes more clear. Instead of taking a 
hands-off, negative-right approach of allowing listeners to chose whether to listen to an 
owner‟s broadcast or not, ownership regulation involves government taking positive action 
to restrict the number of stations on which any particular owner can broadcast – doing so in 
the name of ensuring both the public-interest need for diversity in ownership and voices 
heard. 
 In summary, the paternalism of the Fairness Doctrine, localism and ownership 
regulations should be seriously questioned as a potential threat to individual negative-right 
freedom in the name of upholding other values. In the name of positive-right “freedom,” 
this type of paternalism uses individuals to reach an often more utilitarian social goal the 
government regulator believes is in their best interest. 
 In contrast to this paternalistic positive vision is the value placed on the 
anti-paternalistic ideas of negative liberty, freedom and individual rights. Berlin (2002) 
noted that the paternalistic nature in which the conception of freedom had taken, 
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exemplified by him in more communal societies like that in the Soviet Union, was far from 
the conception of freedom that saw the individual and his self-responsibility, free will and 
autonomy as preeminent – something more prominent in the West. That focus on the 
individual was exemplified to some extent in the limited powers given to the federal 
government and the freedom of the individual and states acknowledged in the U.S. 
Constitution. 
 
The Development of a More Negative Right to Free Speech 
 The wording of the U.S. Constitution, the “supreme law of the land,” enumerates 
certain specific powers given to the federal government and leaves all other powers and 
rights to, according to the Tenth Amendment, the people or the states. In doing so, the text 
limited the ability of the federal government to steer and direct the actions of individuals 
beyond that of what it explicitly enumerated. The Bill of Rights, the first ten amendments, 
lays out specific limits on the power of the federal government to infringe on the rights of 
individuals. Rights, under this construction, did not emanate from government but, 
according to the earlier penned Declaration of Independence, were endowed by a creator. 
The federal government was not to violate those rights but only to secure them. 
 The Constitution lays out its treatment of freedom of speech in the First 
Amendment. The wording of this amendment is on the surface negative in nature: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances.  
 
The wording implies that the right to free speech, and for the matter the press, is violated 
when Congress – the constitutionally-vested lawmaking authority according to Article 1, 
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Section 1 – makes laws abridging the freedom of speech. It does not call for Congress to 
foster or ensure diverse or balanced political speech from all speakers, nor does it require 
Congress to ensure that individuals are provided with diverse or balanced information from 
speakers. The wording simply suggests that Congress should be hands-off, abstaining from 
making laws that would abridge the freedom of speech. It says nothing of private 
censorship, only federal government laws that would abridge. 
 In debate over the amendments, it was sufficiently noted that these rights listed 
were rights of individuals to be left alone by the federal government. James Madison, often 
referred to as the “father of the Constitution” for his influence in drafting the document, 
noted in the debates that there were those at the time who, despite the powers of the federal 
government being limited by the original and unamended Constitution, feared that the 
government, as all governments, was still susceptible to the abuse of individual liberties 
(“Annals,” 1789). Madison viewed the amendments as a way to ensure that such abuses “of 
the powers of the General Government may be guarded against in a more secure manner 
than is now done....” (“Annals,” 1789, pp. 449 & 450). Particularly referencing the 
relationship of rights to restraint from government, Madison wrote that:  
... the great mass of people who opposed [the unamended Constitution], disliked it 
because it did not contain effectual provisions against encroachments on particular 
rights, and those safeguards which they have been long accustomed to have 
interposed between them and the magistrate who exercises the sovereign power.  
(“Annals,” 1789, p. 450) 
  
Similarly, Thomas Jefferson, in an earlier letter to Madison, noted that a bill of 
rights represented “what the people are entitled to against every government on earth” 
(Jefferson, 1787). A large influence on the Bill of Rights was Virginia‟s own Declaration 
of Rights. That charter‟s specific reference to freedom of the press in its text noted that, 
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“That the freedom of the press is one of the great bulwarks of liberty, and can never be 
restrained but by despotic governments” (“Bill of Rights”, n.d.). The link was clearly made 
at the time that the rights to free speech and the press protected by the First Amendment 
were specifically protected from the federal government, not private individuals or groups. 
 Though the wording of the Constitution, read casually by the reader in 
contemporary times, seems to note a purely negative right to free speech (e.g.; a completely 
hands-off approach by government), that was not necessarily the consensus among those at 
the time of the founding. English common law had developed at that time to view freedom 
of speech as a freedom solely from prior restraint from government censorship, not 
subsequent penalties. As William Blackstone noted in his commentaries on the common 
law: 
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state: but this 
consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from 
censure for criminal matter when published. Every freeman has an undoubted right 
to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public: to forbid this, is to destroy the 
freedom of the press: but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, 
he must take the consequence of his own temerity.  (Blackstone, 1769) 
  
Blackstone then added that subsequent punishment could still be justified if it punished that 
which was “dangerous or offensive” and “of a pernicious tendency” (Blackstone, 1769). 
This could also include, “malicious defamations of any person, and especially a magistrate, 
made public by either printing, writing, signs, or pictures, in order to provoke him to wrath, 
or expose him to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule” (Blackstone, 1769) and was 
typically referred to as “libel.” 
Under the understanding at the time, unlike what has developed in constitutional 
case law since the 1900s, truth was not a defense in criminal matters involving such libel. 
“For the same reason it is immaterial with respect to the essence of a libel, whether the 
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matter of it be true or false,” wrote Blackstone, “since the provocation, and not the falsity, 
is the thing to be punished criminally: though, doubtless, the falsehood of it may aggravate 
its guilt, and enhance its punishment” (Blackstone, 1769). 
 It was this common-law understanding of free speech and the press at the time that 
enabled the passage and enforcement of the infamous “Alien and Sedition Acts” in the 
United States after the Constitution and Bill of Rights had both already been adopted. The 
Sedition Act in particular allowed the federal government to fine and imprison individuals 
for writings that were critical of those in government – deeming it seditious libel. This type 
of penalty was a type of speech and press restriction generally thought to be viewed by the 
majority at that time to be within the scope of government authority. It is important to note 
that the constitutionality of the Sedition Act was never ruled on by the Supreme Court at 
the time; however, it was not without its critics – particularly those whose supporters were 
on the receiving end of government penalties for such speech (O‟Brien, 2005).  
 Those most adamantly opposed to the Act included the likes of Thomas Jefferson 
and James Madison. In contrast to the perceived majority opinion at the time that 
abridgment of speech meant only that government could not impose any previous restraint 
on the press, James Madison, himself the chief author of the First Amendment, seemed to 
hold an opinion most closely aligned with a negative-right vision of free political speech. 
Referencing the traditional debate over liberty versus licentiousness in terms of what 
speech could be regulated by government, Madison, in an address to the people of Virginia, 
gave his support to the belief that despite the press‟ perceived abuses of their liberty from 
government restriction, there could be seen no alternative remedy that would not lead to 
“enslaving the press” (Madison, 1906, p. 336).  
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Both Madison and Jefferson were instrumental in drafting two separate resolutions 
critical of the Alien and Sedition Acts. In the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, the 
constitutional legitimacy of the acts was called into questioned, particularly in light of the 
Constitution‟s wording in the Tenth Amendment leaving all non-enumerated powers to the 
states.  
In espousing the importance of free political speech, the Madison-drafted Virginia 
Resolution asserted that the acts had been “levelled against the right of freely examining 
public characters and measures, and of free communication among the people thereon, 
which has ever been justly deemed the only effectual guardian of every other right” 
(O‟Brien, 2005, p. 44). Madison also explicitly argued against government sanctions 
post-speech, not just prior restraint, when reporting on the Virginia Resolutions. “The 
freedom of the press under the common law is, in the defences of the Sedition Act, made to 
consist in an exemption from all previous restraint on printed publications by persons 
authorized to inspect and prohibit them,” wrote Madison. He added:  
It appears to the committee that this idea of the freedom of the press can never be 
admitted to be the American idea of it; since a law inflicting penalties on printed 
publications would have a similar effect with a law authorizing a previous restraint 
on them. It would seem a mockery to say that no laws should be passed preventing 
publications from being made, but that laws might be passed for punishing them in 
case they should be made.  (Madison, 1800). 
  
 Madison‟s vision of a more negative-right approach to the First Amendment should 
be additionally qualified not only by the apparently pervasive opinion during his time that 
prior restraint was the only legitimate type of action safeguarded against in terms of speech 
but also by the fact that his opinion on the constitutionality of seditious libel was based to a 
large extent on his view that it was the federal government, specifically Congress (the 
lawmaking body), to which the First Amendment at that time pertained. The states were 
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free under the construction of the Bill of Rights, particularly by the Tenth Amendment, to 
legislate on and regulate speech as they deemed appropriate. Though states also enshrined 
protections of speech and the press in their constitutions, and Madison, himself, initially 
proposed additional wording as part of the Bill of Rights that would have prevented states 
from abridging the freedom of speech and the press, the end result of the Constitution was 
only to govern federal abridgment (“Journal,” 1789; O‟Brien, 2005). It would not be until 
later that much of the Bill of Rights would be applied to the states by the courts under the 
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, known as “incorporation”30. 
 Though the more Madisonian approach to the freedoms of speech and the press, 
which was more in line with the negative-rights view, did not reflect the majority of views 
in the Congress which passed the Alien and Sedition Acts, it did eventually rule the day in 
much of American constitutional case law governing political speech and freedom of the 
press. This was particularly the case in the 1900s when questions over the scope of the First 
Amendment and government action beyond mere prior restraint were more readily 
addressed in federal courts – the most notable exception, of course, being the rights of 
broadcasters under the Red Lion precedent.  
As Justice William Brennan would write in the majority opinion in New York Times 
v. Sullivan (1964): 
Although the Sedition Act was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its 
validity has carried the day in the court of history. Fines levied in its prosecution 
were repaid by Act of Congress on the ground that it was unconstitutional.  (p. 
276) 
  
He also noted in the opinion a report to the U.S. Senate in 1836 that “assumed that its 
invalidity was a matter „which no one now doubts‟,” adding that, “Jefferson, as President, 
                                                 
30
 See chapter 4 in O‟Brien (2005) for further details on this trend. 
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pardoned those who had been convicted and sentenced under the Act and remitted their 
fines” (p. 276). The majority‟s opinion, more than a century and a half after the expiration 
of the Sedition Act, was thus that the Act was unconstitutional (New York Times v. 
Sullivan, 1964). 
 It really was not until the 1900s where constitutional case law in regard to free 
speech and the press was largely developed. As cases were brought before the Supreme 
Court then, the trend in interpretation was progressively becoming more in line with a 
negative-rights turn not only protecting political speech against prior restraints but also 
subsequent penalties.  
Originally addressing a similar law to the Alien and Sedition Acts, the 1917 
Espionage Act, the Court set up a standard that would through time become an eventual 
precedent where political speech could only be penalized if it was used in such a manner 
that would bring about a “clear and present danger” of the “substantive evils that Congress 
has a right to prevent” (Schenck v. United States, 1919, p. 52). By doing so, the Court 
eventually asserted that the First Amendment not only protected against prior restraint but 
also subsequent penalty in certain cases (O‟Brien, 2005). 
Several years later, the Court would specifically address the issue of libel. Though 
libel and “slander” (the spoken form) were still prosecutable offenses, the aforementioned 
New York Times v. Sullivan (1964) case restricted their scope by setting the precedent that 
cases of libel and slander against public figures had to represent not only false claims, but 
they also had to stem from “actual malice” or “reckless disregard” for the truth of the claim 
(p. 280). 
Fifty years after Schenck, in Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969), notably the same year as 
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the Red Lion decision, the Court further limited the government‟s role in penalizing 
political speech by ruling that mere advocacy of violent means was not enough to warrant 
government penalty under the First and Fourteenth Amendments; actual “incitement to 
imminent lawless action” (p. 449) had to transpire for government penalty to be justified. 
This test of incitement to imminent lawless action is the more recent test used to determine 
the scope of constitutional protection in terms of political speech and represented quite 
possibly the furthest progression toward a more negative-rights view from the Court.  
The legacy of these cases and a string of others in the 1900s related to the First 
Amendment could be argued to be more in line with the vision Madison had of free speech 
and the press. Again, the exceptions to acceptable political speech were now so very 
narrowly defined to the point that the speech had to, by its very nature, provoke “incitement 
to imminent lawless action” (Brandenburg v. Ohio, 1969, p. 449), or it had to be flatly false 
with malicious intent or disregard for the truth in order for subsequent punishment to 
proceed legally.  
These developments, for all intents and purposes, have finally perhaps led 
American First Amendment jurisprudence closest to a negative-right view of freedom 
speech and the press. Though this turn does not necessarily represent a perfectly absolutist 
negative-right turn, it is significant progress toward that end, particularly when compared 
to the common-law, prior-restraint approach that enabled prosecution for “seditious libel” 
or the more positive-right conception supported by proponents of the Fairness Doctrine 
and similar public-interest regulations that still sees a role for government to actively foster 
diversity in speech
31
.  
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 Several other cases highlighting this more negative-right turn in free speech and press protections could be 
mentioned here, but doing so would go beyond the purpose of this section and deviate from the main points. 
 111 
Perhaps one the best defenses of the more Madisonian approach to the First 
Amendment emanating from the increasingly negative-right turn to free-speech 
jurisprudence particularly in cases dealing with broadcast political speech came in 
opinions from Justice William O. Douglas. For example, in his dissent in the 1973 Yale 
Broadcasting v. FCC case, Douglas rejected the different treatment of broadcast and print 
in terms of government interference and First Amendment protection. He wrote that there 
was an “inevitable danger resulting from placing such powers in governmental hands – a 
danger appreciated by the Framers of the First Amendment” (Yale Broadcasting v. FCC, 
1973, p. 916).  
Douglas had earlier wrote in CBS v. DNC (1973) that: 
The Fairness Doctrine has no place in our First Amendment regime. It puts the head 
of the camel inside the tent and enables administration after administration to toy 
with TV and radio in order to serve its sordid or its benevolent ends.  (p. 154) 
  
Noting the chilling effect, Douglas wrote in his Yale dissent, “The threat of governmental 
action alone would impose a prohibited restraint upon the press” (p. 917). And in citing a 
previous case, Lamont v. Postmaster General (1965), he wrote that such prior restraint or 
“inhibition” against First Amendment rights “is a power denied to the government” (Yale 
Broadcasting v. FCC, 1973, p. 917).  
Seemingly attacking the notion that the public-interest standard upheld by the FCC 
licensing regime included, as the majority wrote in Red Lion, a right “to receive suitable 
access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences” (Red Lion v. 
FCC, 1969, p. 390), Douglas noted that, “The Commission imposes on the licensees a 
responsibility to analyze the meaning of each song‟s lyrics and make a judgment as to the 
social value of the message” (Yale Broadcasting v. FCC, 1973, p. 917). He postulated that 
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such government scrutiny could lead to applying such oversight to even comedy programs 
(Yale Broadcasting v. FCC, 1973). 
It was clear that Douglas detested the notion of the Fairness Doctrine and its 
corollary rules, rules which he believed hindered the passion and diversity in public debate 
which were intended goals of the Doctrine. He concluded that it was not constitutionally 
permissible under the First Amendment for the federal government to “decide what 
messages, spoken or in music, are of the proper „social value‟ to reach the people” (Yale 
Broadcasting v. FCC, 1973, p. 918). For better or for worse, government was to be hands 
off in its approach to political speech – in print or broadcast; there was no distinction in his 
mind with regard to the First Amendment (Yale Broadcasting v. FCC, 1973). 
 Despite this more Madisionian, negative-rights turn in interpretation of the federal 
government‟s relation to political speech, there remains a persistent counter argument that 
interprets a general right to free speech that is tempered by other government interests. 
Over the years of constitutional interpretation by the courts, the individual right to speak 
has been qualified or limited. Courts have managed to allow certain restrictions on 
individual speech in the broader goal of carrying out a greater government interest
32
. The 
argument here for a negative-right approach to broadcast political speech is not meant to 
necessarily be a blanket statement that no speech whatsoever can be regulated by the FCC. 
To argue specifically that point and detail case law in terms of regulating other types of 
speech which those at the time of the writing of the Bill of Rights might have viewed as 
licentious, like “obscenity,” would go well beyond the scope of this thesis – not to mention 
that it would also be harder to clearly peg with the meaning of “speech” by the framers – 
and would require much more elaboration which would digress from the main thrust of the 
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 See chapter 5 in O‟Brien (2005) for greater detail on the restrictions allowed by the courts. 
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argument.  
 The main argument of this section is that of all the types of speech safeguarded 
against government regulation by the development of First-Amendment case law in the 
United States, explicitly political speech – opinion on government and its actions – has 
been viewed to be the most overtly obvious and the one to be most ardently protected. It is 
the free critique and examination of government and government officials that is protected 
by not limiting such speech. The negative-rights approach to political speech, exemplified 
in Madison‟s views on the matter, represents an attempt to deny government, more 
specifically those with sordid political intentions in government, the power to silence or 
punish speech that may go against their particular inclinations or interest.  
The abuse of such manipulation of speech and the press was amply noted in the 
history of regulating broadcast political speech under the Fairness Doctrine. To go into 
each exception made by the courts in terms of non-political speech and expression would 
go beyond the scope of this thesis. As such, the focus here will be on the government 
interests appealed to in respect to political speech in broadcast specifically. These 
exceptions relate to appeals to democracy and the general public interest, with a condition 
for regulation being the supposed scarcity of the broadcast spectrum. 
 Democracy, it is argued, is fostered by active deliberation and the hearing of all 
sides of an opinion. The positive-right proponent would argue that where there is a scarce 
resource, like the broadcast spectrum, enough access must be granted to ensure that all 
points of view are represented in order for the society as a whole to make informed 
democratic decisions. Under this logic, it then becomes necessary for government to 
ensure that fairness and access are granted. The type of focus on democratic 
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decision-making that leads to government regulating political speech over the airwaves 
necessarily acts to restrict certain individual broadcasters‟ speech by requiring them to 
withhold speaking their opinion to present another‟s perspective33. 
 The more general “public interest” has been interpreted by the courts to include a 
range of other social goals. As has been noted in previously mentioned cases like Red Lion 
and Citizens Committee, the public interest has encompassed anything from ensuring the 
more general positive right of the public to receive social, political and moral ideas through 
broadcast to balancing the type of music played over the airwaves.  
In 2007, reacting to calls to reinstate the Fairness Doctrine, former FCC Chairman 
Fowler asserted that those who justify the rule based on the public interest are “politicians 
trying to control part of the press” (Rowland, 2007b). He added: “To say the airwaves 
belong to the people - all these reasons they use to regulate are excuses. They‟re not 
reasons” (Rowland, 2007b). Recall Fowler‟s earlier argument against the scarcity 
rationale: “When the founding fathers came up with the First Amendment, there were eight 
weekly newspapers in the entire country, and yet they said, „These eight shall be free.‟ 
They didn‟t do a scarcity analysis”34.  
Similarly, Justice John Marshall Harlan noted in the dissent in Patterson v. 
Colorado (1907): 
I cannot assent to that view, if it be meant that the legislature may impair or abridge 
the rights of a free press and of free speech whenever it thinks that the public 
welfare requires that to be done. The public welfare cannot override constitutional 
privileges ….  (p. 465) 
                                                 
33
 It may be important to clarify here that the arguments in this thesis are not meant to disparage the notion 
that informed decision-making and exposure to varying points of view are important and critical to 
democracy. Rather, the argument is that government acting to enforce such exposure to balanced opinion is a 
dubious practice that can lead to unintended consequences. 
 
34
 Again, this is the quote from the Donlan (1982) article as presented on page 53 of Jung (1996). 
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The public-interest standard, coupled with the scarcity rationale, enables a wide variety of 
excuses to justify the denial of individual political speech rights – something not in line 
with the development of the constitutional protection of political speech. 
 Despite the negative-right interpretation of the First Amendment‟s protection of 
political speech, there remains the specter of the Supreme Court‟s opinion in the Red Lion 
case. In that case, as was detailed in a previous chapter, the Court upheld the FCC‟s 
authority to enforce diversity of political opinion content in broadcasting. The sum 
argument was that the scarcity of radio frequencies not only allowed for licensing by the 
FCC but also direction of content. A negative-right approach would not necessarily forbid 
the regulation of frequencies to prevent signal bleeding; such a step is merely a 
technological regulation. However, a negative-right approach would forbid the FCC from 
directing the content of the political speech over those signals. Notably asserting the 
distinction to be made between technological and content regulation, former FCC 
Chairman Fowler once compared television to “just another appliance – it‟s a toaster with 
pictures” (Tucker, 1985). That statement crudely voiced the negative-right approach to the 
regulation of broadcast political speech. 
 The Red Lion court seemed to conflate the two issues in its majority opinion. It 
justified content regulation on the basis that technological regulation was necessary to 
ensure the practical use of the spectrum. At one point, the opinion asserted, “Just as the 
Government may limit the use of sound-amplifying equipment potentially so noisy that it 
drowns out civilized private speech, so may the Government limit the use of broadcast 
equipment” (Red Lion v. FCC, 1969, p. 387). If this argument were limited to the need to 
regulate the technology in order to avoid signal overlap, it would not raise constitutional 
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issues. However, the Court used it partly to justify the FCC‟s actions to compel individual 
broadcasters to present contrasting opinions from their own – a regulation of content. 
 In addition, another line of reasoning that the Red Lion (1969) opinion asserted was 
that: 
... nothing in the First Amendment ... prevents the Government from requiring a 
licensee ... to conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present 
those views and voices which are representative of his community and which 
would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves.  (p. 389) 
  
But such a requirement would necessarily involve the government coercing individual 
broadcasters into presenting, with their broadcast equipment, those political views to 
which they may not agree. But government-coerced or compelled speech has been ruled to 
be just as much anathema to the First Amendment as government restriction of voluntary 
speech. Courts have generally ruled starting in the 1900s that where the government 
overtly compels individuals to speak or express views that they disagree with, it violates 
their First-Amendment rights
35
.  
In a similar argument concerning government compelled funding of religion, 
Thomas Jefferson had once noted, “That to compel a man to furnish contributions of 
money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves and abhors, is sinful and 
tyrannical” (“Virginia Act,” 1779). This type of compelled speech is perhaps the most 
questionable form of positive-right regulation given that it goes beyond the mere 
restriction of speech and onto a government mandate to utter opinion that may contradict 
one‟s own deeply-held views. It stands to reason that government specifically compelling 
broadcasters to use their time, resources and money to express views which they may 
disagree with would likewise fall prey to the same criticism. 
                                                 
35
 See the Supreme Court‟s ruling in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943) for one of the 
first examples of rulings against government-compelled speech. 
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 Neither the deliberative-democracy nor the public-interest rationales for regulating 
broadcast political speech under the Fairness Doctrine and its corollary rules can be firmly 
squared with the more negative-rights interpretation that has developed in relation to 
non-broadcast political speech. The negative-rights vision sees the enemy of free speech as 
government, not more speech. The negative-right freedom of speech permits the free will 
of individuals to choose for themselves what to say, and consequently what to not say in 
matters of politics, free from government influence. Likewise, that freedom also means 
that certain viewpoints and topics will invariably be of more interest to individuals than 
other viewpoints and topics. That may mean certain viewpoints will not see as much 
coverage on the broadcast medium given that it is reliant upon ratings to determine what 
people want to hear. But under this construction, it is for the individuals to decide what to 
listen to, not government.  
The threat of federal government manipulation of political speech was the chief 
fear addressed by Madison. That threat of government manipulation was evident in the 
history of implementing the Fairness Doctrine. However, the Doctrine is gone and does not 
immediately show signs of reimplementation. Other regulations more likely to be 
implemented do, however, raise similar constitutional questions. 
 Potential localism regulations would give local community advisory boards sway 
over speech heard over the airwaves. Under this potential localism regime, despite the 
FCC‟s attempt to delegate the decision-making to local boards of community activists as a 
means of legitimizing such regulation, the fact cannot be lost that neither the boards nor the 
FCC would have any legal power except for the fact that they are extensions of 
Congressional regulatory power. However, that regulatory power – the power to determine 
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the content of political speech – is expressly prohibited. If the boards were given any real, 
enforceable power over programming decisions, it would constitute an abridgement of the 
First Amendment under the negative-rights construction.  
In addition, even if the board had no direct decision-making power, if the FCC 
decided to base licensing decisions on whether a station listened to its advisory board, this 
would still raise serious constitutional issues. Such a move would, in effect, represent the 
government coercing broadcasters into changing their content in favor of the 
government-backed board‟s content suggestions. In fact, the FCC had indicated in its 2008 
localism review that it would consider adding specific guidelines to the license renewal 
process which would take into account the performance of licensees in terms of adhering to 
localism content (FCC, 2008). 
 Proposed localism regulations might place government-backed power to influence 
the content of radio and television broadcasts in the hands of community advisory boards. 
In that the boards would be backed with the regulatory power of the FCC, a creation of 
Congress, it would by extension represent Congress delegating its regulatory power to the 
boards. As such, these boards would conceivably have the power to determine what 
broadcast content serves the local community and what content does not. This 
determination, under the development of First-Amendment case law would be 
constitutionally suspect. However, a more exact determination of if these eventual localism 
requirements would abridge the First Amendment‟s protection of political speech or not 
will have to be made if and when formal rules are eventually implemented by the 
Commission. 
 Ownership rules are the other prevalent broadcast regulation that may have 
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constitutional implications. In the sense that new ownership regulations can involve 
government preventing an owner from owning a station and broadcasting certain political 
views with it when absent the specific government ownership regulation the owner would 
have been free to do so, they may implicate to a degree a restriction on the owner‟s 
negative free-speech rights. However, this connection between ownership regulations and 
free speech is probably the weakest, given that, unlike in localism where the owner‟s actual 
speech is regulated after obtaining a license, denying a license to a potential owner does not 
specifically abridge actual speech. The potential owner has not obtained the license to 
utilize the broadcast spectrum yet. Though government cannot abridge a person‟s actual 
political speech, it is not required to provide access to a limited vehicle for that speech.  
 The power to regulate ownership caps would fall under the commerce clause of the 
Constitution found in Article 1, Section 8, which permits regulation of interstate 
commerce. Broadcast signals of commercial stations, in that they can often cross state 
lines, would constitute in most definitions the type of interstate commerce that falls under 
the commerce clause. As such, one could view ownership regulations as merely anti-trust 
economic regulations preventing the monopolization of an industry. Such regulations have 
been viewed in case law to be generally consistent with the commerce clause
36
. 
 It just so happens, though, that this particular industry often trades in political 
speech – something protected from government abridgement by the Constitution. It is in 
this form of regulation that the emphasis placed in case law on the regulation of content 
becomes of particular importance. However, preventing one owner from owning too many 
stations is not direct content regulation of speech. It denies surplus licenses to an individual 
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 See U.S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association (1897) for an early example of courts acknowledging the 
ability of the federal government to prevent monopoly activity. 
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owner, not their right to speak what they desire to speak over the airwaves for which they 
do have a license. As such, the relationship of broadcast ownership rules to the legal 
protection of speech under the First Amendment is rather weak when compared to the 
relationship of localism to speech abridgement and may not necessarily be grounds to 
reject ownership rules on the basis of constitutional considerations. 
 This negative-rights approach to the First Amendment that has been argued for here 
is something that still may be opposed by those advocating a positive-right conception of 
free speech. They may, despite arguments for the Madisonian view and the more 
negative-right interpretation developed in later years by the courts, continue to point to the 
Red Lion case as an example of the Supreme Court upholding the Fairness Doctrine as 
constitutionally permissible. However, it should be noted that, even assuming the 
positive-right vision of free speech was legitimate, the continued constitutionality of the 
Doctrine in the Red Lion opinion hinged on it not acting in a way to hinder free speech (the 
chilling effect). That chilling effect might demonstrate an abridgement of free speech that 
the courts would need to revisit. The chilling effect would not only represent a 
constitutional dilemma but also a practical problem. 
 
Practical Problems with the Positive Conception 
 In addition to the philosophical and constitutional issues with a positive conception 
of free speech, there are also practical problems with enforcement and implementation of 
rules and regulations aimed at upholding this conception. The first problem is the actual 
implementation of a positive-right conception and the practicality of such a task. The 
second is that in many areas, enforcement of a positive-right conception of free speech may 
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actually inhibit speech through a chilling effect. 
 Implementing the Fairness Doctrine proved at times to be difficult and taxing. It 
often involved regulators in time-consuming and tedious monitoring of broadcast content 
that, in the end, was prone to subjectivity. One example of this was the monitoring of 
political advertisements under the Doctrine. According to Simmons (1978), “In 1975, there 
were five lawyers, one broadcast analyst, and two secretaries working in the 
Fairness/Political Branch, which also handles section 315 equal time complaints and 
inquiries” (p. 14). This small group of government employees was responsible for 
ascertaining if broadcasters were being fair in their coverage of issues of public importance 
and then passing the issues on to the appointed FCC commissioners.  
 In addition, Simmons (1978) also noted that often, in determining if licensees had 
met their obligations in terms of providing fair and balanced coverage:  
... only major opinions need be presented. Nonestablishment, minority viewpoints 
– no matter what their worth – simply do not need airing. And even if there are a 
number of major “establishment” viewpoints on an issue, the licensee will probably 
be safe from reprimand if it presents only two.  (pp. 191 & 192) 
  
This demonstrated a further daunting challenge to the small staff and Commission: 
determining which viewpoints are the major, important viewpoints.  
 Further exemplifying the tediousness involved in such tasks, one former FCC 
staffer, recounting the process of determining a licensee‟s devotion to fairness, noted:  
I was there when we used to take a stop-watch upon a complaint and we would 
watch a program or listen to it and we would say, “7 minutes pro, 6 minutes con, X 
minutes neutral.” Now if that isn‟t getting into the broadcasters‟ knickers, I don‟t 
know what is.  (Simmons, 1978, p. 204) 
 
He added, “Furthermore, we used to argue about whether it was 7 minutes or 8 minutes, 
depending upon what someone thought ....” (p. 204). Noting the controversy with such 
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detailed scrutiny of broadcasters by the Commission, Former FCC Chairman Dean Burch 
questioned if this process involved the Commission “too deeply in day-to-day journalistic 
practices” (Friendly, 1976, p. 151)37. 
 Localism regulations, in that they would involve an ascertainment of a station‟s 
commitment to coverage of local issues and concerns, may lead to a similar type of 
detailed, taxing and inherently subjective oversight noted in respect to the Fairness 
Doctrine. Local advisory boards would conceivably be involved in analyzing the details of 
broadcasts. Even if the boards themselves would not be conducting detailed reviews of 
broadcasts, the FCC would. The FCC would condition station license renewal in part on 
whether it was implementing suggestions from the local boards. To ascertain if it was 
meeting this requirement, the Commission staff could find itself involved in pouring over 
broadcast records, and once again, dubiously monitoring broadcast content – this time 
searching for content that it would deem to be either serving the local interests or not 
serving the local interests. 
 In implementing this, just as in any policy implementation, how the regulators 
determine what constitutes coverage of issues of interest to the local communities can 
greatly affect the results. That determination would fall prey to the difficulty inherent in a 
process where a select few government regulators decide for the local community what 
issues they care about and what topics interest them – a process that can be prone to bias 
and subjectivity, not to mention political influence.  
Even factoring in the existence of the community advisory boards, the makeup of 
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 At one point, the Screen Actors Guild attempted to add even more to the FCC‟s plate of tedious content 
monitoring by seeking to have the Commission limit the number of re-runs that could be aired on television 
(Powe, 1987). Friendly (1976) also noted the daunting steps which the FCC had to take in determining 
fairness violations on pages 188 and 189. 
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the board would still fail to capture an accurate representation of the public‟s aggregate 
interests, let alone the interests of those in the community who actually listen to or watch 
the broadcast station under review. As noted, these boards would most likely be made up 
local officials and “leaders” (FCC, 2008, p. 14) of various segments in the community, the 
definition of which would also fall prey to subjectivity.  
Also, those most interested in participating in these boards might likely be the more 
politically active members of a community and those with various financial or political 
interests in influencing the direction of broadcast licensing in the community. The average 
citizen, especially the average listener or viewer (to the degree that even that term could be 
sufficiently defined), may not necessarily be well represented on the boards. Such a 
mal-representation would distort the validity of the board‟s opinions on if a station is 
serving the interests and needs of the local community. 
 Another implementation issue to be concerned with in localism is the emphasis 
placed on serving the community‟s interest, not necessarily the interests of those who 
actually listen to or watch a station. Some members of a community, despite access and 
exposure to local radio and television, may not be interested or may not prioritize listening 
to or watching a particular station. Particularly in today‟s technology-saturated 
environment, some may rely on the internet for their news and information. Others may 
prefer the local newspapers. Still others may listen to satellite radio. To what degree does 
the FCC‟s priority on the community‟s overall needs sacrifice the needs of those who 
would actually listen to or watch a local broadcast in the first place. It serves little purpose 
to cater a particular service to a larger public that may not necessarily ever intend to use it. 
 The practical implications of implementing stricter ownership regulations do not 
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seem to be as evident. Regulators could arbitrarily cap ownership, based at times of course 
on Congressional direction, at a certain number with relative ease. Given the FCC‟s 
previous experience in this area of regulation, the caps, though potentially arbitrary, would 
likely run into little implementation issues.  
 However, when the focus of diversity of ownership shifts from simply capping to 
taking positive action to actively pursue ownership from certain underserved communities, 
the practical risks to implementation become more possible. The rationale, in both 
ownership regulations and localism, in pursuing the participation of underserved 
communities (racial and ethnic minorities and women) is to give members of these groups 
a voice in the public dialogue that it was believed beforehand was not present. The push to 
foster the participation of these underserved groups can be seen as a way to better serve the 
interests of the local community as a whole and also to expose others to the issues and 
concerns of those in the minority.  
How the FCC defines what constitutes an underserved group can be prone to 
political pressure from activists on all sides. The degree to which such a determination can 
be inherently subjective is an issue that could prove troublesome for implementation. Will 
transferring ownership of a license to a person who happens to be of a particular 
underserved group necessarily ensure that the perceived concerns and views of that group 
would be more readily discussed on the airwaves? And to what degree can individual 
members of any particular underserved group be said to hold similar perspectives and 
interests? The answers to these questions go beyond the scope of this thesis and will not be 
pursued in detail here. But this short mention of this controversy should be sufficient to 
demonstrate another potential pitfall with the practical implementation of particular 
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regulations seeking greater diversification and minority ownership of broadcast stations. 
 Beyond these practical issues in implementation, there is a concern with the 
practical effect of implementation on the overall stated goals of localism and ownership 
regulations. The chief aim of such moves has been to foster more diverse and free speech. 
But to what degree, as was the case with the Fairness Doctrine, can the implementation of 
localism and ownership regulations actually act in a way to inhibit free and diverse speech? 
 As was amply noted by the FCC in its 1985 report on the Fairness Doctrine (FCC, 
1985), the fairness obligations appeared to have an overall chilling effect on broadcasters 
in respect to their willingness to present issues of importance to the public and to present 
different perspectives on those issues. The report listed numerous examples demonstrating 
that broadcasters were inhibited by the Fairness Doctrine and were reticent to even cover 
many issues for fear of being subject to a fairness violation. The report argued that 
enforcement of the Doctrine hindered the presentation of what the Commission called 
“unorthodox opinions” (p. 104) – those not in the mainstream – because of its focus on 
balancing opinion between “major” and “significant” viewpoints (p. 105). The report also 
argued that the Doctrine enabled officials in government to intimidate broadcasters
38
. 
These factors triggered, in the FCC‟s collective mind at the time, the Supreme Court‟s Red 
Lion opinion caveat that, should the Fairness Doctrine in practice lead to a reduction in 
coverage, it would need to be reconsidered (FCC, 1985). 
 In addition, other evidence that the Fairness Doctrine inhibited speech was 
presented in a study by Hazlett and Sosa (1997). The authors looked at the prevalence of 
informational programming – the chief type of program regulated by the Doctrine – over 
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here would be impractical. 
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time on radio broadcasts. They found a correlation between an increase in the amount of 
informational programming and the removal of the Fairness Doctrine in 1987. Hazlett and 
Sosa argued that the burden of fairness regulations was a disincentive for broadcasters to 
cover important, but controversial, public issues. With that burden removed, the authors 
argued, the data show a noticeable increase in the amount of informational programming in 
comparison to other formats thanks to the lessening regulation (Hazlett & Sosa, 1997).  
 In an interesting twist touching on the ownership issue, Hazlett (1997) wrote 
another article later that year arguing that the scarcity rationale and the ensuing regulations 
tied to it over the years, like the Fairness Doctrine, were actually used as means for 
regulators and station owners to distribute monopoly rights over an important medium to 
the detriment of the unregulated, free-flow of information critical to the functioning of 
democracy and free speech. In this later article, Hazlett argued that the rules could be seen 
as an example of regulatory capture where the regulated entities (the broadcasters already 
possessing licenses) had an advantage over competitors not already in the policy loop, 
essentially using the regulation as a means of erecting barriers to entry for potential 
competitors. This would represent government regulation said to be in the public interest 
actually having the effect of disserving that supposed public interest by hindering 
broadcast content competition (Hazlett, 1997). 
 The potential chilling effect on broadcasters that might result from the oversight of 
community advisory boards and eventual FCC re-licensing decisions based in part on a 
station‟s adherence to the suggestions of the boards is similar to that demonstrated in the 
age of the Fairness Doctrine. Broadcasters, afraid of FCC action determining that they are 
not serving their local communities by heeding the input of the community advisory boards 
 127 
will become inhibited in their presentation of views. They may often find themselves 
operating in fear of upsetting the government-backed advisory boards. Such a scenario 
would in effect act to squelch the freedom of speech of the broadcasters in a similar manner 
in which the Fairness Doctrine acted to inhibit speech. 
 By backing the community advisory boards, government would find itself in the 
dubious position of inhibiting broadcast speech not in line with the opinions of those on the 
boards. And who is to say that the opinions of those on the boards are aligned with the 
actual listeners and viewers of the stations in their communities? Recall that these boards 
might likely be made up of local activists and those determined to be community leaders. 
Those broadcasters choosing to appeal to their actual listeners and viewers may not 
necessarily side with the community advisory boards on issues of broadcast content. Not 
doing so, however, would potentially make them subject to fines or license revocation from 
the FCC. Such a predicament could not only chill the speech of the broadcasters but would 
also be a disservice to the listeners and viewers at the same time. Implementation of the 
localism regulations in this manner would no doubt defeat the intent of the regulations. 
 The chilling effect would not seem to be necessarily as great a concern when 
dealing with ownership rules, however. Perhaps the only conceivable way in which a 
chilling effect might display itself in the enforcement of ownership regulations would be if 
the regulations were implemented in such a way as to have the effect of discriminating 
against certain owners because of the content of their programming. A push for “diversity” 
in ownership, no matter the good intentions of the initial regulation, may still pose such a 
problem in the implementation phase. 
 Recall the examples, mentioned in the earlier chapter on the history of the Fairness 
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Doctrine, of how ownership rules and regulations could be implemented in such a way as 
to discriminate against certain owners based on their partisan leanings. As recounted by 
Powe (1987), the ownership issue was used both in the FDR and Eisenhower 
administrations to seemingly attempt to hinder ownership of broadcast licenses by those 
with whom the administrations disagreed. FDR attempted to implement strict 
cross-ownership regulation to prevent the newspaper owners, who he viewed to be against 
his New Deal policies, from owning radio licenses. Similarly, Republicans under the 
Eisenhower administration gained control of the FCC, which, despite guidelines and 
delineated factors meant to steer the licensing process, resulted in several questionable 
decisions on granting new television licenses (Powe, 1987). Powe (1987) argued that those 
decisions had the overall effect of favoring friends and those more supportive of the party‟s 
views and personalities.  
If the implementation of future ownership regulations were to resemble the patterns 
set by the Democrats under FDR and the Republicans under Eisenhower, the legitimacy of 
such decisions and the potential chilling effect that might result would become areas of 
great concern. Ownership regulations could be used for partisan political purposes and not 
to foster the positive-right goals of democratic debate and diversity of speech. 
 The aforementioned examples demonstrate that the ownership-regulation process 
carries with it the potential for political bias and manipulation in its implementation. As 
can be the case in many policy areas, the careful structuring of any policy may still be 
susceptible to distortion and corruption when the time comes for the regulatory agency to 
actually implement it. Though the wording of a particular broadcast ownership policy may 
appear in writing to be clear of partisan influence and corruption, how it is carried out may 
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not be so sterile.  
If the net effect of the implementation of any future ownership regulation in the 
name of diversity were to be to discourage views critical of any particular political party or 
official in power, the result would necessarily constitute a chilling effect on the very type 
of political speech protected by the First Amendment. Where official intimidation exists in 
the ability of broadcasters to present political views freely, the broadcasters will have an 
incentive to censor their own speech in fear of losing their ability to broadcast. The history 
of such regulation has shown that the power given to politicians through regulation to 
control who will be granted a license and who will not is unavoidably tainted with the 
potential for corruption. With this in mind, the implementation of any future 
ownership-related regulations should be paid particular attention to in order to avoid the 
unfortunate track record demonstrated in past regulatory decisions. 
 
Negative Consequences for Negative-Right Speech? 
 In the end, a return to the explicit Fairness Doctrine does not seem probable at this 
point. However, new localism rules and stricter ownership regulations do seem probable. 
As such, it has been necessary to consider in this chapter how the implementation of these 
public-interest regulations might affect individual, negative-right speech. 
 Localism rules and the accompanying oversight would place government in the 
position of once again monitoring broadcast content in order to determine if it sufficiently 
upheld a commitment to local issues as determined by a government-backed board. As 
such, it yields itself to similar problems experienced under the Fairness Doctrine in terms 
of an uncomfortable level of paternalism, an abridgement of First-Amendment rights and 
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pitfalls in practical implementation – often resulting in a chilling effect on speech. 
 Ownership regulations aimed at the goal of diversity are not as clearly prone to the 
same problems. However, how “diversity” is defined in seeking to serve underserved 
communities does pose some possible practical issues. There also remains the possibility 
of such rules having an indirect negative effect on individual speech based on how they are 
implemented, particular given the history of such regulation, but that possibility is at this 
point mostly speculative without concrete examples from actual implementation. Any 
further ownership rules should be proceeded with caution by the FCC and Congress to 
ensure that they do not represent an uncomfortable level of paternalism, a constitutional 
abridgment of free speech or an overall chilling effect on speech. 
 The Fairness Doctrine, as carried out, represented just such an unsettling level of 
government paternalism, a constitutional abridgement of free speech and a tedious 
involvement of the government in speech content that resulted in a chilling effect. With the 
continued interest of the FCC to develop new localism rules and the apparent recent swing 
toward pursuing tighter ownership regulations, all in the name of the public interest, 
democratic decision-making and diversity, it is incumbent on politicians, regulators and 
citizens alike to ensure that this process of fostering a positive right to free speech does not 
follow the unfortunate track record of the now defunct Doctrine – this time under a 
different banner. If the FCC is to continue down this road, the past experience with the 
Fairness Doctrine and its demonstrated effect on individual, negative-right speech should 
at least serve as a warning to the Commission to proceed with caution – if not move them to 
consider abandoning the positive-right approach to broadcast political speech altogether. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
Review 
This thesis started out by noting that there exists disagreement about the nature of 
the concepts of “rights,” “freedom” and “liberty,” making them akin to the type of 
essentially contested concepts that Gallie (1956) noted. One way in which this 
disagreement has been noted is in Berlin‟s (2002) dichotomy of negative and positive 
liberty. 
 The thesis then demonstrated that underlying the arguments for and against various 
broadcast regulations aimed at fairness, diversity and the public interest has been a more 
theoretical conflict between those with a positive-right conception of free speech and those 
with a negative-right conception. It did so by detailing the history of the rise, reign and fall 
of the Fairness Doctrine as well as discussion of more recent calls for other public-interest 
measures like localism and stricter ownership regulations pursued in the name of diversity. 
 Although the Fairness Doctrine does not seem to be likely to return in the near 
future, new localism and stricter ownership regulations do seem probable. This thesis has 
argued that, for the most part, the positive-right nature of these regulations, as well as the 
defunct Fairness Doctrine, is problematic philosophically, constitutionally and practically. 
The positive-right conception lends itself to an uncomfortable level of paternalism on the 
part of government regulators, a constitutional abridgement of negative-right speech and a 
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tedious involvement of government in regulation that can lead to a chilling effect on 
speech. 
 
Other Areas of Study 
 After making these points, there may also be noted several areas of further study 
and discussion that, though important, may go beyond the main thrust and focus of this 
thesis. As such, some of these topics will be briefly mentioned here as means of proposing 
them for further areas of research. 
 One topic touched on throughout this thesis has been the scarcity rationale that has 
been used to justify the FCC‟s regulation of the broadcast spectrum. At several points, it 
has been briefly noted that there has been much criticism of the scarcity rationale and the 
ensuing public-interest regulations stemming from it. The arguments in this chapter have 
mostly dealt with criticisms of political content regulation and not other FCC rules. Their 
exist other potential points of criticism of other content regulation like rules governing 
obscenity, violence and children‟s programming in light of the boom in other mediums like 
the internet and satellite programming that dilute the influence of broadcasting. Does the 
prevalence of these new mediums, as the well as the increased, more efficient use of the 
broadcast spectrum, negate the need for the FCC to regulate in these areas in the name of 
protecting a once supposed scarce resource? Further study into this subject in light of 
specific points made in this thesis might prove insightful. 
 Another area of further study might be to look at how airwave spectrum auctions 
finally giving ownership rights to a frequency for the purpose of broadcasting, like has 
been done in areas of wireless communication (FCC, 1999a), can alleviate the justification 
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used for the deep involvement of the government in regulating the airwaves. What has 
allowed the continued oversight of broadcast content and practices by the FCC has been 
the fact that the airwaves were believed owned by the public, with the broadcasters only 
given a temporary license to use them. Treating broadcasters in such a custodial role over 
the nation‟s supposed common property has partly justified in many minds the ability of 
politicians and regulators, the representatives of the public, to control and influence 
broadcasters in the name of upholding the greater public interest. It is this control and 
influence that has been many times criticized for involving government in a dubious 
position of regulating the presentation of political issues and viewpoints – something 
pointed to in several sections of this thesis as potentially corruptible.  
 Some, like Hazlett (1997), have noted that such an arrangement allows government 
to grant monopoly rights to certain privileged broadcasters to the detriment of a truly free 
marketplace of ideas. In an earlier article, Hazlett (1990) also argued that such an 
arrangement is exactly what the regulators had in mind when setting up the system of 
government oversight in the name of the public interest. It, he argues, was in their rational 
self interest to allocate spectrum usage in this manner. Essentially, it guaranteed their 
continued control over the medium to the benefit of their political interests (Hazlett, 1990). 
 The ownership rights given to a broadcaster under an auction system would 
potentially negate the FCC‟s ability to revoke licenses from a broadcaster on the basis of 
their adherence to certain public-interest obligations. The spectrum, as the property of the 
broadcaster, could no longer be used as a tool for politicians and regulators to promote the 
supposed public interest, which, as has been demonstrated through the previous chapters, is 
a process filled with potential abuse.  
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 Further study into how the specific system in place, allowing review by the FCC 
over periods of years to determine whether or not a licensee can continue to use its 
allocated piece of spectrum, may actually inhibit competition and disserve the interests of 
the listening and viewing public to the benefit of regulators and their favored broadcasters 
might prove very useful. To what degree does the system in place lead to a 
government-sponsored monopolization of the airwaves? Is it the government‟s regulation 
of licensing that actually fosters monopoly-like activity in broadcasting – essentially 
representing an example of regulatory capture? It may help demonstrate a further 
problematic area in the FCC‟s regulatory power beyond that of its implications for free 
speech as noted in this thesis. 
 One other area of further research would be focused on the subject of positive and 
negative rights. This thesis dealt specifically with the positive-right and negative-right 
conceptions of free speech. It focused on how attempts to uphold a positive-right 
conception affected the negative-right conception. Such a comparison could also 
conceivably be applied to other rights protected under the Bill of Rights and other charters 
such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In what way do these other rights have 
both positive and negative conceptions? Then, how does the positive conception affect the 
negative one? And, conversely, how does the negative conception affect the positive? 
Also, other than rights which can display both conceptions, what about rights which only 
seem to convey a positive conception, such as the aforementioned right to “periodic 
holidays” (United Nations) mentioned in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights? 
How do they affect other rights? 
 Looking at the affect of the positive conception on the negative conception in 
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respect to several rights may help clarify the confusion in terms noted by Berlin (2002). 
Noting the ways each conception may conflict with each other may help our understanding 
of what specific values are upheld by each conception, which may enable us to apply more 
clarity to the definition of what is meant by any given right. In areas in which such conflict 
exists, would it be better for clarity to define the “right” in question as something other than 
a right? Looking at several rights in this manner might help us better categorize what we 
mean by a “right” to this or that good or action so as to avoid the apparent conflict that 
arises when the positive and negative conceptions seem to limit each other – as was 
demonstrated to be the case with the positive and negative conceptions of the right to free 
speech. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 The subjects of rights, freedom and government regulation touched on this thesis 
are aspects of our political culture which can be looked at from many angles and varying 
detail. Though touching on these subjects, the concern of this thesis was focused on how 
the specific positive-right approach to free speech taken in much of broadcast regulation 
like the Fairness Doctrine has affected both the negative-right vision of free speech and the 
stated goals of the positive-right approach. The argument in this thesis has been that, in the 
limited area of concern focused on, enforcing the positive-right approach appears to have 
negative consequences for both the negative right to free speech and the intended results of 
the positive-right approach.  
 As noted in the previous chapter, the history of the Fairness Doctrine highlighted in 
this thesis should serve as a warning to regulators in their ongoing endeavors to enforce 
 136 
such a positive-right vision through other public-interest measures like localism and 
stricter ownership rules. The pursuit of newer ways for government to enforce the 
positive-right vision of free speech may again lead to undesirable and unintended 
consequences. 
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